From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: paul@paul-moore.com (Paul Moore) Date: Sat, 8 Apr 2017 09:14:53 -0400 Subject: [PATCH RFC 00/11] LSM: Stacking for major security modules In-Reply-To: References: <509e0281-9f8a-83c2-f9d6-5532903cda46@schaufler-ca.com> <1491503171.4532.10.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> <1491511104.4532.17.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> Message-ID: To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 6:50 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote: > On 4/6/2017 3:24 PM, James Morris wrote: >> On Thu, 6 Apr 2017, Stephen Smalley wrote: >> >>> Yes, but in the meantime, if you want to be able to test >>> CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKING=y with modules in enforcing mode on >>> distributions that enable a major security module, it seems like you >>> need to provide some way of handling this compatibly. >> Regardless of the config option, we can't break existing userspace. This >> is a long-standing Linux kernel development rule. >> >> You'll need to implement new interfaces for any changes. > > The big question is SO_PEERSEC. SO_PEERSEC provides > undefined "security credentials". You don't need to > define a new interface here because the interface allows > different configurations (e.g. Smack active, SELinux > active, both active) to provide different information. Just a gentle reminder that ignoring existing conventions because the formal (?) specification declares the interface as "undefined" is a really good way to break userspace :) In all seriousness, a new interface with a well defined specification that could support multiple labels/LSM might not be a bad idea if for no other reason that what we currently have is a bit broken, but works due to dumb luck (see the discussion in the GH issue below). https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/24 -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html