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From: jannh@google.com (Jann Horn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM
Date: Sat, 3 Jun 2017 12:39:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAG48ez1W6Pwxuhc92OGvtmLQLE8XhXCJvZDoqDCMSODvtGUT_A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170603055351.16080-1-matt@nmatt.com>

On Sat, Jun 3, 2017 at 7:53 AM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote:
> This patch was modified from Brad Spengler's Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
> feature in Grsecurity and also incorporates logging ideas from
> cormander's tpe-lkm.
>
> Modifications from the Grsecurity implementation of TPE were made to
> turn it into a stackable LSM using the existing LSM hook bprm_set_creds.
> Also, denial messages were improved by including the full path of the
> disallowed program. (This idea was taken from cormander's tpe-lkm)
[...]
> Threat Models:
[...]
> 2. Attacker on system replaces binary used by a privileged user with a
>    malicious one
>
> *  This situation arises when administrator of a system leaves a binary
>    as world writable.
>
> *  TPE is very effective against this threat model

How do you end up with world-writable binaries in $PATH?
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-03 10:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-03  5:53 [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM Matt Brown
2017-06-03  6:33 ` Al Viro
2017-06-04  5:24   ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04  5:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Biggers
2017-06-04 12:43       ` Matt Brown
2017-06-04  6:51     ` Al Viro
2017-06-03 10:39 ` Jann Horn [this message]
2017-06-03 22:30   ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-06-05 15:30 ` Alan Cox

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