From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: "T.J. Mercier" <tjmercier@google.com>
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@android.com>,
"Martijn Coenen" <maco@android.com>,
"Joel Fernandes" <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Carlos Llamas" <cmllamas@google.com>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@parisplace.org>,
hannes@cmpxchg.org, daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch,
android-mm@google.com, jstultz@google.com, jeffv@google.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] security: binder: Add binder object flags to selinux_binder_transfer_file
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 16:36:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQtbTWXXy8mNxNDdukaAp6YB4CX5Xa6dvSZ_r4DhM2EXg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230123191728.2928839-5-tjmercier@google.com>
On Mon, Jan 23, 2023 at 2:18 PM T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com> wrote:
>
> Any process can cause a memory charge transfer to occur to any other
> process when transmitting a file descriptor through binder. This should
> only be possible for central allocator processes, so the binder object
> flags are added to the security_binder_transfer_file hook so that LSMs
> can enforce restrictions on charge transfers.
>
> Signed-off-by: T.J. Mercier <tjmercier@google.com>
> ---
> drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 ++++-
> include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++--
> security/security.c | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
> 7 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
...
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 3c5be76a9199..d4cfca3c9a3b 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@
> #include <linux/bpf.h>
> #include <linux/kernfs.h>
> #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
> +#include <uapi/linux/android/binder.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
> #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
> #include <linux/fanotify.h>
> @@ -2029,7 +2030,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
>
> static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
> const struct cred *to,
> - struct file *file)
> + struct file *file,
> + u32 binder_object_flags)
> {
> u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
> struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
> @@ -2038,6 +2040,15 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
> struct common_audit_data ad;
> int rc;
>
> + if (binder_object_flags & BINDER_FD_FLAG_XFER_CHARGE) {
> + rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
> + cred_sid(from), sid,
> + SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER_CHARGE,
> + NULL);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
> ad.u.path = file->f_path;
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index a3c380775d41..2eef180d10d7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
> { "tun_socket",
> { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "attach_queue", NULL } },
> { "binder", { "impersonate", "call", "set_context_mgr", "transfer",
> - NULL } },
> + "transfer_charge", NULL } },
> { "cap_userns",
> { COMMON_CAP_PERMS, NULL } },
> { "cap2_userns",
My first take on reading these changes above is that you've completely
ignored my previous comments about SELinux access controls around
resource management. You've leveraged the existing LSM/SELinux hook
as we discussed previously, that's good, but can you explain what
changes you've made to address my concerns about one-off resource
management controls?
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-23 21:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-23 19:17 [PATCH v2 0/4] Track exported dma-buffers with memcg T.J. Mercier
2023-01-23 19:17 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] memcg: Track exported dma-buffers T.J. Mercier
2023-01-24 14:59 ` Michal Hocko
2023-01-24 18:55 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-01-25 12:05 ` Michal Hocko
2023-01-25 20:04 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-01-24 19:46 ` Shakeel Butt
2023-01-25 11:52 ` Michal Hocko
2023-01-25 17:30 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2023-01-25 20:04 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-01-31 14:00 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2023-02-01 1:49 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-02-01 14:23 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2023-02-01 14:52 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2023-02-02 23:43 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-02-03 9:27 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2023-02-02 23:43 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-02-03 9:46 ` Tvrtko Ursulin
2023-01-23 19:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] dmabuf: Add cgroup charge transfer function T.J. Mercier
2023-01-23 19:17 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] binder: Add flags to relinquish ownership of fds T.J. Mercier
2023-01-25 4:20 ` kernel test robot
2023-01-25 17:30 ` Carlos Llamas
2023-01-25 22:07 ` T.J. Mercier
2023-01-23 19:17 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] security: binder: Add binder object flags to selinux_binder_transfer_file T.J. Mercier
2023-01-23 21:36 ` Paul Moore [this message]
[not found] ` <CABdmKX0Jc3OTnSMv_GoL0eEo=7W9dP29+r5K=PfF84xAUHviBw@mail.gmail.com>
2023-01-24 4:47 ` T.J. Mercier
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