linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.2 (#2)
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 16:59:05 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhT8tYyUt_gtUR-jD-33LMW2RmzSXwP_OgPrh5ujQSiuUA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)

Hi Linus,

Three patches for v5.2; one fixes a problem where we weren't correctly
logging raw SELinux labels, the other two fix problems where we
weren't properly checking calls to kmemdup().  Please merge for the
next v5.2-rc release.

Thanks,
-Paul
--
The following changes since commit 05174c95b83f8aca0c47b87115abb7a6387aafa5:

 selinux: do not report error on connect(AF_UNSPEC) (2019-05-20 21:46:02 -0400)

are available in the Git repository at:

 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
   tags/selinux-pr-20190612

for you to fetch changes up to fec6375320c6399c708fa9801f8cfbf950fee623:

 selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
   (2019-06-12 12:27:26 -0400)

----------------------------------------------------------------
selinux/stable-5.2 PR 20190612

----------------------------------------------------------------
Gen Zhang (2):
     selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
     selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()

Ondrej Mosnacek (1):
     selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings

security/selinux/avc.c   | 10 ++++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

             reply	other threads:[~2019-06-12 20:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-12 20:59 Paul Moore [this message]
2019-06-13  3:15 ` [GIT PULL] SELinux fixes for v5.2 (#2) pr-tracker-bot

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=CAHC9VhT8tYyUt_gtUR-jD-33LMW2RmzSXwP_OgPrh5ujQSiuUA@mail.gmail.com \
    --to=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).