From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
To: Francis Laniel <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add capabilities file to sysfs
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 12:20:15 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wniu2rs0.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220120180116.167702-1-flaniel@linux.microsoft.com> (Francis Laniel's message of "Thu, 20 Jan 2022 19:01:14 +0100")
Francis Laniel <flaniel@linux.microsoft.com> writes:
> Hi.
>
>
> First, I hope you are fine and the same for your relatives.
>
>
> Capabilities are used to check if a thread has the right to perform a given
> action [1].
> For example, a thread with CAP_BPF set can use the bpf() syscall.
>
> Capabilities are used in the container world.
> In terms of code, several projects related to container maintain code where the
> capabilities are written alike include/uapi/linux/capability.h [2][3][4][5].
> For these projects, their codebase should be updated when a new capability is
> added to the kernel.
> Some other projects rely on <sys/capability.h> [6].
> In this case, this header file should reflect the capabilities offered by the
> kernel.
>
> So, in this series, I added a new file to sysfs:
> /sys/kernel/security/capabilities.
Actually that is a file in securityfs. Which is related but slightly
different. For sysfs this would be immediately unacceptable as it
breaks the one value per file rule. I don't know what the rules
are for securityfs but I do know files that contain many many lines
and get very large tend to be problematic in both their kernel
implementation and in userspace parsing speed.
So I am looking for what the advantage of this file that justifies the
cost of maintaining it.
> The goal of this file is to be used by "container world" software to know kernel
> capabilities at run time instead of compile time.
I don't understand the problem you are trying to solve. If the software
needs to updated what benefit is there for all of the information to be
available at runtime?
>
> The "file" is read-only and its content is the capability number associated with
> the capability name:
> root@vm-amd64:~# cat /sys/kernel/security/capabilities
> 0 CAP_CHOWN
> 1 CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
> ...
> 40 CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
>
> The kernel already exposes the last capability number under:
> /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap
> So, I think there should not be any issue exposing all the capabilities it
> offers.
> If there is any, please share it as I do not want to introduce issue with this
> series.
The mapping between capabilities and numbers should never change it is
ABI. I seem to remember a version number in the file capability so that
if the mappings do change that number can be changed in a way that
existing software is not confused.
What is the advantage in printing all of the mappings?
>
> Also, if you see any way to improve this series please share it as it would
> increase this contribution quality.
>
> Change since v2:
> * Use a char * for cap_string instead of an array, each line of this char *
> contains the capability number and its name.
> * Move the file under /sys/kernel/security instead of /sys/kernel.
>
> Francis Laniel (2):
> capability: Add cap_string.
> security/inode.c: Add capabilities file.
>
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 1 +
> kernel/capability.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/inode.c | 16 ++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
>
>
> Best regards and thank you in advance for your reviews.
> ---
> [1] man capabilities
> [2] https://github.com/containerd/containerd/blob/1a078e6893d07fec10a4940a5664fab21d6f7d1e/pkg/cap/cap_linux.go#L135
> [3] https://github.com/moby/moby/commit/485cf38d48e7111b3d1f584d5e9eab46a902aabc#diff-2e04625b209932e74c617de96682ed72fbd1bb0d0cb9fb7c709cf47a86b6f9c1
> moby relies on containerd code.
> [4] https://github.com/syndtr/gocapability/blob/42c35b4376354fd554efc7ad35e0b7f94e3a0ffb/capability/enum.go#L47
> [5] https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/00f56786bb220b55b41748231880ba0e6380519a/libcontainer/capabilities/capabilities.go#L12
> runc relies on syndtr package.
> [6] https://github.com/containers/crun/blob/fafb556f09e6ffd4690c452ff51856b880c089f1/src/libcrun/linux.c#L35
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-20 18:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-20 18:01 [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add capabilities file to sysfs Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] capability: Add cap_string Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:01 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] security/inode.c: Add capabilities file Francis Laniel
2022-01-21 8:58 ` Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:09 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add capabilities file to sysfs Casey Schaufler
2022-01-20 18:14 ` Francis Laniel
2022-01-20 18:20 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2022-01-20 19:01 ` Francis Laniel
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