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From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com,  keescook@chromium.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com,  penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] LSM: Exclusive secmark usage
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 17:57:51 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTJBSejFr78csXudG4xKW5hXVy3undDP-m8YdjhJLYrYA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251001215643.31465-2-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

On Wed, Oct 1, 2025 at 5:56 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> The network secmark can only be used by one security module
> at a time. Establish mechanism to identify to security modules
> whether they have access to the secmark. SELinux already
> incorparates mechanism, but it has to be added to Smack and
> AppArmor.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h        |  1 +
>  security/apparmor/include/net.h  |  5 +++++
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c          |  7 ++++---
>  security/security.c              |  6 ++++++
>  security/selinux/hooks.c         |  4 +++-
>  security/smack/smack.h           |  5 +++++
>  security/smack/smack_lsm.c       |  3 ++-
>  security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 10 ++++++++--
>  8 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

...

>  /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index c95a5874bf7d..5b6db7d8effb 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
>   */
>  static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
>  {
> -       return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
> +       return selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_secmark &&
> +              (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
>                 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
>  }

This is an odd way to approach secmark enablement in SELinux, and not
something I think I want to see.  Ignoring the
selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork "abomination" (a joke I think only
about four people in the world might understand), the
selinux_secmark_enabled() function is really there simply as a
performance optimization since the majority of SELinux users don't
utilize the per-packet access controls.  Using it as a mechanism to
effectively turn off SELinux's secmark functionality could result in a
confusing situation for users who are setting SELinux secmarks on
packets and not seeing the system's policy properly enforced.

-- 
paul-moore.com

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-13 21:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20251001215643.31465-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2025-10-01 21:56 ` [PATCH 0/2] LSM: Identify module using network facilities Casey Schaufler
2025-10-01 21:56   ` [PATCH 1/2] LSM: Exclusive secmark usage Casey Schaufler
2025-10-09 18:49     ` Stephen Smalley
2025-10-10 15:02       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-13 22:11         ` Paul Moore
2025-11-04 16:58           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-13 21:57     ` Paul Moore [this message]
2025-11-04 16:41       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-01 21:56   ` [PATCH 2/2] LSM: Allow reservation of netlabel Casey Schaufler
2025-10-09 18:53     ` Stephen Smalley
2025-10-10 15:08       ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-10 19:53         ` Stephen Smalley
2025-10-10 21:10           ` Casey Schaufler
2025-10-13 22:21             ` Paul Moore
2025-11-04 17:07               ` Casey Schaufler
2025-11-04 17:01       ` Casey Schaufler

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