From: luto@kernel.org (Andy Lutomirski)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 08/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2017 06:46:38 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrU-KEhF-OaHGVOu64TNeemP1pT1Y1Deba9TSGOzfOfu3w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1501545093-56634-9-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 4:51 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> Instead of a separate function, open-code the cap_elevated test, which
> lets us entirely remove bprm->cap_effective (to use the local "effective"
> variable instead), and more accurately examine euid/egid changes via the
> existing local "is_setid".
>
> The following LTP tests were run to validate the changes:
>
> # ./runltp -f syscalls -s cap
> # ./runltp -f securebits
> # ./runltp -f cap_bounds
> # ./runltp -f filecaps
>
> All kernel selftests for capabilities and exec continue to pass as well.
>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-08-01 13:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-31 23:51 [PATCH v4 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 01/15] exec: Rename bprm->cred_prepared to called_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 02/15] exec: Correct comments about "point of no return" Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 03/15] binfmt: Introduce secureexec flag Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:23 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:44 ` James Morris
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 04/15] apparmor: Refactor to remove bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 05/15] selinux: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:45 ` James Morris
2017-08-01 13:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 06/15] smack: " Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:46 ` James Morris
2017-08-01 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 07/15] commoncap: " Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 08/15] commoncap: Move cap_elevated calculation into bprm_set_creds Kees Cook
2017-08-01 13:46 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 09/15] LSM: drop bprm_secureexec hook Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 10/15] exec: Use secureexec for setting dumpability Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:48 ` James Morris
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 11/15] exec: Use secureexec for clearing pdeath_signal Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:50 ` James Morris
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 12/15] smack: Remove redundant pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:50 ` James Morris
2017-08-01 15:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 13/15] exec: Consolidate dumpability logic Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 14/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-07-31 23:51 ` [PATCH v4 15/15] exec: Consolidate pdeath_signal clearing Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:52 ` James Morris
2017-08-01 0:34 ` [PATCH v4 00/15] exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec Kees Cook
2017-08-01 0:54 ` James Morris
2017-08-01 3:03 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 5:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-08-01 5:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-08-01 15:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-01 20:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-08-01 21:04 ` Kees Cook
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