From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.7 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48B62C43387 for ; Tue, 8 Jan 2019 00:11:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F326720675 for ; Tue, 8 Jan 2019 00:11:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=chromium.org header.i=@chromium.org header.b="G3GkoK9W" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726853AbfAHALN (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:11:13 -0500 Received: from mail-yb1-f195.google.com ([209.85.219.195]:40439 "EHLO mail-yb1-f195.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726667AbfAHALN (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:11:13 -0500 Received: by mail-yb1-f195.google.com with SMTP id x201so899146ybg.7 for ; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 16:11:11 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=i2jrAniAs3eoh59XfCipKbR86Nf0ElapY6M5DmhIpSM=; b=G3GkoK9WNj5KANlEYcX1RLtkolgvIXeMKO60y05oG51ngcw0mX5nL2hyVfHKZG2DVC ND1lDp5l8T1xYzfGX08yYwJ89NdDn3OEwO0qIe5bpvDX4MW5IGxIic4p2IWfKI0d96R/ c/17I1iIrntHsz2AIN9giFchFwHRCJ87zZ0OI= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=i2jrAniAs3eoh59XfCipKbR86Nf0ElapY6M5DmhIpSM=; b=msPNRB1t4TMRsUG52GWwphYwiZ2qC9tmp5PjFQxoHZF7ujQDeMxUCYdoSdHg6veeeC 2crf5m+n7IisewptLsJllByEZUYSgZJbSnkmd5qJvsklUj2yJOZpXEB6YCZEAkiYLOtW M9TlgUE96TRwknoSaiIhBLptIP9dZcY/Z06wWhseOA265mz9DDQLNb+zOx3PwilEUOhQ WMhZCRPqqWNIlrzEEfY2ezP3M5M/KdpA1KOUidDJ848QfK4rCG0Mix4O6dUQOqmPpsUd Io7EO4+caOorPcUYmiSXwovoey8/XE+Igh3sgv9om1heV8u60psWI5LuVhG6FCiqkNv0 dVbw== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukdZINTGF/BQ18E0X1ODM0D4czqsVwmcP+He2oHfRLxmMydgxjeK bRLHusIDAliyYy64T+tiGGYlwn9IA39t08VzgE17eg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN5khTbAvxsJEKxJaSUobABPsG6c3OoTAnYJ8yh3ErZZYA+kO9Jfk9Z9IdLn8PLbeg2bp8bM0NgJZJ4e4CVWvJA= X-Received: by 2002:a25:16c6:: with SMTP id 189mr34025182ybw.17.1546906270823; Mon, 07 Jan 2019 16:11:10 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <52258331-8aba-c67e-bea0-b5fe0dfcd020@schaufler-ca.com> <20181218223718.96738-1-mortonm@chromium.org> In-Reply-To: From: Micah Morton Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 16:10:59 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capable To: Kees Cook Cc: James Morris , Stephen Smalley , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 3:13 PM Kees Cook wrote: > > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 2:37 PM wrote: > > > > From: Micah Morton > > > > This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the > > security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is > > used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for > > the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag > > passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether > > security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by > > the proposed SafeSetID LSM). > > > > Signed-off-by: Micah Morton > > --- > > Changes since the last patch: Changed the code to use a bitmask instead > > of a struct to represent the options passed to security_capable. > > FWIW, I too prefer this v2 patch. I don't see a reason to keep an > "option-ified" function around if it's been generalized into a > bitfield argument. > > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 8 +++++--- > > include/linux/security.h | 28 +++++++++++++------------- > > kernel/capability.c | 22 +++++++++++--------- > > kernel/seccomp.c | 4 ++-- > > security/apparmor/capability.c | 14 ++++++------- > > security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 2 +- > > security/apparmor/ipc.c | 3 ++- > > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 ++-- > > security/commoncap.c | 17 ++++++++-------- > > security/security.c | 14 +++++-------- > > security/selinux/hooks.c | 16 +++++++-------- > > security/smack/smack_access.c | 2 +- > > 12 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > > index aaeb7fa24dc4..ef955a44a782 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > > @@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ > > * @cred contains the credentials to use. > > * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in > > * @cap contains the capability . > > - * @audit contains whether to write an audit message or not > > + * @opts contains options for the capable check > > * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. > > * @syslog: > > * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing > > @@ -1446,8 +1446,10 @@ union security_list_options { > > const kernel_cap_t *effective, > > const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, > > const kernel_cap_t *permitted); > > - int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap, int audit); > > + int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, > > + struct user_namespace *ns, > > + int cap, > > + unsigned int opts); > > int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); > > int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry); > > int (*syslog)(int type); > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > index d170a5b031f3..038e6779948c 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > @@ -54,9 +54,12 @@ struct xattr; > > struct xfrm_sec_ctx; > > struct mm_struct; > > > > +/* Default (no) options for the capable function */ > > +#define SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT 0x0 > > bikeshed: maybe we should call this CAP_OPT_* ? (Then this might be > CAP_OPT_NONE?) I agree, I like those names better. > > > /* If capable should audit the security request */ > > -#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0 > > -#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1 > > +#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0x01 > > +/* If capable is being called by a setid function */ > > +#define SECURITY_CAP_INSETID 0x02 > > For the 1 and 2 case, can you use BIT(0) and BIT(1) instead? This > makes it clear this is a bitfield here (and does all the type magic > for higher-order bits if we ever get ther). Done. > > > /* LSM Agnostic defines for sb_set_mnt_opts */ > > #define SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS 1 > > @@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ enum lsm_event { > > > > /* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ > > extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap, int audit); > > + int cap, unsigned int opts); > > extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); > > extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode); > > extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent); > > @@ -233,10 +236,10 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > > const kernel_cap_t *effective, > > const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, > > const kernel_cap_t *permitted); > > -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap); > > -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap); > > +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, > > + struct user_namespace *ns, > > + int cap, > > + unsigned int opts); > > int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb); > > int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry); > > int security_syslog(int type); > > @@ -492,14 +495,11 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new, > > } > > > > static inline int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, > > - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > > + struct