messages from 2018-04-04 00:25:20 to 2018-04-13 19:29:20 UTC [more...]
[manpages PATCH] capabilities.7: describe namespaced file capabilities
2018-04-13 19:29 UTC (5+ messages)
[RFC PATCH v3 0/3] ima: namespacing IMA
2018-04-13 16:25 UTC (4+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support
[PATCH] lockdown: fix coordination of kernel module signature verification
2018-04-13 15:27 UTC
[PATCH v6 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks
2018-04-13 14:13 UTC (3+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time
[RFC PATCH v22 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data
2018-04-13 13:41 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct
` [PATCH 2/6] vmalloc: rename llist field in vmap_area
` [PATCH 3/6] Protectable Memory
` [PATCH 4/6] Documentation for Pmalloc
` [PATCH 5/6] Pmalloc selftest
` [PATCH 6/6] lkdtm: crash on overwriting protected pmalloc var
[RFC v3 0/2] WhiteEgret LSM module
2018-04-13 4:30 UTC (5+ messages)
[PATCH 0/3] kexec: limit kexec_load syscall
2018-04-12 22:41 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] ima: based on the "secure_boot" policy limit syscalls
` [PATCH 2/3] kexec: call LSM hook for kexec_load syscall
` [PATCH 3/3] ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
[PATCH 00/24] security: Add kernel lockdown
2018-04-12 16:52 UTC (52+ messages)
` [PATCH 01/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image
` [PATCH 02/24] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown
` [PATCH 03/24] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode
` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when "
` [PATCH 06/24] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if "
` [PATCH 07/24] hibernate: Disable when "
` [PATCH 08/24] uswsusp: "
` [PATCH 09/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access "
` [PATCH 10/24] x86: Lock down IO port "
` [PATCH 11/24] x86/msr: Restrict MSR "
` [PATCH 12/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method "
` [PATCH 13/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been "
` [PATCH 14/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is "
` [PATCH 15/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection "
` [PATCH 16/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when "
` [PATCH 17/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
` [PATCH 18/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
` [PATCH 19/24] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
` [PATCH 20/24] Lock down /proc/kcore
` [PATCH 21/24] Lock down kprobes
` [PATCH 22/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down
` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down perf
` [PATCH 24/24] debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
[PATCH] security: Remove unused field from security_hook_list
2018-04-12 15:29 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH v5 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time
2018-04-11 21:36 UTC (7+ messages)
[PATCH ghak47 V1] audit: normalize MAC_POLICY_LOAD record
2018-04-11 21:11 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH ghak46 V1] audit: normalize MAC_STATUS record
2018-04-11 21:08 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name
2018-04-11 16:01 UTC (4+ messages)
KASAN: null-ptr-deref Read in xattr_getsecurity
2018-04-10 23:20 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH] tpm: tpm_crb: relinquish locality on error path
2018-04-10 20:25 UTC (5+ messages)
[PATCH] tpm: moves the delay_msec increment after sleep in tpm_transmit()
2018-04-10 12:31 UTC (6+ messages)
[PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing
2018-04-10 4:48 UTC (10+ messages)
` [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp, landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy
` [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: "
[ANNOUNCE] Linux Security Summit North America 2018 - CFP
2018-04-09 23:14 UTC
[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
2018-04-09 13:55 UTC (7+ messages)
[GIT PULL] SELinux patches for v4.17
2018-04-09 5:31 UTC (12+ messages)
[PATCH 0/5 V2] tpm: timeouts revamp
2018-04-08 20:01 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH] security: remove security_settime
2018-04-08 9:34 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH v5 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks
2018-04-08 6:59 UTC
[GIT PULL][SECURITY] Integrity updates for v4.17
2018-04-07 23:47 UTC
[GIT PULL][SECURITY] TPM updates for v4.17
2018-04-07 23:37 UTC
[GIT PULL][SECURITY] Smack updates for v4.17
2018-04-07 23:34 UTC
[PATCH v4 0/1] Safe LSM (un)loading, and immutable hooks
2018-04-07 9:26 UTC (10+ messages)
[PATCH v4 0/4] Migrate all TPM 2.0 commands to use struct tpm_buf
2018-04-06 10:31 UTC (2+ messages)
[GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot
2018-04-06 4:42 UTC (82+ messages)
Updates on ima digest list feature
2018-04-05 17:44 UTC
An actual suggestion (Re: [GIT PULL] Kernel lockdown for secure boot)
2018-04-05 16:11 UTC (12+ messages)
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