From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"Fan Wu" <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>,
<tytso@mit.edu>, <ebiggers@kernel.org>, <axboe@kernel.dk>,
<agk@redhat.com>, <snitzer@kernel.org>, <eparis@redhat.com>,
<paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<fsverity@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-block@vger.kernel.org>,
<dm-devel@lists.linux.dev>, <audit@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 22:38:29 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D05O8BUCPQL6.22850B90ITSCR@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D05O6JVMMZY7.5ZUBAPJH22FC@kernel.org>
On Thu Mar 28, 2024 at 10:36 PM EET, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu Mar 28, 2024 at 10:17 PM EET, Fan Wu wrote:
> > Overview:
> > ---------
>
> s/://
>
> It is already a heading.
>
> >
> > IPE is a Linux Security Module which takes a complimentary approach to
>
> Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) is a ...
>
> > access control. Whereas existing mandatory access control mechanisms
> > base their decisions on labels and paths, IPE instead determines
> > whether or not an operation should be allowed based on immutable
> > security properties of the system component the operation is being
> > performed on.
>
> What is "a immutable property of the system component", or even,
> what is "a immutable property" and what is "a system component".
>
> These should be defined per context of use as there is no unambiguous
> definitions of these "properties".
>
> So can you add a paragraph before this defining these concepts?
> Otherwise, it would be pretty hard to review any of this.
>
> I.e. I have to make my own imaginary definitions of them and possibly
> make completely false conclusions what was meant.
This might sound like nitpicking but often in security patch sets
people get their own ideas and that leads to useless iterations
etc. so I think it is useful to be pretty formal with definitions
so that we dont end up shadow boxing...
I have ton of experience with this with SGX patches in the past.
BR, Jarkko
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-03-28 20:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-03-28 20:17 [PATCH v16 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 01/20] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:45 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-28 22:11 ` Randy Dunlap
2024-03-30 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 02/20] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-28 20:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 03/20] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 04/20] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 05/20] initramfs|security: Add a security hook to do_populate_rootfs() Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 06/20] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 07/20] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 08/20] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 09/20] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 10/20] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 11/20] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2024-03-30 11:26 ` kernel test robot
2024-04-02 1:26 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 12/20] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 13/20] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-04-02 1:26 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 14/20] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-04-02 1:26 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 15/20] security: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook Fan Wu
2024-04-02 1:26 ` Paul Moore
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 16/20] fsverity: consume fsverity built-in signatures via LSM hook Fan Wu
2024-04-03 5:02 ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 17/20] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2024-04-03 5:10 ` Eric Biggers
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 18/20] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 19/20] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:17 ` [PATCH v16 20/20] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
2024-03-28 20:36 ` [PATCH v16 00/20] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-03-28 20:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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