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From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	 Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
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	 linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 14:57:43 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALmYWFuOXAiT05Pi2rZ1nUAKDGe9JyTH7fro2EYS1fh3zeGV5Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240709.aech3geeMoh0@digikod.net>

On Tue, Jul 9, 2024 at 1:42 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 08, 2024 at 03:07:24PM -0700, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 8, 2024 at 2:25 PM Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On 08/07/2024 22:15, Jeff Xu wrote:
> > > > IIUC:
> > > > CHECK=0, RESTRICT=0: do nothing, current behavior
> > > > CHECK=1, RESTRICT=0: permissive mode - ignore AT_CHECK results.
> > > > CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1: call AT_CHECK, deny if AT_CHECK failed, no exception.
> > > > CHECK=1, RESTRICT=1: call AT_CHECK, deny if AT_CHECK failed, except
> > > > those in the "checked-and-allowed" list.
> > >
> > > I had much the same question for Mickaël while working on this.
> > >
> > > Essentially, "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1" means to restrict without checking.
> > > In the context of a script or macro interpreter, this just means it will
> > > never interpret any scripts. Non-binary code execution is fully disabled
> > > in any part of the process that respects these bits.
> > >
> > I see, so Mickaël does mean this will block all scripts.
>
> That is the initial idea.
>
> > I guess, in the context of dynamic linker, this means: no more .so
> > loading, even "dlopen" is called by an app ?  But this will make the
> > execve()  fail.
>
> Hmm, I'm not sure this "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1" configuration would make
> sense for a dynamic linker except maybe if we want to only allow static
> binaries?
>
> The CHECK and RESTRICT securebits are designed to make it possible a
> "permissive mode" and an enforcement mode with the related locked
> securebits.  This is why this "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1" combination looks a
> bit weird.  We can replace these securebits with others but I didn't
> find a better (and simple) option.  I don't think this is an issue
> because with any security policy we can create unusable combinations.
> The three other combinations makes a lot of sense though.
>
If we need only handle 3  combinations,  I would think something like
below is easier to understand, and don't have wield state like
CHECK=0, RESTRICT=1

XX_RESTRICT: when true: Perform the AT_CHECK, and deny the executable
after AT_CHECK fails.
XX_RESTRICT_PERMISSIVE:  take effect when XX_RESTRICT is true. True
means Ignoring the AT_CHECK result.

Or

XX_CHECK: when true: Perform the AT_CHECK.
XX_CHECK_ENFORCE takes effect only when XX_CHECK is true.   True means
restrict the executable when AT_CHECK failed; false means ignore the
AT_CHECK failure.

Of course, we can replace XX_CHECK_ENFORCE with XX_RESTRICT.
Personally I think having _CHECK_ in the name implies the XX_CHECK
needs to be true as a prerequisite for this flag , but that is my
opinion only. As long as the semantics are clear as part of the
comments of definition in code,  it is fine.

Thanks
-Jeff


> >
> > > "CHECK=1, RESTRICT=1" means to restrict unless AT_CHECK passes. This
> > > case is the allow list (or whatever mechanism is being used to determine
> > > the result of an AT_CHECK check). The actual mechanism isn't the
> > > business of the script interpreter at all, it just has to refuse to
> > > execute anything that doesn't pass the check. So a generic interpreter
> > > can implement a generic mechanism and leave the specifics to whoever
> > > configures the machine.
> > >
> > In the context of dynamic linker. this means:
> > if .so passed the AT_CHECK, ldopen() can still load it.
> > If .so fails the AT_CHECK, ldopen() will fail too.
>
> Correct
>
> >
> > Thanks
> > -Jeff
> >
> > > The other two case are more obvious. "CHECK=0, RESTRICT=0" is the
> > > zero-overhead case, while "CHECK=1, RESTRICT=0" might log, warn, or
> > > otherwise audit the result of the check, but it won't restrict execution.
> > >
> > > Cheers,
> > > Steve

  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-09 21:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-04 19:01 [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05  0:04   ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:53     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:38       ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 18:03   ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-06 14:55     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 15:32       ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08  8:56         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:37           ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:34             ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC Eric W. Biederman
2024-07-08 17:59               ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-10 10:05             ` [PATCH] binfmt_elf: Fail execution of shared objects with ELIBEXEC (was: Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)) Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:08     ` [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 16:25       ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 16:40         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:05           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 17:33           ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-08 17:52             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09  9:18               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 10:05                 ` Florian Weimer
2024-07-09 20:42                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 18:57                 ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:41                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06  8:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-07  9:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17  6:33   ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17  8:26     ` Steve Dower
2024-07-17 10:00       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18  1:02         ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-18 12:22           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-20  1:59             ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-20 11:43               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-23 13:16                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-23 13:16               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18  1:51         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:23           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 22:54             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-17 10:01     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18  2:08       ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-18 12:24         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 13:03           ` James Bottomley
2024-07-18 15:35             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19  1:29           ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19  8:44             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 14:16               ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:04                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 15:27                   ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15                     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-05 18:35                       ` Jeff Xu
2024-08-09  8:45                         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-08-09 16:15                           ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:12           ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-19 15:31             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-19 17:36               ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-23 13:15                 ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:46         ` enh
2024-07-18 15:35           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 2/5] security: Add new SHOULD_EXEC_CHECK and SHOULD_EXEC_RESTRICT securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05  0:18   ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 17:54     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-05 21:44       ` Kees Cook
2024-07-05 22:22         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06 17:28             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-06 14:56         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 14:16           ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-18 16:20             ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 16:17   ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 17:53     ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 18:48       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 21:15         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-08 21:25           ` Steve Dower
2024-07-08 22:07             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-09 20:42               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-09 21:57                 ` Jeff Xu [this message]
2024-07-10  9:58                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-10 16:26                     ` Kees Cook
2024-07-11  8:57                       ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:02                         ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-16 15:10                           ` Steve Dower
2024-07-16 15:15                           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:18                             ` Jeff Xu
2024-07-10 16:32                     ` Steve Dower
2024-07-20  2:06   ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-07-23 13:15     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 3/5] selftests/exec: Add tests for AT_CHECK and related securebits Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 4/5] selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_CHECK Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-04 19:01 ` [RFC PATCH v19 5/5] samples/should-exec: Add set-should-exec Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 19:40   ` Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:42     ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-08 20:35 ` [RFC PATCH v19 0/5] Script execution control (was O_MAYEXEC) Mimi Zohar
2024-07-09 20:43   ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-16 15:57     ` Roberto Sassu
2024-07-16 16:12       ` James Bottomley
2024-07-16 17:31         ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-18 16:21           ` Mickaël Salaün
     [not found]         ` <E608EDB8-72E8-4791-AC9B-8FF9AC753FBE@sempervictus.com>
2024-07-16 17:47           ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-17 17:59             ` Boris Lukashev
2024-07-18 13:00               ` Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-15 20:16 ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-07-16  7:13   ` Mickaël Salaün

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