Re: [PATCH v5] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm

[Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>]

Hi Jarkko,

On 9/1/26 10:31 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 01, 2026 at 09:11:32PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
>> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
>> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
>> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
>> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>>
>> Define struct trusted_key_tpm and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store
>> a pointer to it in the private member of struct trusted_key_options.
>>
>> No functional change intended.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> Changelog:
>>
>>   v5:
>>    - Rename struct trusted_tpm_options to struct trusted_key_tpm, as suggested
>>      by Jarkko.
>>
>>   v4:
>>    - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were
>>      merged
>>    - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts
>>
>>   v3:
>>    - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed
>>      in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature")
>>
>>   v2:
>>    - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7
>>    - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private
>>    - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean
>>      up patch)
>>    - Address other minor comments from Jarkko
>>
>>   include/keys/trusted-type.h               | 11 ---
>>   include/keys/trusted_tpm.h                | 14 ++++
>>   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++---------
>>   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------
>>   4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>>   
>>   struct trusted_key_options {
>>   	uint16_t keytype;
>> -	uint32_t keyhandle;
>> -	unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> -	uint32_t blobauth_len;
>> -	unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> -	uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>> -	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>> -	int pcrlock;
>> -	uint32_t hash;
>> -	uint32_t policydigest_len;
>> -	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> -	uint32_t policyhandle;
>>   	void *private;
>>   };
>>   
>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> index 3a0fa3bc8454..dafbd4a84ddd 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>> @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
>>   
>>   extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>>   
>> +struct trusted_key_tpm {
>> +	uint32_t keyhandle;
>> +	unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> +	uint32_t blobauth_len;
>> +	unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> +	uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>> +	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>> +	int pcrlock;
>> +	uint32_t hash;
>> +	uint32_t policydigest_len;
>> +	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>> +	uint32_t policyhandle;
>> +};
>> +
>>   int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *options);
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> index bf0bf7f36970..d396f4267180 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
>>   #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
>>   static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
>> +
>>   	if (!trusted_debug)
>>   		return;
>>   
>>   	pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
>> -	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
>> -	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
>> -	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
>> +	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
>> +	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
>> +	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
>>   	print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
>> -			     16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>> +			     16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>>   }
>>   
>>   static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
>> @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>>   static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>   		    struct trusted_key_options *o)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>>   	struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>   	/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
>>   	p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>>   
>> -	ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
>> +	ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
>>   		       p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
>> -		       o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
>> +		       private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
>> +		       private->pcrinfo_len);
>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>   		pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>   
>> @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>   static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *o)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>>   	struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>   
>>   	tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>   
>> -	ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
>> -			 o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>> +	ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
>> +			 p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>   		pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>   	else
>> @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>>   static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *opt)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private;
>>   	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
>>   	char *p = c;
>>   	int token;
>> @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   	if (tpm2 < 0)
>>   		return tpm2;
>>   
>> -	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>> +	private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>>   
>>   	if (!c)
>>   		return 0;
>> @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   
>>   		switch (token) {
>>   		case Opt_pcrinfo:
>> -			opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>> -			if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>> +			private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>> +			if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> -			res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>> -				      opt->pcrinfo_len);
>> +			res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>> +				      private->pcrinfo_len);
>>   			if (res < 0)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>   			break;
>> @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   			if (res < 0)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>   			opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
>> -			opt->keyhandle = handle;
>> +			private->keyhandle = handle;
>>   			break;
>>   		case Opt_keyauth:
>>   			if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> -			res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
>> +			res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
>>   				      SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>   			if (res < 0)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   			 * hex strings.  TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
>>   			 * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
>>   			 */
>> -			opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>> +			private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>>   
>> -			if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>> -				res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> +			if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>> +				res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>>   					      TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>   				if (res < 0)
>>   					return -EINVAL;
>>   
>> -				opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>> +				private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>>   				break;
>>   			}
>>   
>> -			if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
>> -				memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> -				       opt->blobauth_len);
>> +			if (tpm2 &&
>> +			    private->blobauth_len <=
>> +			    sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
>> +				memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> +				       private->blobauth_len);
>>   				break;
>>   			}
>>   
>> @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
>>   			if (res < 0)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> -			opt->pcrlock = lock;
>> +			private->pcrlock = lock;
>>   			break;
>>   		case Opt_hash:
>>   			if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>   			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
>>   				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
>> -					opt->hash = i;
>> +					private->hash = i;
>>   					break;
>>   				}
>>   			}
>> @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   			}
>>   			break;
>>   		case Opt_policydigest:
>> -			digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
>> +			digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
>>   			if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> -			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
>> +			res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
>>   				      digest_len);
>>   			if (res < 0)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> -			opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>> +			private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>>   			break;
>>   		case Opt_policyhandle:
>>   			if (!tpm2)
>> @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
>>   			if (res < 0)
>>   				return -EINVAL;
>> -			opt->policyhandle = handle;
>> +			private->policyhandle = handle;
>>   			break;
>>   		default:
>>   			return -EINVAL;
>> @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>   
>>   static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private;
>>   	struct trusted_key_options *options;
>>   	int tpm2;
>>   
>> @@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>>   		/* set any non-zero defaults */
>>   		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>>   
>> -		if (!tpm2)
>> -			options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> +		private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
>> +		if (!private) {
>> +			kfree_sensitive(options);
>> +			options = NULL;
>> +		} else {
>> +			if (!tpm2)
>> +				private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> +			options->private = private;
>> +		}
>>   	}
>>   	return options;
>>   }
>>   
>>   static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = NULL;
>>   	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
> It would be leaner if you did:
>
> 	struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
>
> Then you can just return instead of jumping to "out".
>
> Applies also to trusted_tpm_unseal at least.


