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From: Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@redhat.com>
To: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	lennart@poettering.net, cyphar@cyphar.com, kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2023 22:04:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFdtZitYhOK4TzAJVbFPMfup_homxSSu3Q8zjJCCiHCf22eJvQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEf4Bza9GvJ0vw2-0M8GKSXmOQ8VQCmeqEiQpMuZBjwqpA03vw@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 7:40 PM Andrii Nakryiko
<andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2023 at 10:38 AM Maryam Tahhan <mtahhan@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
>
> Please avoid replying in HTML.
>

Sorry.

[...]

>
> Disclaimer: I don't know anything about Kubernetes, so don't expect me
> reply with correct terminology or detailed understanding of
> configuration of containers.
>
> But on a more generic and conceptual level, it seems like you are
> making some implementation assumptions and arguing based on that.
>

Firstly, thank you for taking the time to respond and explain. I can see
where you are coming from.

Yeah, admittedly I did make a few assumptions. I was thrown by the reference
to `unprivileged` processes in the cover letter. It seems like this is a way to
grant namespaced BPF permissions to a process (my gross
oversimplification - sorry).
Looking back throughout your responses there's nothing unprivileged here.

[...]


> Hopefully you can see where I'm going with this. And this is just one
> random tiny example. We can think up tons of other cases to prove BPF
> is not isolatable to any sort of "container".
>
> >
> > Anyway - I hope this clarifies my original intent - which is proxy at least starts to solve one part of the puzzle. Whatever approach(es) we take to solve the rest of these problems the more we can stick to tried and trusted mechanisms the better.
>
> I disagree. BPF proxy complicates logistics, operations, and developer
> experience, without resolving the issue of determining trust and the
> need to delegate or proxy BPF functionality.

I appreciate your viewpoint. I just don't think that this is a one
solution fits every
scenario situation. For example in the case of AF_XDP, I'd like to be
able to run
my containers without any additional privileges. I've been working on a device
plugin for Kubernetes whose job is to provision netdevs with an XDP redirect
program (then later there's a CNI that moves the netdev into the pod network
namespace).  Originally I was using bpf locally in the device plugin
(to load the
bpf program and get the XSK map fd) and SCM rights to pass the XSK_MAP over
UDS but honestly it was relatively cumbersome from an app development POV, very
easy to get wrong, and trying to keep up with the latest bpf api
changes started to
become an issue. If I wanted to add more interesting bpf programs I
had to do a full
recompile...

I've now moved to using bpfd, for the loading and unloading of the bpf
program on my behalf,
it also comes with a bunch of other advantages including being able to
update my trusted bpf
program transparently to both the device plugin my application (I
don't have to respin this either
when I write/want to add a new bpf prog), but mainly I have a trusted
proxy managing bpffs, bpf progs and maps for me. There's still more
work to do here...

I understand this is a much simplified scenario. and I'm sure I can
think of several more where
proxy is useful. All I'm trying to say is, I'm not sure there's just a
one size fits all soln for these issues.

Thanks
Maryam


  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-22 21:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-07 23:53 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 01/18] bpf: introduce BPF token object Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 02/18] libbpf: add bpf_token_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 03/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF_TOKEN_CREATE test Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 04/18] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 05/18] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 06/18] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 07/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 08/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 09/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled test for BPF_MAP_CREATE command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 10/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 11/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 12/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_BTF_LOAD selftest Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 13/18] bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 14/18] bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD command Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 15/18] bpf: take into account BPF token when fetching helper protos Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 16/18] bpf: consistenly use BPF token throughout BPF verifier logic Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 17/18] libbpf: add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-07 23:53 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 18/18] selftests/bpf: add BPF token-enabled BPF_PROG_LOAD tests Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-08 18:49 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 00/18] BPF token Stanislav Fomichev
2023-06-08 22:17   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 11:17 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-09 18:21   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 21:21     ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-09 22:03       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 10:49         ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-12 22:08           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-13 21:48             ` Hao Luo
2023-06-14 12:06             ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-15 22:55               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-09 18:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-09 19:08   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-19 17:40     ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-21 23:48       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22  8:22         ` Maryam Tahhan
2023-06-22 16:49           ` Andy Lutomirski
     [not found]             ` <5a75d1f0-4ed9-399c-4851-2df0755de9b5@redhat.com>
2023-06-22 18:40               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 21:04                 ` Maryam Tahhan [this message]
2023-06-22 23:35                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23  1:02                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 15:10                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 23:23                     ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-06-24 13:59                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-24 15:28                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-26 15:23                           ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-07-04 20:48                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-07-04 21:06                               ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-27 10:22                           ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-26 22:31                         ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-26 22:08                   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 19:05             ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23  3:28               ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-23 16:13                 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-06-26 22:08                 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-22 18:20           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 23:07             ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2023-06-26 22:08               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-07-04 21:05                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2023-06-09 22:29 ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-09 22:57   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 12:02     ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 14:31       ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 22:27       ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-14  0:23         ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-14  9:39           ` Christian Brauner
2023-06-15 22:48             ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-23 22:18               ` Daniel Borkmann
2023-06-26 22:08                 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-15 22:47           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2023-06-12 12:44 ` Dave Tucker
2023-06-12 15:52   ` Djalal Harouni
2023-06-12 23:04   ` Andrii Nakryiko

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