From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9995EC25B0E for ; Tue, 16 Aug 2022 19:20:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S233790AbiHPTUO (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Aug 2022 15:20:14 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:39052 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237046AbiHPTUM (ORCPT ); Tue, 16 Aug 2022 15:20:12 -0400 Received: from smtp-42ac.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-42ac.mail.infomaniak.ch [84.16.66.172]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EE93C8037A for ; Tue, 16 Aug 2022 12:20:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp-2-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [10.5.36.107]) by smtp-3-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4M6gvq3GShzMpw6L; Tue, 16 Aug 2022 21:20:07 +0200 (CEST) Received: from ns3096276.ip-94-23-54.eu (unknown [23.97.221.149]) by smtp-2-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4M6gvp4p8DzlqwsR; Tue, 16 Aug 2022 21:20:06 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=digikod.net; s=20191114; t=1660677607; bh=/Sgf95Pc1zb2WgcW4ZIdBYTzhUolJbzlXZIdEuWH42U=; h=Date:To:Cc:References:From:Subject:In-Reply-To:From; b=NfCF93U1JM/ZyeEGfAgVKqEQRRwFPJE3QDhWAA4Sy29q2T1OWf/XGf/lXxBYGkNIw IxW9DH6kwoKI9v32nHKEZdmWMwkcUK7Gi3jON4LQbTtTMC/yTDK7SpQdCA9pETFGgo 5pyxQrsS6fZDfABgOzR4CnW9FgNQKudMdXnT9+84= Message-ID: <90883a01-4d32-c3d0-4334-563ba9a5a39d@digikod.net> Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2022 21:20:06 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Content-Language: en-US To: =?UTF-8?Q?G=c3=bcnther_Noack?= , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Morris , Paul Moore , "Serge E . Hallyn" References: <20220814192603.7387-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com> <20220814192603.7387-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com> From: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] landlock: Support file truncation In-Reply-To: <20220814192603.7387-2-gnoack3000@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: On 14/08/2022 21:26, Günther Noack wrote: > Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation. > > This flag hooks into the path_truncate LSM hook and covers file > truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as > well as creat(). > > This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates > corresponding selftests, and includes minor documentation changes to > document the flag. > > Signed-off-by: Günther Noack > --- > Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 10 ++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 17 ++++++++++++----- > security/landlock/fs.c | 9 ++++++++- > security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- > security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 ++++--- > 7 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > index b8ea59493964..6648e59fabe7 100644 > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > @@ -380,6 +380,16 @@ by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. > Previous limitations > ==================== > > +File truncation (ABI < 3) > +------------------------- > + > +File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is > +always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. > + > +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely > +control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access > +right. > + This should be in the forth patch, below the file renaming and linking section. > File renaming and linking (ABI 1) > --------------------------------- > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > index 23df4e0e8ace..a2fef267bf34 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > @@ -95,8 +95,15 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { > * A file can only receive these access rights: > * > * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. > - * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that > + * you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in > + * order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or > + * :manpage:`creat(2)`. > * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file through file truncation APIs > + * like :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, or s/through file truncation APIs like/with/ > + * :manpage:`open(2)` with `O_TRUNC` or :manpage:`creat(2)`. This access right :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC`. With only one "or". > + * is available since the third version of the Landlock ABI. > * > * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The > * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the > @@ -139,10 +146,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { > * > * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions > * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, > - * :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, > - * :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, > - * :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, > - * :manpage:`access(2)`. > + * :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`, > + * :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`, > + * :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. > * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. > */ > /* clang-format off */ > @@ -160,6 +166,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11) > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12) > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13) > +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14) > /* clang-format on */ > > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ > diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c > index ec5a6247cd3e..c57f581a9cd5 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/fs.c > +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c > @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode) > #define ACCESS_FILE ( \ > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ > - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) > /* clang-format on */ > > /* > @@ -1140,6 +1141,11 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir, > return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR); > } > > +static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path) > +{ > + return current_check_access_path(path, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE); > +} > + > /* File hooks */ > > static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file) > @@ -1192,6 +1198,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, hook_path_truncate), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), > }; > diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h > index b54184ab9439..82288f0e9e5e 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/limits.h > +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h > @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ > #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16 > #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX > > -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER > +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE > #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) > #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) > > diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c > index 735a0865ea11..f4d6fc7ed17f 100644 > --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c > +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c > @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { > .write = fop_dummy_write, > }; > > -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2 > +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3 > > /** > * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c > index da9290817866..72cdae277b02 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c > @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version) > const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { > .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, > }; > - ASSERT_EQ(2, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, > + ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, > LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); > > ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0, > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c > index 21a2ce8fa739..cb77eaa01c91 100644 > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c > @@ -399,9 +399,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval) > #define ACCESS_FILE ( \ > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ > - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) > > -#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER > +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE > > #define ACCESS_ALL ( \ > ACCESS_FILE | \ > @@ -415,7 +416,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval) > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ > - ACCESS_LAST) > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER) > > /* clang-format on */ >