From: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] proc: Allow pid_revalidate() during LOOKUP_RCU
Date: Tue, 05 Jan 2021 16:56:56 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <877doqhoh3.fsf@stepbren-lnx.us.oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210105055935.GT3579531@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> writes:
> On Mon, Jan 04, 2021 at 03:21:22PM -0800, Stephen Brennan wrote:
>> The pid_revalidate() function drops from RCU into REF lookup mode. When
>> many threads are resolving paths within /proc in parallel, this can
>> result in heavy spinlock contention on d_lockref as each thread tries to
>> grab a reference to the /proc dentry (and drop it shortly thereafter).
>>
>> Investigation indicates that it is not necessary to drop RCU in
>> pid_revalidate(), as no RCU data is modified and the function never
>> sleeps. So, remove the LOOKUP_RCU check.
>
> Umm... I'm rather worried about the side effect you are removing here -
> you are suddenly exposing a bunch of methods in there to RCU mode.
> E.g. is proc_pid_permission() safe with MAY_NOT_BLOCK in the mask?
> generic_permission() call in there is fine, but has_pid_permission()
> doesn't even see the mask. Is that thing safe in RCU mode? AFAICS,
> this
> static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
> unsigned int mode)
> {
> u32 sid = current_sid();
> u32 csid = task_sid(child);
>
> if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
> return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
>
> return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
> }
> is reachable and IIRC avc_has_perm() should *NOT* be called in RCU mode.
> If nothing else, audit handling needs care...
>
> And LSM-related stuff is only a part of possible issues here. It does need
> a careful code audit - you are taking a bunch of methods into the conditions
> they'd never been tested in. ->permission(), ->get_link(), ->d_revalidate(),
> ->d_hash() and ->d_compare() instances for objects that subtree. The last
> two are not there in case of anything in /proc/<pid>, but the first 3 very
> much are.
You're right, this was a major oversight on my part. The main motivation
of this patch is to reduce contention on the /proc dentry, which occurs
directly after d_revalidate() returns -ECHILD the first time in
lookup_fast(). To drop into ref mode, we call unlazy_child(), while
nd->path still refers to /proc and dentry refers to /proc/PID. Grabbing
a reference to /proc is the heart of the contention issue.
But directly after a successful d_revalidate() in lookup_fast(), we
return and go to step_into(), which assigns the /proc/PID dentry to
nd->path. After this point, any unlazy operation will not try to grab
the /proc dentry, resulting in significantly less contention.
So it would already be a significant improvement if we kept this change
to pid_revalidate(), and simply added checks to bail out of each of the
other procfs methods if we're in LOOKUP_RCU. Would that be an acceptable
change for you?
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-01-06 0:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-01-04 23:21 [PATCH v4] proc: Allow pid_revalidate() during LOOKUP_RCU Stephen Brennan
2021-01-05 5:59 ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 16:50 ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 17:45 ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 19:59 ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 20:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-01-05 21:12 ` Al Viro
2021-01-05 23:25 ` Stephen Brennan
2021-01-06 0:00 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-06 0:38 ` Al Viro
2021-01-06 2:43 ` Paul Moore
2021-01-14 22:51 ` Stephen Brennan
2021-01-06 0:56 ` Stephen Brennan [this message]
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