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From: paul@paul-moore.com (Paul Moore)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root
Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2017 18:11:40 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhS4oDiNNjLQD5QwdWaZ2AK3n0v-qP2h9CvF7XLcppSXKA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <fcc7f8815666df526110b59d76707d52bd1ca9c9.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com>

On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
> Now that the logic is inverted, it is much easier to see that both real
> root and effective root conditions had to be met to avoid printing the
> BPRM_FCAPS record with audit syscalls.  This meant that any setuid root
> applications would print a full BPRM_FCAPS record when it wasn't
> necessary, cluttering the event output, since the SYSCALL and PATH
> records indicated the presence of the setuid bit and effective root user
> id.
>
> Require only one of effective root or real root to avoid printing the
> unnecessary record.
>
> Ref: commit 3fc689e96c0c ("Add audit_log_bprm_fcaps/AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS")
> See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
> ---
>  security/commoncap.c |    5 ++---
>  1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Trying to sort this out, I've decided that I dislike the capabilities
code as much as I dislike the audit code.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 7e8041d..759f3fa 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
>   *
>   * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
>   *   1) cap_effective has all caps
> - *   2) we are root
> + *   2) we became root *OR* are were already root
>   *   3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
>   * Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
>   *
> @@ -545,8 +545,7 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root)
>
>         if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred) &&
>             !(__cap_full(effective, cred) &&
> -             __is_eff(root, cred) &&
> -             __is_real(root, cred) &&
> +             (__is_eff(root, cred) || __is_real(root, cred)) &&
>               root_privileged()))
>                 ret = true;
>         return ret;
> --
> 1.7.1
>
> --
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-- 
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www.paul-moore.com
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  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-09-20 22:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-05  6:46 [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-06  6:05   ` James Morris
2017-09-07 19:42   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-07 19:57   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:15   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:18   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:22   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:23   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:26   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:27   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:34   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-20 22:11   ` Paul Moore [this message]
2017-09-20 22:25     ` Kees Cook
2017-09-20 22:27       ` Paul Moore
2017-09-05  6:46 ` [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-08 18:36   ` Kees Cook
2017-09-20 22:22   ` Paul Moore
2017-09-08 17:02 ` [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Paul Moore
2017-09-14  5:54   ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-09-14  6:46     ` Paul Moore
2017-09-14  6:49       ` Paul Moore

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