messages from 2017-10-19 23:14:32 to 2017-10-26 20:12:57 UTC [more...]
[PATCH v5 00/18] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
2017-10-26 20:12 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v5 12/18] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
` [PATCH v5 13/18] PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_message_sig and verify_pkcs7_message_sig
` [PATCH v5 18/18] ima: Write modsig to the measurement list
[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
2017-10-26 19:20 UTC (3+ messages)
Fixing CVE-2017-15361
2017-10-26 19:07 UTC (19+ messages)
[PATCH v3] tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
2017-10-26 16:50 UTC (6+ messages)
[PATCH] tpm: remove chip_num parameter from in-kernel API
2017-10-26 16:23 UTC (26+ messages)
` [tpmdd-devel] "
[PATCH 18/27] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
2017-10-26 15:46 UTC (68+ messages)
` [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 01/27] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 04/27] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when "
` [PATCH 05/27] kexec: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 06/27] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
` [PATCH 07/27] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set
` [PATCH 08/27] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 09/27] uswsusp: "
` [PATCH 10/27] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 11/27] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 12/27] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 13/27] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface "
` [PATCH 14/27] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 15/27] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 16/27] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 17/27] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 25/27] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH 26/27] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode
[PATCH V3 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
2017-10-26 14:20 UTC (6+ messages)
` [PATCH V3 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
Proposal: rename tpm1_eventlog.c and tpm2_eventlog.c
2017-10-26 14:14 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH v2] tpm: use struct tpm_chip for tpm_chip_find_get()
2017-10-26 10:54 UTC (8+ messages)
[PATCH] Audit: remove unused audit_log_secctx function
2017-10-25 21:19 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH] tpm: Move Linux RNG connection to hwrng
2017-10-25 20:04 UTC (10+ messages)
[PATCH v3 0/2] ima: change how MODULE_SIG_FORCE is checked on modules checking policy
2017-10-25 17:18 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/2] module: export module signature enforcement status
` [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
[RFC PATCH 3/5] sctp: Add LSM hooks
2017-10-24 20:27 UTC (6+ messages)
[RFC PATCH 5/5] selinux: Add SCTP support
2017-10-24 15:50 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH v4 0/4] additional TPM performance improvements
2017-10-24 13:45 UTC (11+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/4] tpm: move wait_for_tpm_stat() to respective driver files
` [PATCH v4 2/4] tpm: ignore burstcount to improve tpm_tis send() performance
[PATCH v2 0/2] ima: change how MODULE_SIG_FORCE is checked on modules checking policy
2017-10-24 10:41 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH v2 1/2] module: export module signature enforcement status
` [PATCH v2 2/2] ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
[RFC][PATCH 1/2] ima: preserve the integrity of appraised files
2017-10-24 10:07 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH net-next v7 0/5] bpf: security: New file mode and LSM hooks for eBPF object permission control
2017-10-23 23:28 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCH net-next v7 3/5] security: bpf: Add LSM hooks for bpf object related syscall
` [PATCH net-next v7 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations
` [PATCH net-next v7 5/5] selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf object file receive
[PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
2017-10-23 23:20 UTC (2+ messages)
Can we delete audit_log_secctx()?
2017-10-23 23:14 UTC (3+ messages)
[RFC PATCH] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode
2017-10-23 15:59 UTC
[RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: Add CAP_SYS_MOUNT
2017-10-23 12:57 UTC (6+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 2/2] fs: add the possibility to use CAP_SYS_MOUNT to (u)mount a fs
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: Add CAP_SYS_MOUNT
[PATCH 0/2] ima: change how MODULE_SIG_FORCE is checked on modules checking policy
2017-10-23 12:57 UTC (5+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/2] module: export module signature enforcement status
` [PATCH 2/2] ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
[PATCH] tpm: remove a misleading error message from tpm_get_timeouts()
2017-10-23 11:31 UTC
[RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED
2017-10-21 19:09 UTC (6+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 2/2] fs: Grant CAP_TRUSTED rw access to trusted xattrs
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED
[PATCH 0/8] CaitSith LSM module
2017-10-21 17:17 UTC (5+ messages)
[PATCH] [v2] tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038
2017-10-21 2:22 UTC (2+ messages)
[GIT PULL] vfs i_version fix for Linus
2017-10-20 9:34 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH] ima: fix hash algorithm initialization
2017-10-20 8:01 UTC
[PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
2017-10-20 5:15 UTC (5+ messages)
[RFC PATCH 1/5] security: Add support for SCTP security hooks
2017-10-20 4:53 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH 1/2] security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
2017-10-19 23:32 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
- recent:[subjects (threaded)|topics (new)|topics (active)]
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).