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From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com>
Cc: sergeh@kernel.org,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	 Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	 paul@paul-moore.com,  jmorris@namei.org, kees@kernel.org,
	 morgan@kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/commoncap: don't assume "setid" if all ids are identical
Date: Fri, 09 May 2025 09:44:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87h61t7siv.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKPOu+89=+SFk1hKGLheMtPq+K47E9FRCo1DBQo9zGMwW=Tr2w@mail.gmail.com> (Max Kellermann's message of "Fri, 9 May 2025 08:15:33 +0200")

Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> writes:

> On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 12:12 AM <sergeh@kernel.org> wrote:
>> ABI stability is about the most important thing to Linus, so yes, if
>> documentation and code disagree, then we should fix the documentation,
>> except in the case where the current behavior just really is wrong
>> or insecure.
>
> It is insecure indeed (can be abused for LD_PRELOAD
> attacks):https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKPOu+8+1uVrDJHwmHJd2d46-N6AwjR4_bbtoSJS+sx6J=rkjg@mail.gmail.com/

I don't understand what you are trying to solve,
but the patch at the top of the thread introduces a
has_identical_uids_gids and is pure nonsense.

In particular __is_setuid or __is_setgid being true guarantees
that has_identical_uids_gids will be false.

Which means has_identical_uids_gids adds nothing, and the patch is
pointless.



If your concern is LD_PRELOAD and the like please don't play with
the uids/gids and instead just make certain bprm->secureexec gets
set.



At this point I am pretty certain that changing the logic and leaving
extra uids/gids set will result in security vulnerabilities for someone
who actually depends upon how the code works today.  I see no evidence
in this conversation that anyone has surveyed the users of NO_NEW_PRIVS
and verified how anyone actually uses it.  Without such evidence we
have to assume that userspace depends upon the current behavior.

Eric


  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-09 14:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-03-06  8:26 [PATCH] security/commoncap: don't assume "setid" if all ids are identical Max Kellermann
2025-03-07 10:32 ` kernel test robot
2025-03-09 15:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2025-04-28 11:43   ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-06 13:21     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2025-05-06 14:51       ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-07  3:16         ` Andrew G. Morgan
2025-05-07  6:33           ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-08  3:32             ` Andrew G. Morgan
2025-05-08  6:38               ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-08  8:37               ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-09 17:50             ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-08 22:12         ` sergeh
2025-05-09  6:15           ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-09 14:44             ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2025-05-09 16:53               ` Max Kellermann
2025-05-09 20:17                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2025-05-09 18:41               ` [PATCH] Documentation/no_new_privs.rst: document dropping effective ids Max Kellermann
2025-05-15 16:24 ` [PATCH] exec: Correct the permission check for unsafe exec Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-15 22:09   ` Kees Cook
2025-05-16 15:26     ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-16 18:06       ` Jann Horn
2025-05-16 18:08         ` Jann Horn
2025-05-16 21:46         ` sergeh
2025-05-20 22:38           ` Jann Horn
2025-05-20 22:43             ` Kees Cook
2025-05-16 23:29         ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-20 20:20           ` Kees Cook
2025-05-20 22:13             ` [PATCH v2] " Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-20 22:35               ` Kees Cook
2025-05-20 23:53               ` Jann Horn
2025-05-21 15:27                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-21 15:36                   ` Jann Horn
2025-06-11  0:18                     ` Paul Moore
2025-06-11 14:23                       ` Max Kellermann
2025-06-13 15:07                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-06-12 21:26                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2025-06-13  1:48                         ` Kees Cook
2025-06-13 15:28                           ` Paul Moore
2025-06-16 19:57                             ` Kees Cook
2025-06-16 20:16                               ` Paul Moore
2025-05-16 21:48     ` [PATCH] " sergeh
2025-05-16 21:49   ` sergeh

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