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From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, kernel@collabora.com, gbiv@google.com,
	ryanbeltran@google.com, inglorion@google.com,
	ajordanr@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org,
	Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>,
	Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Mike Frysinger <vapier@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] proc: restrict /proc/pid/mem
Date: Fri, 24 May 2024 22:49:54 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9ce0c222-c80c-4049-8746-d74e612c3030@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240524192858.3206-2-adrian.ratiu@collabora.com>

Hi--

On 5/24/24 12:28 PM, Adrian Ratiu wrote:
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index 412e76f1575d..0cd73f848b5a 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -183,6 +183,74 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
>  	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
>  	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>  
> +menu "Procfs mem restriction options"
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_FOLL_FORCE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict all FOLL_FORCE flag usage"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict all FOLL_FORCE usage during /proc/*/mem RW.
> +	  Debuggerg like GDB require using FOLL_FORCE for basic

	  Debuggers

> +	  functionality.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_FOLL_FORCE_PTRACE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict FOLL_FORCE usage except for ptracers"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict FOLL_FORCE usage during /proc/*/mem RW, except
> +	  for ptracer processes. Debuggerg like GDB require using

	                         Debuggers

> +	  FOLL_FORCE for basic functionality.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_READ_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict all open() read access"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict all open() read access to /proc/*/mem files.
> +	  Use with caution: this can break init systems, debuggers,
> +	  container supervisors and other tasks using /proc/*/mem.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_READ_PTRACE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict open() for reads except for ptracers"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict open() read access except for ptracer processes.
> +	  Use with caution: this can break init systems, debuggers,
> +	  container supervisors and other non-ptrace capable tasks
> +	  using /proc/*/mem.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_WRITE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict all open() write access"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict all open() write access to /proc/*/mem files.
> +	  Debuggers like GDB and some container supervisors tasks
> +	  require opening as RW and may break.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_OPEN_WRITE_PTRACE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict open() for writes except for ptracers"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict open() write access except for ptracer processes,
> +	  usually debuggers.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_WRITE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict all write() calls"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict all /proc/*/mem direct write calls.
> +	  Open calls with RW modes are still allowed, this blocks
> +	  just the write() calls.
> +
> +config PROC_MEM_RESTRICT_WRITE_PTRACE_DEFAULT
> +	bool "Restrict write() calls except for ptracers"
> +	default n
> +	help
> +	  Restrict /proc/*/mem direct write calls except for ptracer processes.
> +	  Open calls with RW modes are still allowed, this blocks just
> +	  the write() calls.
> +
> +endmenu

-- 
#Randy
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
https://subspace.kernel.org/etiquette.html

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-25  5:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-24 19:28 [PATCH v4 1/2] proc: pass file instead of inode to proc_mem_open Adrian Ratiu
2024-05-24 19:28 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] proc: restrict /proc/pid/mem Adrian Ratiu
2024-05-25  5:49   ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2024-05-27 11:21     ` Adrian Ratiu
2024-05-31 21:29   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-24 21:05 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] proc: pass file instead of inode to proc_mem_open kernel test robot
2024-05-24 21:56 ` kernel test robot
2024-05-31 21:14 ` Kees Cook

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