From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] LSM: add security_execve_abort() hook
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:47:42 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTac1ZuAzD5w=NtSYryu8vYxHnCx0NsMP-C4nmqiffA-Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <76bcd199-6c14-484f-8d4d-5a9c4a07ff7b@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
On Thu, Feb 15, 2024 at 9:33 AM Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> On 2024/02/15 6:46, Paul Moore wrote:
> >> To quickly summarize, there are two paths forward that I believe are
> >> acceptable from a LSM perspective, pick either one and send me an
> >> updated patchset.
> >>
> >> 1. Rename the hook to security_bprm_free() and update the LSM hook
> >> description as I mentioned earlier in this thread.
> >>
> >> 2. Rename the hook to security_execve_revert(), move it into the
> >> execve related functions, and update the LSM hook description to
> >> reflect that this hook is for reverting execve related changes to the
> >> current task's internal LSM state beyond what is possible via the
> >> credential hooks.
> >
> > Hi Tetsuo, I just wanted to check on this and see if you've been able
> > to make any progress?
> >
>
> I'm fine with either approach. Just worrying that someone doesn't like
> overhead of unconditionally calling security_bprm_free() hook.
> If everyone is fine with below one, I'll post v4 patchset.
My guess is that based on the previous comments people are going to
prefer option #2 above, but we'll see what everyone says. I did have
one comment, below ...
> fs/exec.c | 1 +
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
> security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3aaad75c9ce8..ba2f480b2bdb 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1223,6 +1223,18 @@ void security_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * security_bprm_free() - Notify of completion of an exec()
The short summary above doesn't match the summary below. If we stick
with the security_bprm_free() approach please change "Notify of
completion of an exec()" to "Notify LSMs of a bprm free event" or
similar.
> + * This hook is called when a linux_bprm instance is being destroyed, after
> + * the bprm creds have been released, and is intended to cleanup any internal
> + * LSM state associated with the linux_bprm instance.
> + */
> +void security_bprm_free(void)
> +{
> + call_void_hook(bprm_free);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * security_fs_context_submount() - Initialise fc->security
> * @fc: new filesystem context
>
--
paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-15 23:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-06 13:58 [PATCH v3 0/3] fs/exec: remove current->in_execve flag Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-06 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] LSM: add security_execve_abort() hook Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-07 0:00 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-07 11:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-07 14:34 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-07 16:01 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-14 21:46 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-15 14:33 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-15 23:47 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2024-05-01 20:04 ` Kees Cook
2024-06-10 20:44 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-11 13:10 ` Tetsuo Handa
2024-06-11 17:19 ` Paul Moore
2024-02-06 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] tomoyo: replace current->in_execve flag with " Tetsuo Handa
2024-02-06 13:59 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] fs/exec: remove current->in_execve flag Tetsuo Handa
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