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From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>,
	Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>, <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	<revest@chromium.org>, <jackmanb@chromium.org>, <ast@kernel.org>,
	<daniel@iogearbox.net>, <andrii@kernel.org>,
	<songliubraving@fb.com>, <yhs@fb.com>, <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>,
	<stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>, <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	<shuah@kernel.org>, <brauner@kernel.org>,
	<casey@schaufler-ca.com>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<selinux@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kernel-team@cloudflare.com>, <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
	<karl@bigbadwolfsecurity.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
Date: Tue, 02 Aug 2022 16:33:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87a68mcouk.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <18225d94bf0.28e3.85c95baa4474aabc7814e68940a78392@paul-moore.com> (Paul Moore's message of "Fri, 22 Jul 2022 08:20:10 -0400")

Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> writes:

> On July 22, 2022 2:12:03 AM Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2022 at 12:28:04PM -0500, Frederick Lawler wrote:
>>> While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace creation, we
>>> used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to prevent
>>> a call to create_user_ns().
>>>
>>> The calls look something like this:
>>>
>>> cred = prepare_creds()
>>> security_prepare_creds()
>>> call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
>>> if (cred)
>>> create_user_ns(cred)
>>>
>>> We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
>>> introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
>>>
>>> The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds()
>>> is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is
>>> meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2]
>>>
>>> Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce
>>> a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
>>>
>>> This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function
>>> and userns_create LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF.
>> Patch 1 and 4 still need review from the lsm/security side.
>
>
> This patchset is in my review queue and assuming everything checks
> out, I expect to merge it after the upcoming merge window closes.

It doesn't even address my issues with the last patchset.

So it has my NACK.

Eric

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-02 21:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-21 17:28 [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Frederick Lawler
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] security, lsm: " Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22  8:21   ` Christian Brauner
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22  8:18   ` Christian Brauner
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22  6:07   ` Martin KaFai Lau
2022-07-22 13:41     ` Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22  8:15   ` Christian Brauner
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] selinux: Implement " Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22  6:11 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Martin KaFai Lau
2022-07-22 12:20   ` Paul Moore
2022-08-01 13:13     ` Frederick Lawler
2022-08-01 15:19       ` Paul Moore
2022-08-02 21:24         ` KP Singh
2022-08-03  1:49           ` Paul Moore
2022-08-01 15:25       ` Casey Schaufler
2022-08-01 16:34         ` Paul Moore
2022-08-02 21:27           ` KP Singh
2022-08-02 21:33     ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-08-03 15:20       ` Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-07-25 22:53   ` Paul Moore
2022-07-26 12:02   ` Djalal Harouni
2022-07-26 14:41   ` Ignat Korchagin

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