From: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
puiterwi@redhat.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace
Date: Mon, 06 Dec 2021 09:11:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <915b3be92544f6572f214f360a592708f46ad7e6.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e4134d4f-5134-ade8-6428-3510ac940757@linux.ibm.com>
On Mon, 2021-12-06 at 09:03 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 12/5/21 23:27, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 14:11 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > On 12/3/21 13:50, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > > On Fri, 2021-12-03 at 13:06 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > [...]
> > > > > I suppose any late filesystem init callchain would have to be
> > > > > connected to the user_namespace somehow?
> > > >
> > > > I don't think so; I think just moving some securityfs entries
> > > > into
> > > > the user_namespace and managing the notifier chain from within
> > > > securityfs will do for now. [although I'd have to spec this
> > > > out in
> > > > code before I knew for sure].
> > > It doesn't have to be right in the user_namespace. The IMA
> > > namespace
> > > is connected to the user namespace and holds the dentries now...
> > >
> > > Please spec it out...
> > OK, this is what I have. fill_super turned out to be a locking
> > nightmare, so I triggered it from free context instead (which
> > doesn't
> > have the once per keyed superblock property, so I added a flag in
> > the
> > user namespace). I've got it to the point where the event is
> > triggered
> > on mount and unmount, so all the entries for the namespace are
> > added
> > when the filesystem is mounted and remove when it's
> > unmounted. This
> > style of addition no longer needs the simple_pin_fs, because the
> > add/remove callbacks substitute (plus, if we pinned, the free_super
> > wouldn't trigger on unmount). The default behaviour still does
> > pinning
> > and unpinning, but that can be keyed off the current
> > user_namespace.
> >
> > This is all on top of your current series ... some of the functions
> > should probably be renamed, but I kept them to show how the code
> > was
> > migrating in this sketch.
> >
> > James
> >
> > ---
> >
> > From 59c45daa8698c66c3bcebfb194123977d548a9a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> > 2001
> > From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
> > Date: Sat, 4 Dec 2021 16:38:37 +0000
> > Subject: [PATCH] rework securityfs
> >
> > ---
> >
> > -
> > -static void _securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry,
> > - struct vfsmount **mount, int
> > *mount_count)
> > +void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry)
> > {
> > struct inode *dir;
> > + struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
>
> I had problems with this in this place. So I had to use use
>
> struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
Yes, I think that works ... the owner in the parent namespace could
actually unmount it, so keying off the user namespace it was mounted on
is definitely the correct form.
> I'll try to split up your patch and post a v3 with then. Or is it too
> early?
It's never too early to see what the series is shaping up as. However,
I'm still not sure I got the right trigger for the SECURITYFS_NS_ADD
notifier, so that may still have to move ... or even that there isn't
some locking subtlety I missed in triggering SECURITY_NS_REMOVE from
kill_sb.
I also suspect Christian will want a pointer to the securityfs pieces
in struct user_namespace rather than discrete elements added directly.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-06 14:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-12-03 2:30 [RFC v2 00/19] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 01/19] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 02/19] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 03/19] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 04/19] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 05/19] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 06/19] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 07/19] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 08/19] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 09/19] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 10/19] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 11/19] securityfs: Prefix global variables with securityfs_ Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 12/19] securityfs: Pass static variables as parameters from top level functions Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 13/19] securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 14/19] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 15/19] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 16:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-03 17:39 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 16/19] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 17/19] userns: Introduce a refcount variable for calling early teardown function Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 18/19] ima/userns: Define early teardown function for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 2:31 ` [RFC v2 19/19] ima: Setup securityfs " Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 15:07 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 17:03 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 18:06 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 18:50 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-03 19:11 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-04 0:33 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 11:52 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 4:27 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:03 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-06 14:11 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2021-12-06 17:22 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-03 19:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-12-06 12:08 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 13:38 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:13 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 15:44 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 16:25 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:11 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:21 ` James Bottomley
2021-12-06 14:42 ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-06 14:51 ` James Bottomley
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