From: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] ima: invalidate unsupported PCR banks
Date: Wed, 26 Mar 2025 15:31:32 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87semzoocb.fsf@> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a4bf93f0c64f4b329e022663afecf6edf0e22884.camel@linux.ibm.com> (Mimi Zohar's message of "Wed, 26 Mar 2025 10:18:41 -0400")
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> On Wed, 2025-03-26 at 10:01 +0100, Nicolai Stange wrote:
>> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> writes:
>>
>> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
>> > > index 6f5696d999d0..a43080fb8edc 100644
>> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
>> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
>> > > @@ -625,26 +625,43 @@ int ima_calc_field_array_hash(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
>> > > u16 alg_id;
>> > > int rc, i;
>> > >
>> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_COMPAT_FALLBACK_TPM_EXTEND)
>> > > rc = ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(field_data, entry, ima_sha1_idx);
>> > > if (rc)
>> > > return rc;
>> > >
>> > > entry->digests[ima_sha1_idx].alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1;
>> > > +#endif
>> > >
>> > > for (i = 0; i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip) + ima_extra_slots; i++) {
>> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_COMPAT_FALLBACK_TPM_EXTEND)
>> > > if (i == ima_sha1_idx)
>> > > continue;
>> > > +#endif
>> > >
>> > > if (i < NR_BANKS(ima_tpm_chip)) {
>> > > alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
>> > > entry->digests[i].alg_id = alg_id;
>> > > }
>> > >
>> > > - /* for unmapped TPM algorithms digest is still a padded SHA1 */
>> > > + /*
>> > > + * For unmapped TPM algorithms, the digest is still a
>> > > + * padded SHA1 if backwards-compatibility fallback PCR
>> > > + * extension is enabled. Otherwise fill with
>> > > + * 0xfes. This is the value to invalidate unsupported
>> > > + * PCR banks with. Also, a non-all-zeroes value serves
>> > > + * as an indicator to kexec measurement restoration
>> > > + * that the entry is not a violation and all its
>> > > + * template digests need to get recomputed.
>> > > + */
>> > > if (!ima_algo_array[i].tfm) {
>> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_COMPAT_FALLBACK_TPM_EXTEND)
>> > > memcpy(entry->digests[i].digest,
>> > > entry->digests[ima_sha1_idx].digest,
>> > > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>
>> ^
>> That's been here before, just for the record for the below.
>
> And it is correct.
>
>>
>> > > +#else
>> > > + memset(entry->digests[i].digest, 0xfe, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> > > +#endif
>> >
>> > Using TPM_DIGEST_SIZE will result in a padded 0xfe value.
>>
>> Yes, but as the sysfs files for unsupported algos are gone, this will be
>> used only for extending the PCR banks. tpm[12]_pcr_extend()
>> (necessarily) truncate the digests to the correct size before sending
>> them to the TPM.
>>
>> But if you prefer I can absolutely replace TPM_DIGEST_SIZE by
>> hash_digest_size[ima_algo_array[i].algo].
>
> Unlike violations, which are the full digest size, a padded sha1 is extended
> into the unsupported algos TPM banks. I assume you'd want it to be the full
> digest size like violations.
You are so right, thanks for spotting! What I wanted is
TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, not TPM_DIGEST_SIZE (== 20).
Thanks,
Nicolai
--
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Frankenstraße 146, 90461 Nürnberg, Germany
GF: Ivo Totev, Andrew McDonald, Werner Knoblich
(HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-03-26 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-03-23 14:08 [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] ima: get rid of hard dependency on SHA-1 Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] ima: don't expose runtime_measurements for unsupported hashes Nicolai Stange
2025-03-25 14:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 7:44 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-26 13:28 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] ima: always create runtime_measurements sysfs file for ima_hash Nicolai Stange
2025-03-24 14:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 8:21 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-26 13:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 13:46 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-26 14:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] ima: invalidate unsupported PCR banks Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 21:18 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-25 1:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-25 15:44 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-26 8:45 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-24 15:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 9:01 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-26 14:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 14:31 ` Nicolai Stange [this message]
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] ima: make SHA1 non-mandatory Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] ima: select CRYPTO_SHA256 from Kconfig Nicolai Stange
2025-03-25 15:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] ima: move INVALID_PCR() to ima.h Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] tpm: enable bank selection for PCR extend Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 20:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-26 9:45 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-26 1:18 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 9:41 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] ima: track the set of PCRs ever extended Nicolai Stange
2025-03-25 17:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-03-26 9:56 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] ima: invalidate unsupported PCR banks only once Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] tpm: authenticate tpm2_pcr_read() Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 17:25 ` James Bottomley
2025-03-26 6:34 ` Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 20:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] ima: introduce ima_pcr_invalidated_banks() helper Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] ima: make ima_free_tfm()'s linkage extern Nicolai Stange
2025-03-23 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] ima: don't re-invalidate unsupported PCR banks after kexec Nicolai Stange
2025-03-26 1:58 ` [RFC PATCH v2 00/13] ima: get rid of hard dependency on SHA-1 Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87semzoocb.fsf@ \
--to=nstange@suse.de \
--cc=James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com \
--cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
--cc=eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).