From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, davem@davemloft.net,
lucien.xin@gmail.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com,
mortonm@chromium.org, nicolas.bouchinet@ssi.gouv.fr,
mic@digikod.net, cgzones@googlemail.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org,
keescook@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors
Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 10:48:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y1j0d8kT3WkeoORR@archlinux> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <21fe8e7deb04596f0fdba621b657a21c00a074f1.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Hi Mimi,
On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 11:58:40AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-10-25 at 08:06 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > On 10/25/2022 7:21 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2022-10-25 at 15:33 +0200, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> > >>> Agreed, independently as to whether BPF defines a security xattr, if
> > >>> two LSMs initialize security xattrs, then this change is needed. Are
> > >>> there any other examples?
> > >> I think that in its current state the kernel cannot load two LSM capable of xattr
> > >> initialization as they are all defined with the `LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE` flag set.
> > >> But I may be unaware of other LSM in development stage.
> > > Casey, Paul, can we get confirmation on this?
> >
> > I'm working really hard to eliminate LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE. Dealing with
> > multiple security modules initializing security xattrs has been in the
> > stacking patch sets that have been in review for years now. So no,
> > you can't wave the problem away by pointing at LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE.
>
> Please note that the original problem being addressed by this patch
> will be addressed by Roberto's BPF patch. The question here was
> whether this addresses an existing bug, other than BPF, or a future
> one, and whether it needs to be backported.
>
Should I split the NULL pointer dereference fix in a separated patch for EVM ?
> From your response, initializing multiple security xattrs is not an
> issue at the moment so it doesn't need to be backported. Whether this
> patch should be upstreamed with the LSM stacking patch set is a
> separate question.
>
> >
> > >>> (nit: I understand the line size has generally been relaxed, but for
> > >>> IMA/EVM I would prefer it to be remain as 80 chars.)
> > >>>
> > >> No problem, will change it !
> > >>
> > >> I'll take time to run few tests with BPF and send a patch v3 with new changes.
> > > Since Roberto's patches will address the BPF bug(s), is this a fix for
> > > a real bug or a possbile future one. Cc'ing stable might not be
> > > necessary.
Ok, will remove stable.
Thanks,
Nicolas Bouchinet
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-26 8:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-20 13:55 [PATCH] evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-20 15:02 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-21 13:12 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-20 15:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-21 14:04 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-20 16:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-21 13:17 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-20 19:51 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-21 13:47 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-24 16:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-25 13:33 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2022-10-25 14:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-25 14:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-25 15:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-25 15:58 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-26 8:48 ` Nicolas Bouchinet [this message]
2022-10-21 14:02 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-24 12:50 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
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