Linux Security Modules development
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 messages from 2026-11-17 19:30:28 to 2026-11-18 00:52:44 UTC [more...]

[BUG] bpf, lsm: new first argument in 7.4 inode hooks silently breaks BPF LSMs
 2026-11-18  0:52 UTC  (11+ messages)

[PATCH -next -v4 00/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights
 2026-11-18  0:16 UTC  (4+ messages)
` [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook

[PATCH RFC v3 18/44] selinux: use fc_init_pseudo() for selinuxfs
 2026-11-17 23:34 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH RFC v3 17/44] securityfs: use fc_init_pseudo()
 2026-11-17 23:34 UTC  (2+ messages)

[RFC PATCH v2 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots
 2026-11-17 23:13 UTC  (14+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v2 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces()
` [RFC PATCH v2 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces
` [RFC PATCH v2 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace
` [RFC PATCH v2 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call
` [RFC PATCH v2 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() "
` [RFC PATCH v2 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() "
` [RFC PATCH v2 07/13] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3()
` [RFC PATCH v2 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig()
` [RFC PATCH v2 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount()
` [RFC PATCH v2 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls
` [RFC PATCH v2 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI
` [RFC PATCH v2 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite
` [RFC PATCH v2 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE

[PATCH v5 4/8] lsm: Add memcg_charge_task LSM hook
 2026-11-17 22:54 UTC  (2+ messages)

[PATCH v5 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer
 2026-11-17 22:54 UTC  (2+ messages)

[RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots
 2026-11-17 20:53 UTC  (5+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() system call

[RFC PATCH v2 0/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK
 2026-11-17 20:32 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [RFC PATCH v2 2/3] security: Add PR_CAPBSET_DROP_MASK for process-wide bounding-set drops

[PATCH v11 0/3] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0
 2026-11-17 20:13 UTC  (7+ messages)
` [PATCH v11 1/3] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v11 2/3] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP
` [PATCH v11 3/3] selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces


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