* Re: [PATCH] powerpc/perf: Fix handling of privilege level checks in perf interrupt context
[not found] <1614061909-1734-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
@ 2021-02-23 10:36 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Ondrej Mosnacek @ 2021-02-23 10:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: atrajeev
Cc: Michael Ellerman, linuxppc-dev, maddy, Jiri Olsa, kan.liang,
Peter Zijlstra, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Linux Security Module list, SElinux list
(CC'ing LSM and SELinux lists; the initial message can be found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/1614061909-1734-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com/T/)
On Tue, Feb 23, 2021 at 7:32 AM Athira Rajeev
<atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> Running "perf mem record" in powerpc platforms with selinux enabled
> resulted in soft lockup's. Below call-trace was seen in the logs:
>
> CPU: 58 PID: 3751 Comm: sssd_nss Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7+ #2
> NIP: c000000000dff3d4 LR: c000000000dff3d0 CTR: 0000000000000000
> REGS: c000007fffab7d60 TRAP: 0100 Not tainted (5.11.0-rc7+)
> <<>>
> NIP [c000000000dff3d4] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x94/0x120
> LR [c000000000dff3d0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0x120
> Call Trace:
> [c00000000fd471a0] [c00000000fd47260] 0xc00000000fd47260 (unreliable)
> [c00000000fd471e0] [c000000000b5fbbc] skb_queue_tail+0x3c/0x90
> [c00000000fd47220] [c000000000296edc] audit_log_end+0x6c/0x180
> [c00000000fd47260] [c0000000006a3f20] common_lsm_audit+0xb0/0xe0
> [c00000000fd472a0] [c00000000066c664] slow_avc_audit+0xa4/0x110
> [c00000000fd47320] [c00000000066cff4] avc_has_perm+0x1c4/0x260
> [c00000000fd47430] [c00000000066e064] selinux_perf_event_open+0x74/0xd0
> [c00000000fd47450] [c000000000669888] security_perf_event_open+0x68/0xc0
> [c00000000fd47490] [c00000000013d788] record_and_restart+0x6e8/0x7f0
> [c00000000fd476c0] [c00000000013dabc] perf_event_interrupt+0x22c/0x560
> [c00000000fd477d0] [c00000000002d0fc] performance_monitor_exception+0x4c/0x60
> [c00000000fd477f0] [c00000000000b378] performance_monitor_common_virt+0x1c8/0x1d0
> interrupt: f00 at _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x120
> NIP: c000000000dff378 LR: c000000000b5fbbc CTR: c0000000007d47f0
> REGS: c00000000fd47860 TRAP: 0f00 Not tainted (5.11.0-rc7+)
> <<>>
> NIP [c000000000dff378] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x120
> LR [c000000000b5fbbc] skb_queue_tail+0x3c/0x90
> interrupt: f00
> [c00000000fd47b00] [0000000000000038] 0x38 (unreliable)
> [c00000000fd47b40] [c00000000aae6200] 0xc00000000aae6200
> [c00000000fd47b80] [c000000000296edc] audit_log_end+0x6c/0x180
> [c00000000fd47bc0] [c00000000029f494] audit_log_exit+0x344/0xf80
> [c00000000fd47d10] [c0000000002a2b00] __audit_syscall_exit+0x2c0/0x320
> [c00000000fd47d60] [c000000000032878] do_syscall_trace_leave+0x148/0x200
> [c00000000fd47da0] [c00000000003d5b4] syscall_exit_prepare+0x324/0x390
> [c00000000fd47e10] [c00000000000d76c] system_call_common+0xfc/0x27c
>
> The above trace shows that while the CPU was handling a performance
> monitor exception, there was a call to "security_perf_event_open"
> function. In powerpc core-book3s, this function is called from
> 'perf_allow_kernel' check during recording of data address in the sample
> via perf_get_data_addr().
>
> Commit da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
> introduced security enhancements to perf. As part of this commit, the new
> security hook for perf_event_open was added in all places where perf
> paranoid check was previously used. In powerpc core-book3s code, originally
> had paranoid checks in 'perf_get_data_addr' and 'power_pmu_bhrb_read'. So
> 'perf_paranoid_kernel' checks were replaced with 'perf_allow_kernel' in
> these pmu helper functions as well.
>
> The intention of paranoid checks in core-book3s is to verify privilege
> access before capturing some of the sample data. Along with paranoid
> checks, 'perf_allow_kernel' also does a 'security_perf_event_open'. Since
> these functions are accessed while recording sample, we end up in calling
> selinux_perf_event_open in PMI context. Some of the security functions
> use spinlock like sidtab_sid2str_put(). If a perf interrupt hits under
> a spin lock and if we end up in calling selinux hook functions in PMI
> handler, this could cause a dead lock.
>
> Since the purpose of this security hook is to control access to
> perf_event_open, it is not right to call this in interrupt context.
> But in case of powerpc PMU, we need the privilege checks for specific
> samples from branch history ring buffer and sampling register values.
> Reference commits:
> Commit cd1231d7035f ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak via
> perf_get_data_addr()")
> Commit bb19af816025 ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak to
> userspace via BHRB buffer")
>
> As a fix, patch caches 'perf_allow_kernel' value in event_init in
> 'pmu_private' field of perf_event. The cached value is used in the
> PMI code path.
>
> Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
> Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
> index 4b4319d8..9e9f67f 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c
> @@ -189,6 +189,11 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static bool event_allow_kernel(struct perf_event *event)
> +{
> + return (bool)event->pmu_private;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * The user wants a data address recorded.
> * If we're not doing instruction sampling, give them the SDAR
> @@ -222,7 +227,7 @@ static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *
> if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid)
> *addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR);
>
> - if (is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)) && perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) != 0)
> + if (is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR)) && !event_allow_kernel(event))
> *addrp = 0;
> }
>
> @@ -507,7 +512,7 @@ static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct perf_event *event, struct cpu_hw_events *
> * addresses, hence include a check before filtering code
> */
> if (!(ppmu->flags & PPMU_ARCH_31) &&
> - is_kernel_addr(addr) && perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) != 0)
> + is_kernel_addr(addr) && !event_allow_kernel(event))
> continue;
>
> /* Branches are read most recent first (ie. mfbhrb 0 is
> @@ -2049,6 +2054,13 @@ static int power_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
> if (err)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /*
> + * We (ab)use pmu_private to cache the result of perf_allow_kernel(). We
> + * need access to that result at interrupt time, but can't call
> + * perf_allow_kernel() directly from interrupt context.
> + */
> + event->pmu_private = (void *)(long)(perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr) == 0);
I don't think you need this. Unless I'm missing something, you can
simply use "event->attr.exclude_kernel" in place of
"!event_allow_kernel(event)". If it is set, then there must have been
a successful perf_allow_kernel() check in perf_event_open(2) before
the event was created. power_pmu_event_init() would be called shortly
after via perf_event_alloc() -> perf_init_event(), so I don't think
this additional check would add much value.
> +
> event->hw.config = events[n];
> event->hw.event_base = cflags[n];
> event->hw.last_period = event->hw.sample_period;
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel
Red Hat, Inc.
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