user_namespace *ns, > > + int cap, > > + unsigned int opts) > > { > > - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > > -} > > - > > -static inline int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, > > - struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { > > - return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > > + return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, opts); > > } > > > > static inline int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, > > diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > > index 1e1c0236f55b..454576743b1b 100644 > > --- a/kernel/capability.c > > +++ b/kernel/capability.c > > @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t, > > int ret; > > > > rcu_read_lock(); > > - ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); > > + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > > rcu_read_unlock(); > > > > return (ret == 0); > > @@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, > > One argument for _keeping_ the _noaudit() function as in v3 is that > keeping this one but removing the other seems inconsistent. Hmm yeah. Removing the function still seems like the lesser evil to me but I see what you mean. > > > int ret; > > > > rcu_read_lock(); > > - ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap); > > + ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > > rcu_read_unlock(); > > > > return (ret == 0); > > @@ -363,7 +363,9 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap) > > return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap); > > } > > > > -static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) > > +static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, > > + int cap, > > + unsigned int opts) > > { > > int capable; > > > > @@ -372,8 +374,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) > > BUG(); > > } > > > > - capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) : > > - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap); > > + capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts); > > if (capable == 0) { > > current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; > > return true; > > @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit) > > */ > > bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > > { > > - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true); > > + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); > > > > @@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); > > */ > > bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) > > { > > - return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false); > > + return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > > } > > EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit); > > > > @@ -448,10 +449,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); > > bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, > > int cap) > > { > > + > > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) > > return false; > > > > - if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) > > + if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0) > > return true; > > > > return false; > > @@ -500,10 +502,12 @@ bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns) > > { > > int ret = 0; /* An absent tracer adds no restrictions */ > > const struct cred *cred; > > + > > rcu_read_lock(); > > cred = rcu_dereference(tsk->ptracer_cred); > > if (cred) > > - ret = security_capable_noaudit(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); > > + ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, > > + SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > > rcu_read_unlock(); > > return (ret == 0); > > } > > diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c > > index f2ae2324c232..ddf615eb1bf7 100644 > > --- a/kernel/seccomp.c > > +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c > > @@ -383,8 +383,8 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) > > * behavior of privileged children. > > */ > > if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && > > - security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), > > - CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) > > + security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), > > + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) != 0) > > return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); > > > > /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */ > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c > > index 253ef6e9d445..0f6dca54b66e 100644 > > --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c > > +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c > > @@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, > > * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap > > * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) > > * @cap: capability to test if allowed > > - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated > > + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated > > * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) > > * > > * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM > > */ > > -static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, > > - struct common_audit_data *sa) > > +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, > > + unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) > > { > > int error; > > > > @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, > > else > > error = -EPERM; > > > > - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { > > + if (opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) { > > if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) > > return error; > > /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it > > @@ -142,13 +142,13 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int audit, > > * aa_capable - test permission to use capability > > * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) > > * @cap: capability to be tested > > - * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated > > + * @opts: SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated > > * > > * Look up capability in profile capability set. > > * > > * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. > > */ > > -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) > > +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) > > { > > struct aa_profile *profile; > > int error = 0; > > @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit) > > > > sa.u.cap = cap; > > error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, > > - profile_capable(profile, cap, audit, &sa)); > > + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); > > > > return error; > > } > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h > > index e0304e2aeb7f..1b3663b6ab12 100644 > > --- a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h > > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h > > @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ struct aa_caps { > > > > extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[]; > > > > -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, int audit); > > +int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts); > > > > static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) > > { > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c > > index 527ea1557120..4a1da2313162 