Linux Security Modules development
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 messages from 2026-10-26 09:57:32 to 2026-10-28 15:04:39 UTC [more...]

[PATCH v3 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer
 2026-10-28 15:04 UTC  (16+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 1/8] memcg: Add MEMCG_DMABUF accounting infrastructure
` [PATCH v3 2/8] dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg
` [PATCH v3 3/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_task LSM hook
` [PATCH v3 4/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_cgroup "
` [PATCH v3 5/8] selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf charging
` [PATCH v3 6/8] selinux: Restrict dma-buf direct cgroup charging
` [PATCH v3 7/8] dma-buf: transfer memcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE
` [PATCH v3 8/8] selftests/dmabuf-heaps: Add dma-buf memcg accounting tests

[PATCH RFC 0/4] IPE: add a dedicated policy keyring
 2026-10-28 14:26 UTC  (13+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC 1/4] ipe: add the .ipe "

[RFC PATCH v2 0/6] security: introduce Kernel Assurance Plane
 2026-10-28 13:57 UTC  (12+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v2 1/6] docs: security: Describe the Kernel Assurance Plane design
` [RFC PATCH v2 2/6] security: kap: add the LSM ID and internal headers
` [RFC PATCH v2 3/6] security: add the Kernel Assurance Plane LSM
` [RFC PATCH v2 4/6] security: kap: add the securityfs control plane
` [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] kernel: add KAP checks for unshare and setns
` [RFC PATCH v2 6/6] MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the Kernel Assurance Plane

[PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot
 2026-10-28 12:18 UTC  (22+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter
` [PATCH 2/3] mseal sysmap: Allow with CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, default off
` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap

[PATCH v3 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights
 2026-10-28 10:51 UTC  (39+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change()
` [PATCH v3 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook
` [PATCH v3 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers
` [PATCH v3 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers
` [PATCH v3 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode_setattr hook
` [PATCH v3 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 09/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file
` [PATCH v3 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr
` [PATCH v3 -next 11/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks
` [PATCH v3 -next 14/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx
` [PATCH v3 -next 15/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights
` [PATCH v3 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata "
` [PATCH v3 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer
` [PATCH v3 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights

[PATCH 0/8] ns: fixes for the namespace LSM hooks
 2026-10-28 10:42 UTC  (23+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/8] lsm: always call the namespace_free hook
` [PATCH 2/8] bpf: don't mark namespace_init and namespace_free arguments as trusted
` [PATCH 3/8] selftests/bpf: add verifier tests for the namespace LSM hooks
` [PATCH 4/8] landlock: pass the namespace id to log to check_ns_type()
` [PATCH 5/8] ns: allocate the namespace id before the namespace_init hook
` [PATCH 6/8] nstree: drop ns_tree_add_raw()
` [PATCH 7/8] lsm: fix the security_namespace_init() kernel-doc
` [PATCH 8/8] selftests/bpf: add a lifecycle test for the namespace LSM hooks

[PATCH v4 0/3] pidfd: add task path ioctls
 2026-10-28  8:46 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v4 1/3] fs: Introduce task path helpers
` [PATCH v4 2/3] pidfd: Use scoped cleanup for task access
` [PATCH v4 3/3] pidfd: Add task path ioctls

[PATCH 5.15.y] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
 2026-10-28  8:07 UTC 

[PATCH 5.15.y] mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
 2026-10-28  7:42 UTC 

[PATCH v3 4/6] KEYS: Introduce keyring_is_empty()
 2026-10-28  7:28 UTC  (8+ messages)
` [PATCH v3 5/6] KEYS: Replace assoc_array with rhashtable

[PATCH v2] KEYS: key_garbage_collector(): process in chunks
 2026-10-28  4:03 UTC  (4+ messages)

[PATCH] KEYS: key_garbage_collector(): process in chunks
 2026-10-28  1:35 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH security v1] apparmor: fix a use-after-free in aa_lookupn_ns()
 2026-10-27 21:54 UTC  (3+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: Fix namespace reference leak in __aa_find_or_create_ns()
 2026-10-27 21:06 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: check accept index + 1 is in bounds
 2026-10-27 20:27 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: Fix the return value in split_token_from_name() kernel-doc
 2026-10-27 20:20 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: convert duplicated dfa transitions to match_char()
 2026-10-27 17:14 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: fix table_size() integer overflow on 32 bit
 2026-10-27 17:07 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v8 0/6] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
 2026-10-27 14:41 UTC  (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v8 1/6] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v8 2/6] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v8 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0
` [PATCH v8 4/6] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v8 5/6] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v8 6/6] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces

[PATCH] KEYS: dispatch key_gc_work to system_wq
 2026-10-26 23:42 UTC  (8+ messages)

[PATCH v7 0/6] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
 2026-10-26 21:36 UTC  (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v7 1/6] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v7 2/6] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v7 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0
` [PATCH v7 4/6] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v7 5/6] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v7 6/6] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces

[PATCH] apparmor: check address length before reading AF_UNSPEC bind address
 2026-10-26 19:48 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: mediate AF_UNSPEC socket disconnects
 2026-10-26 19:47 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] apparmor: fix NULL peer label deref for connected SOCK_DGRAM sockets
 2026-10-26 19:13 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v6 0/6] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
 2026-10-26 16:05 UTC  (13+ messages)
` [PATCH v6 1/6] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v6 2/6] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v6 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0
` [PATCH v6 4/6] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches
` [PATCH v6 5/6] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v6 6/6] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces

[PATCH RFC v2 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer
 2026-10-26 14:53 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [PATCH RFC v2 7/8] dma-buf: transfer memcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE

[PATCH] apparmor: handle diff-encoded states in leftmatch_fb()
 2026-10-26 13:45 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH] fsverity: Explicitly require FMODE_READ to retrieve hashes
 2026-10-26 13:36 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v3] security: commoncap: drop stale CAP_FS_MASK FIXME
 2026-10-26 13:12 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH 10/10] docs/zh_CN: add LSM/landlock Chinese translation
 2026-10-26 10:12 UTC  (2+ messages)


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