From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, NICE_REPLY_A,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5E0D5C433DF for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 19:24:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 22540206D4 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 19:24:53 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="aq120tI8" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728448AbgHER0j (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Aug 2020 13:26:39 -0400 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:51984 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728734AbgHERZm (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Aug 2020 13:25:42 -0400 Received: from [192.168.0.104] (c-73-42-176-67.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [73.42.176.67]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 996E520B4908; Wed, 5 Aug 2020 10:25:41 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 996E520B4908 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1596648341; bh=+M6ltu7sGUQlnHNTsNp9mZLiIc2hQZ8PeYQpqVYXFYM=; h=Subject:To:Cc:References:From:Date:In-Reply-To:From; b=aq120tI83eo/0ZfotJa85eOXCSF6WK2VaEKe3K2eI2Z1BqmcHcv5/LO7pbV8P3+cS mDeBH4cFuU3GixNGpG6yad9UkomydJTxgRnnBfA7TMacP+M+eS8KMn5BgrBUhTrVqj Tf4oYsXQu+N4S/h0nRw7ASxCAi5FIzFChV3/3c+Q= Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/4] LSM: Measure security module data To: Mimi Zohar , Tyler Hicks , Casey Schaufler Cc: stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20200805004331.20652-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> <50587a3e-bcb5-c68e-c16c-41baf68b4d4a@linux.microsoft.com> <20200805154504.GB4365@sequoia> <69810007161e689ac817099fb1c6df21962963e4.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Message-ID: <9ad079ff-1bd4-1302-e6fb-25a7396ef12f@linux.microsoft.com> Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 10:25:41 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <69810007161e689ac817099fb1c6df21962963e4.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-15; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On 8/5/20 10:03 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Wed, 2020-08-05 at 10:45 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote: > >> In addition to SELINUX_STATE and SELINUX_POLICY, we should also consider >> the proposed LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY func values but require an "lsm" >> rule conditional. >> >> So the current proposed rules: >> >> measure func=LSM_STATE >> measure func=LSM_POLICY >> >> Would become: >> >> measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=selinux >> measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=selinux >> >> The following rules would be rejected: >> >> measure func=LSM_STATE >> measure func=LSM_POLICY >> measure func=LSM_STATE lsm=apparmor >> measure func=LSM_POLICY lsm=smack > > Kees is cleaning up the firmware code which differentiated between how > firmware was loaded. There will be a single firmware enumeration. > > Similarly, the new IMA hook to measure critical state may be placed in > multiple places. Is there really a need from a policy perspective for > differentiating the source of the critical state being measurind? The > data being measured should include some identifying information. Yes Mimi - SELinux is including the identifying information in the "event name" field. Please see a sample measurement of STATE and POLICY for SELinux below: 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303 10 f4a7...9408 ima-ng sha256:8d1d...1834 selinux-policy-hash-1595389353:863934271 > > I think moving away from the idea that measuring "critical" data should > be limited to LSMs, will clarify this. > Are you suggesting that instead of calling the hooks LSM_STATE and LSM_POLICY, we should keep it more generic so that it can be utilized by any subsystem to measure their "critical data"? I think that is a good idea. -lakshmi