messages from 2026-10-26 14:54:01 to 2026-10-28 22:18:20 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 0/8] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set and opt-in netns loopback
2026-10-28 22:17 UTC (8+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/8] net: introduce CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK to auto-enable loopback
` [PATCH 2/8] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces
` [PATCH 3/8] userns: allow restricting capability bounding set via clone3()
` [PATCH 5/8] selftests/net: add test suite for CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK
` [PATCH 6/8] selftests/capabilities: tests for user namespace capability bounding set
` [PATCH 7/8] selftests/capabilities: add clone3() tests for CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET
` [PATCH 8/8] selftests/nsfs: add tests for NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl
[PATCH v3 4/6] KEYS: Introduce keyring_is_empty()
2026-10-28 20:13 UTC (9+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 5/6] KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable
[PATCH RFC 0/4] IPE: add a dedicated policy keyring
2026-10-28 19:03 UTC (15+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC 1/4] ipe: add the .ipe "
[PATCH] fsverity: Tell LSMs about signature only after verity is enabled
2026-10-28 18:06 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] fsverity: Explicitly require FMODE_READ to retrieve hashes
2026-10-28 18:06 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH v3] smack: preserve low-integrity labels across file copy via whitelist
2026-10-28 16:37 UTC (2+ messages)
[RFC PATCH v2 0/6] security: introduce Kernel Assurance Plane
2026-10-28 16:36 UTC (14+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design
` [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] security: kap: add the LSM ID and internal headers
` [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] security: add the Kernel Assurance Plane LSM
` [RFC PATCH v2 4/6] security: kap: add the securityfs control plane
` [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] kernel: add KAP checks for unshare and setns
` [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the Kernel Assurance Plane
[PATCH v3 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer
2026-10-28 16:09 UTC (19+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/8] memcg: Add MEMCG_DMABUF accounting infrastructure
` [PATCH v3 2/8] dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg
` [PATCH v3 3/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_task LSM hook
` [PATCH v3 4/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_cgroup "
` [PATCH v3 5/8] selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf charging
` [PATCH v3 6/8] selinux: Restrict dma-buf direct cgroup charging
` [PATCH v3 7/8] dma-buf: transfer memcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE
` [PATCH v3 8/8] selftests/dmabuf-heaps: Add dma-buf memcg accounting tests
[PATCH 0/8] ns: fixes for the namespace LSM hooks
2026-10-28 15:59 UTC (8+ messages)
[PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot
2026-10-28 15:34 UTC (23+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter
` [PATCH 2/3] mseal sysmap: Allow with CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, default off
` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap
[PATCH v3 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights
2026-10-28 10:51 UTC (39+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change()
` [PATCH v3 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook
` [PATCH v3 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers
` [PATCH v3 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers
` [PATCH v3 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode_setattr hook
` [PATCH v3 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 09/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file
` [PATCH v3 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr
` [PATCH v3 -next 11/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 14/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx
` [PATCH v3 -next 15/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights
` [PATCH v3 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata "
` [PATCH v3 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer
` [PATCH v3 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights
[PATCH v4 0/3] pidfd: add task path ioctls
2026-10-28 8:46 UTC (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/3] fs: Introduce task path helpers
` [PATCH v4 2/3] pidfd: Use scoped cleanup for task access
` [PATCH v4 3/3] pidfd: Add task path ioctls
[PATCH 5.15.y] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
2026-10-28 8:07 UTC
[PATCH 5.15.y] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
2026-10-28 7:42 UTC
[PATCH v2] KEYS: key_garbage_collector(): process in chunks
2026-10-28 4:03 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH] KEYS: key_garbage_collector(): process in chunks
2026-10-28 1:35 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH security v1] apparmor: fix a use-after-free in aa_lookupn_ns()
2026-10-27 21:54 UTC (3+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: Fix namespace reference leak in __aa_find_or_create_ns()
2026-10-27 21:06 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: check accept index + 1 is in bounds
2026-10-27 20:27 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: Fix the return value in split_token_from_name() kernel-doc
2026-10-27 20:20 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: convert duplicated dfa transitions to match_char()
2026-10-27 17:14 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: fix table_size() integer overflow on 32 bit
2026-10-27 17:07 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH v8 0/6] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
2026-10-27 14:41 UTC (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v8 1/6] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v8 2/6] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v8 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0
` [PATCH v8 4/6] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v8 5/6] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v8 6/6] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces
[PATCH] KEYS: dispatch key_gc_work to system_wq
2026-10-26 23:42 UTC (8+ messages)
[PATCH v7 0/6] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
2026-10-26 21:36 UTC (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v7 1/6] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v7 2/6] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v7 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0
` [PATCH v7 4/6] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v7 5/6] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v7 6/6] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces
[PATCH] apparmor: check address length before reading AF_UNSPEC bind address
2026-10-26 19:48 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: mediate AF_UNSPEC socket disconnects
2026-10-26 19:47 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH] apparmor: fix NULL peer label deref for connected SOCK_DGRAM sockets
2026-10-26 19:13 UTC (2+ messages)
[PATCH v6 0/6] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
2026-10-26 16:05 UTC (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 1/6] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v6 2/6] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v6 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0
` [PATCH v6 4/6] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v6 5/6] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v6 6/6] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces
[PATCH RFC v2 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer
2026-10-26 14:53 UTC (4+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC v2 7/8] dma-buf: transfer memcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE
page: next (older) | prev (newer) | latest
- recent:[subjects (threaded)|topics (new)|topics (active)]
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox