linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>, mjg59@google.com
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal
Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:45:14 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8a1773d7707639d275fff138736d57472e26ade5.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200618160133.937-2-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

On Thu, 2020-06-18 at 18:01 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Public keys do not need to be appraised by IMA as the restriction on the
> IMA/EVM keyrings ensures that a key is loaded only if it is signed with a
> key in the primary or secondary keyring.
> 
> However, when evm_load_x509() is loaded, appraisal is already enabled and
> a valid IMA signature must be added to the EVM key to pass verification.
> 
> Since the restriction is applied on both IMA and EVM keyrings, it is safe
> to disable appraisal also when the EVM key is loaded. This patch calls
> evm_load_x509() inside ima_load_x509() if CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is defined.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/iint.c         | 2 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++++
>  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index e12c4900510f..4765a266ba96 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
>  void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
>  {
>  	ima_load_x509();
> +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509
>  	evm_load_x509();
> +#endif
>  }
>  
>  static int __init integrity_fs_init(void)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> index 4902fe7bd570..9d29a1680da8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> @@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
>  
>  	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
>  	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
> +
> +	/* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */
> +	evm_load_x509();
> +
>  	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
>  }
>  #endif

As much as possible IMA and EVM should remain independent of each
other.   Modifying integrity_load_x509() doesn't help.  This looks like
a good reason for calling another EVM function from within IMA.

Mimi



  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-21 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-18 16:01 [PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 02/11] evm: Load EVM key in ima_load_x509() to avoid appraisal Roberto Sassu
2020-08-21 18:45   ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-08-31  9:44     ` Roberto Sassu
2020-08-31 19:26       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 03/11] evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if the HMAC key is loaded Roberto Sassu
2020-08-21 20:14   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-31  8:24     ` Roberto Sassu
2020-08-31 21:31       ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 04/11] evm: Check size of security.evm before using it Roberto Sassu
2020-08-24 12:14   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-18 16:01 ` [PATCH 05/11] evm: Allow xattr/attr operations for portable signatures if check fails Roberto Sassu
2020-08-24 12:16   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-08-21 18:30 ` [PATCH 01/11] evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when the HMAC key is loaded Mimi Zohar
2020-08-24 17:45   ` Mimi Zohar
2020-09-02 11:42     ` Roberto Sassu
2020-09-02 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=8a1773d7707639d275fff138736d57472e26ade5.camel@linux.ibm.com \
    --to=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mjg59@google.com \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).