From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, arve@android.com, tkjos@android.com,
maco@android.com, christian@brauner.io,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
keescook@chromium.org, jannh@google.com,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, devel@driverdev.osuosl.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, joel@joelfernandes.org,
kernel-team@android.com, kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
Date: Mon, 11 Oct 2021 17:33:21 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSDnwapGk6Pvn5iuKv0zCtZSbfnGAkZwKcxVYLVRH6CLg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211007004629.1113572-3-tkjos@google.com>
On Wed, Oct 6, 2021 at 8:46 PM Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> wrote:
>
> Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup
> the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This
> ensures that the security context that opened binder
> is the one used to generate the secctx.
>
> Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's
> security context")
> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
> ---
> v3: added this patch to series
> v4: fix build-break for !CONFIG_SECURITY
>
> drivers/android/binder.c | 11 +----------
> include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c
> index ca599ebdea4a..989afd0804ca 100644
> --- a/drivers/android/binder.c
> +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
> @@ -2722,16 +2722,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
> u32 secid;
> size_t added_size;
>
> - /*
> - * Arguably this should be the task's subjective LSM secid but
> - * we can't reliably access the subjective creds of a task
> - * other than our own so we must use the objective creds, which
> - * are safe to access. The downside is that if a task is
> - * temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected
> - * here; however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that
> - * case well anyway.
> - */
> - security_task_getsecid_obj(proc->tsk, &secid);
> + security_cred_getsecid(proc->cred, &secid);
> ret = security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz);
> if (ret) {
> return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 6344d3362df7..f02cc0211b10 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1041,6 +1041,10 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
> {
> }
>
> +static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
> +{
> +}
Since security_cred_getsecid() doesn't return an error code we should
probably set the secid to 0 in this case, for example:
static inline void security_cred_getsecid(...)
{
*secid = 0;
}
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-10-11 21:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-10-07 0:46 [PATCH v4 0/3] binder: use cred instead of task for security context Todd Kjos
2021-10-07 0:46 ` [PATCH v4 1/3] binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks Todd Kjos
2021-10-07 0:46 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid Todd Kjos
2021-10-11 21:33 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2021-10-11 21:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-10-11 23:10 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-12 9:41 ` Dan Carpenter
2021-10-12 14:13 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-07 0:46 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] binder: use euid from cred instead of using task Todd Kjos
2021-10-08 21:12 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-08 21:24 ` Todd Kjos
2021-10-11 21:39 ` Paul Moore
2021-10-11 23:39 ` Todd Kjos
2021-10-12 12:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2021-10-12 16:52 ` Todd Kjos
2021-10-08 21:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2021-10-11 21:34 ` Paul Moore
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