From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Sandeep Patil <sspatil@android.com>,
Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Michal Marek <michal.lkml@markovi.net>,
Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area
Date: Mon, 15 Apr 2019 19:44:09 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <947dbe9a-3444-6fe4-9f79-f8f210da8960@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190411180117.27704-2-keescook@chromium.org>
On 11.04.2019 21:01, Kees Cook wrote:
> Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
> files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
> going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
> options from the gcc-plugins.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Hello Kees, hello everyone!
After applying this series the kernel config looks like that:
...
...
CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
#
# Kernel hardening options
#
#
# Memory initialization
#
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE=y
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER is not set
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF is not set
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL is not set
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
#
# Crypto core or helper
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI=y
...
...
What do you think about some separator between memory initialization options and
CONFIG_CRYPTO?
Best regards,
Alexander
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-15 16:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-11 18:01 [PATCH v2 0/3] Refactor memory initialization hardening Kees Cook
2019-04-11 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area Kees Cook
2019-04-12 1:38 ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-04-23 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-24 4:05 ` Masahiro Yamada
2019-04-15 16:44 ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2019-04-16 4:02 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-16 13:55 ` Alexander Popov
2019-04-16 13:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-04-19 19:15 ` Alexander Popov
2019-04-11 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] security: Move stackleak config to Kconfig.hardening Kees Cook
2019-04-11 18:01 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] security: Implement Clang's stack initialization Kees Cook
2019-04-12 11:36 ` Alexander Potapenko
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=947dbe9a-3444-6fe4-9f79-f8f210da8960@linux.com \
--to=alex.popov@linux.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=kcc@google.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=labbott@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=michal.lkml@markovi.net \
--cc=ndesaulniers@google.com \
--cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=re.emese@gmail.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=sspatil@android.com \
--cc=yamada.masahiro@socionext.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox