From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>,
<viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, <brauner@kernel.org>,
<chuck.lever@oracle.com>, <jlayton@kernel.org>, <neilb@suse.de>,
<kolga@netapp.com>, <Dai.Ngo@oracle.com>, <tom@talpey.com>,
<zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>,
<dhowells@redhat.com>, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
<eparis@parisplace.org>, <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<keyrings@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"Roberto Sassu" <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
"Stefan Berger" <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 11/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM
Date: Tue, 05 Sep 2023 00:08:43 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CVAFV92MONCH.257Y9YQ3OEU4B@suppilovahvero> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230831104136.903180-12-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com>
On Thu Aug 31, 2023 at 1:41 PM EEST, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
>
> Add the idmap parameter to the definition, so that evm_inode_setattr() can
> be registered as this hook implementation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++-
> security/security.c | 2 +-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++-
> 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 4bdddb52a8fe..fdf075a6b1bb 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_readlink, struct dentry *dentry)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_follow_link, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
> bool rcu)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, struct inode *inode, int mask)
> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct iattr *attr)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
Only 99 characters, i.e. breaking into two lines is not necessary.
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_getattr, const struct path *path)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setxattr, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index cb6242feb968..2b24d01cf181 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2117,7 +2117,7 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>
> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> return 0;
> - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
> + ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, idmap, dentry, attr);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> return evm_inode_setattr(idmap, dentry, attr);
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index ee7c49c2cfd3..bfcc4d9aa5ab 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3075,7 +3075,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
> return rc;
> }
>
> -static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
> +static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct iattr *iattr)
> {
> const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 679156601a10..89f2669d50a9 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -1181,12 +1181,14 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
>
> /**
> * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> * @dentry: the object
> * @iattr: for the force flag
> *
> * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
> */
> -static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
> +static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> + struct iattr *iattr)
static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
Can be still in a single line (100 characters exactly).
> {
> struct smk_audit_info ad;
> int rc;
> --
> 2.34.1
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-04 21:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-31 10:41 [PATCH v2 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] ima: Align ima_inode_post_setattr() definition with " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] ima: Align ima_post_path_mknod() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] ima: Align ima_post_create_tmpfile() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] ima: Align ima_file_mprotect() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] ima: Align ima_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] ima: Align ima_inode_removexattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] ima: Align ima_post_read_file() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] evm: Align evm_inode_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] evm: Align evm_inode_post_setxattr() " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] security: Align inode_setattr hook definition with EVM Roberto Sassu
2023-09-04 21:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2023-09-05 15:56 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-11 10:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] security: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:28 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-04 21:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] security: Introduce inode_post_removexattr hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-09-04 21:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-09-05 6:51 ` Roberto Sassu
2023-09-05 16:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] security: Introduce file_post_open hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] security: Introduce file_pre_free_security hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] security: Introduce path_post_mknod hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] security: Introduce inode_post_set_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 10:41 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] security: Introduce inode_post_remove_acl hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:36 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 11:37 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] security: Introduce key_post_create_or_update hook Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 11:37 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 14:10 ` Chuck Lever
2023-08-31 22:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 11:38 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] ima: Move IMA-Appraisal " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 11:38 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] evm: Move " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 11:38 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] integrity: Move integrity functions to the " Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 22:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 11:38 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed blob for integrity_iint_cache Roberto Sassu
2023-08-31 23:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-08-31 23:01 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] security: Move IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure Casey Schaufler
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