From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 13:43:49 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+zOCLerneUt2b-tvyLLg7fEbr9B0YYow-4DH6oV-nnCw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f4226a44-92fd-8ead-b458-7551ba82f96d@redhat.com>
On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
> No, arm64 doesn't fixup the aliases, mostly because arm64 uses larger
> page sizes which can't be broken down at runtime. CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING
> does use 4K pages which could be adjusted at runtime. So yes, you are
> right we would have physmap exposure on arm64 as well.
Errr, so that means even modules and kernel code are writable via the
arm64 physmap? That seems extraordinarily bad. :(
-Kees
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Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-13 21:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-24 17:56 [RFC PATCH v11 0/6] mm: security: ro protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 1/6] genalloc: track beginning of allocations Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 2/6] genalloc: selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 3/6] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2018-01-25 11:59 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-25 15:14 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-25 15:38 ` Jerome Glisse
2018-01-26 12:28 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 16:36 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-01-30 13:46 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 5:35 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-01-26 11:46 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-02 18:39 ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-03 15:38 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 19:57 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 20:12 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-03 20:32 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-03 22:29 ` Boris Lukashev
2018-02-04 15:05 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-12 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13 0:40 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13 1:25 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-13 3:39 ` Jann Horn
2018-02-13 16:09 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-13 21:43 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-02-14 19:06 ` arm64 physmap (was Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory) Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2018-02-14 20:13 ` Laura Abbott
2018-02-14 19:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-20 16:28 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:22 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 19:48 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 22:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-14 22:27 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <5a83024c.64369d0a.a1e94.cdd6SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2018-02-13 18:10 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] Protectable Memory Laura Abbott
2018-02-20 17:16 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-02-21 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-05 15:40 ` Christopher Lameter
2018-02-09 11:17 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-26 19:41 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 5/6] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 19:14 ` Ralph Campbell
2018-01-25 7:53 ` Igor Stoppa
2018-01-24 17:56 ` [PATCH 6/6] Pmalloc: self-test Igor Stoppa
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