From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net>
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] bpf,lsm: Allow editing capabilities in BPF-LSM hooks
Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2024 20:18:48 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT5XWbhoY2Nw5jQz4GxpDriUdHw=1YsQ4xLVUtSnFxciA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240609104355.442002-5-jcalmels@3xx0.net>
On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 6:40 AM Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net> wrote:
>
> This patch allows modifying the various capabilities of the struct cred
> in BPF-LSM hooks. More specifically, the userns_create hook called
> prior to creating a new user namespace.
>
> With the introduction of userns capabilities, this effectively provides
> a simple way for LSMs to control the capabilities granted to a user
> namespace and all its descendants.
>
> Update the selftests accordingly by dropping CAP_SYS_ADMIN in
> namespaces and checking the resulting task's bounding set.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Calmels <jcalmels@3xx0.net>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/security.h | 4 +-
> kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 6 +-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
> .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c | 12 ++--
> .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c | 7 ++-
> 8 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
I'm not sure we want to go down the path of a LSM modifying the POSIX
capabilities of a task, other than the capabilities/commoncap LSM. It
sets a bad precedent and could further complicate issues around LSM
ordering.
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-10 0:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-09 10:43 [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce user namespace capabilities Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] capabilities: Add " Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 1:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-10 8:47 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 12:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-10 13:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-11 8:20 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-15 15:19 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] capabilities: Add securebit to restrict userns caps Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 2:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-10 9:46 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 13:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-28 14:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-28 14:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] capabilities: Add sysctl to mask off " Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-09 10:43 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] bpf,lsm: Allow editing capabilities in BPF-LSM hooks Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-10 0:18 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-06-11 8:09 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-11 10:31 ` John Johansen
2024-06-11 19:01 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-11 22:20 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-11 22:38 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-12 8:20 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-12 17:29 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-13 3:54 ` John Johansen
2024-06-13 8:50 ` Jonathan Calmels
2024-06-13 20:55 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-15 15:20 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2024-06-13 10:45 ` Dr. Greg
2024-06-13 20:43 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-10 20:12 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce user namespace capabilities Josef Bacik
2024-06-11 8:33 ` Jonathan Calmels
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