Thanks for bringing this up.
Yup, I have made the required changes and posted v6.

Link to v6: 
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260902103120.222326-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com/


>
>>   	int ret = 0;
>>   	int tpm2;
>> @@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>   		goto out;
>>   	dump_options(options);
>>   
>> -	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> +	private = options->private;
>> +	if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>>   		ret = -EINVAL;
>>   		goto out;
>>   	}
>> @@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>   		goto out;
>>   	}
>>   
>> -	if (options->pcrlock) {
>> -		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>> +	if (private->pcrlock) {
>> +		ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>>   		if (ret < 0) {
>>   			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>   			goto out;
>>   		}
>>   	}
>>   out:
>> +	if (options)
>> +		kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>>   	kfree_sensitive(options);
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>>   
>>   static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = NULL;
>>   	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>>   	int ret = 0;
>>   	int tpm2;
>> @@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>   		goto out;
>>   	dump_options(options);
>>   
>> -	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>> +	private = options->private;
>> +	if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>>   		ret = -EINVAL;
>>   		goto out;
>>   	}
>> @@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>   		pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>   
>> -	if (options->pcrlock) {
>> -		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>> +	if (private->pcrlock) {
>> +		ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>>   		if (ret < 0) {
>>   			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>   			goto out;
>>   		}
>>   	}
>>   out:
>> +	if (options)
>> +		kfree_sensitive(options->private);
>>   	kfree_sensitive(options);
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> index 67225dd562a9..29da1a3328ef 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
>>   			   u8 *src, u32 len)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>   	const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
>>   	u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>>   	u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
>> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   	work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
>>   			       asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>>   
>> -	if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
>> +	if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
>>   		unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
>>   		/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
>>   		w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
>> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   		goto err;
>>   	}
>>   
>> -	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
>> +	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
>>   	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
>>   	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>>   
>> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
>>   			   u8 **buf)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>   	int ret;
>>   	struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
>>   	u8 *blob;
>> @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   		return -ENOMEM;
>>   
>>   	*buf = blob;
>> -	options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>> +	private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>>   
>>   	memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
>>   	blob += ctx.priv_len;
>> @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>   	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>>   	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>   	struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   	u32 flags;
>>   	int rc;
>>   
>> -	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
>> +	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
>>   	if (hash < 0)
>>   		return hash;
>>   
>> -	if (!options->keyhandle)
>> +	if (!private->keyhandle)
>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>   
>>   	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
>> @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   
>>   	tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>   
>> -	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>> +	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>>   	if (rc)
>>   		goto out;
>>   
>>   	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
>> -				    options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> +				    private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>   
>>   	/* sensitive */
>> -	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
>> +	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
>>   
>> -	if (options->blobauth_len)
>> -		tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>> +	if (private->blobauth_len)
>> +		tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>>   
>>   	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
>>   	tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
>> @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   
>>   	/* key properties */
>>   	flags = 0;
>> -	flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>> +	flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>>   	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
>>   	tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
>>   
>>   	/* policy */
>> -	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
>> -	if (options->policydigest_len)
>> -		tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
>> +	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
>> +	if (private->policydigest_len)
>> +		tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
>> +			       private->policydigest_len);
>>   
>>   	/* public parameters */
>>   	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
>> @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   			 u32 *blob_handle)
>>   {
>>   	u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>   	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>   	unsigned int private_len;
>>   	unsigned int public_len;
>> @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   	}
>>   
>>   	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
>> -	if (!options->keyhandle)
>> +	if (!private->keyhandle)
>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>   
>>   	/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
>> @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   	tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>   	tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
>>   
>> -	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>> +	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>>   	if (rc)
>>   		return rc;
>>   
>> -	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
>> +	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
>>   				    TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>   
>>   	tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
>> @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
>>   			   u32 blob_handle)
>>   {
>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>   	struct tpm_header *head;
>>   	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>   	u16 data_len;
>> @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   	if (rc)
>>   		return rc;
>>   
>> -	if (!options->policyhandle) {
>> +	if (!private->policyhandle) {
>>   		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>> -					    options->blobauth,
>> -					    options->blobauth_len);
>> +					    private->blobauth,
>> +					    private->blobauth_len);
>>   	} else {
>>   		/*
>>   		 * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
>> @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>   		 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
>>   		 * password.
>>   		 */
>> -		tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
>> +		tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
>>   				     NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
>> -				     options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>> +				     private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>>   		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>>   			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>>   						    NULL, 0);
>> -- 
>> 2.53.0
>>
> BR, Jarkko


Thanks,
Srish.