100644 > > --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c > > +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c > > @@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, > > aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; > > aad(sa)->peer = tracee; > > aad(sa)->request = 0; > > - aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); > > + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, > > + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > > > > return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); > > } > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > > index 42446a216f3b..0bd817084fc1 100644 > > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > > @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, > > } > > > > static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap, int audit) > > + int cap, unsigned int opts) > > { > > struct aa_label *label; > > int error = 0; > > > > label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); > > if (!unconfined(label)) > > - error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit); > > + error = aa_capable(label, cap, opts); > > aa_put_label(label); > > > > return error; > > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c > > index 232db019f051..3d8609192e17 100644 > > --- a/security/commoncap.c > > +++ b/security/commoncap.c > > @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) > > * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. > > */ > > int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, > > - int cap, int audit) > > + int cap, unsigned int opts) > > { > > struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; > > > > @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, > > */ > > static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) > > { > > - > > /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP > > * capability > > */ > > if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, > > - CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) > > + CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) == 0) > > return 0; > > return 1; > > } > > @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > > || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ > > || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ > > || (cap_capable(current_cred(), > > - current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, > > - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ > > + current_cred()->user_ns, > > + CAP_SETPCAP, > > + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT) != 0) /*[4]*/ > > /* > > * [1] no changing of bits that are locked > > * [2] no unlocking of locks > > @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) > > { > > int cap_sys_admin = 0; > > > > - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, > > - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) > > + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, > > + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) > > cap_sys_admin = 1; > > + > > return cap_sys_admin; > > } > > > > @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) > > > > if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { > > ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, > > - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > > + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > > /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ > > if (ret == 0) > > current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > > index d670136dda2c..d2334697797a 100644 > > --- a/security/security.c > > +++ b/security/security.c > > @@ -294,16 +294,12 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > > effective, inheritable, permitted); > > } > > > > -int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap) > > +int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, > > + struct user_namespace *ns, > > + int cap, > > + unsigned int opts) > > { > > - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > > -} > > - > > -int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap) > > -{ > > - return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); > > + return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); > > } > > > > int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > > index a67459eb62d5..a4b2e49213de 100644 > > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > > @@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) > > > > /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ > > static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, > > - int cap, int audit, bool initns) > > + int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns) > > { > > struct common_audit_data ad; > > struct av_decision avd; > > @@ -1796,7 +1796,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, > > > > rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, > > sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); > > - if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { > > + if (!(opts & SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT)) { > > int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state, > > sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0); > > if (rc2) > > @@ -2316,9 +2316,9 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, > > */ > > > > static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, > > - int cap, int audit) > > + int cap, unsigned int opts) > > { > > - return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns); > > + return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns); > > } > > > > static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) > > @@ -3245,11 +3245,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) > > static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) > > { > > const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); > > - int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; > > + unsigned int opts = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT; > > > > - if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit)) > > + if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts)) > > return false; > > - if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true)) > > + if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true)) > > return false; > > return true; > > } > > @@ -3649,7 +3649,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, > > case KDSKBENT: > > case KDSKBSENT: > > error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, > > - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true); > > + SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT, true); > > break; > > > > /* default case assumes that the command will go > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c > > index 9a4c0ad46518..fac2a21aa7d4 100644 > > --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c > > +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c > > @@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred) > > struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; > > int rc; > > > > - rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); > > + rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_DEFAULT); > > if (rc) > > return false; > > > > -- > > 2.20.0.405.gbc1bbc6f85-goog > > > > Otherwise, this looks fine to me. > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook > > James, Stephen, thoughts? > > -- > Kees Cook