From: sdf@google.com
To: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
martin.lau@linux.dev, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
andrii@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] selftests/bpf: fix memory leak of lsm_cgroup
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2022 09:34:23 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3J8HyIfhm7rgpvI@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1668401942-6309-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com>
On 11/14, Wang Yufen wrote:
> kmemleak reports this issue:
> unreferenced object 0xffff88810b7835c0 (size 32):
> comm "test_progs", pid 270, jiffies 4294969007 (age 1621.315s)
> hex dump (first 32 bytes):
> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> 03 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
> backtrace:
> [<00000000376cdeab>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0x110
> [<000000003bcdb3b6>] selinux_sk_alloc_security+0x66/0x110
> [<000000003959008f>] security_sk_alloc+0x47/0x80
> [<00000000e7bc6668>] sk_prot_alloc+0xbd/0x1a0
> [<0000000002d6343a>] sk_alloc+0x3b/0x940
> [<000000009812a46d>] unix_create1+0x8f/0x3d0
> [<000000005ed0976b>] unix_create+0xa1/0x150
> [<0000000086a1d27f>] __sock_create+0x233/0x4a0
> [<00000000cffe3a73>] __sys_socket_create.part.0+0xaa/0x110
> [<0000000007c63f20>] __sys_socket+0x49/0xf0
> [<00000000b08753c8>] __x64_sys_socket+0x42/0x50
> [<00000000b56e26b3>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
> [<000000009b4871b8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
> The issue occurs in the following scenarios:
> unix_create1()
> sk_alloc()
> sk_prot_alloc()
> security_sk_alloc()
> call_int_hook()
> hlist_for_each_entry()
> entry1->hook.sk_alloc_security
> <-- selinux_sk_alloc_security() succeeded,
> <-- sk->security alloced here.
> entry2->hook.sk_alloc_security
> <-- bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security() failed
> goto out_free;
> ... <-- the sk->security not freed, memleak
> The core problem is that the LSM is not yet fully stacked (work is
> actively going on in this space) which means that some LSM hooks do
> not support multiple LSMs at the same time. To fix, skip the
> "EPERM" test when it runs in the environments that already have
> non-bpf lsms installed
> Fixes: dca85aac8895 ("selftests/bpf: lsm_cgroup functional test")
> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
> Cc: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c | 19
> +++++++++++++++----
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c | 8 ++++++++
> 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
> index 1102e4f..a927ade 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_cgroup.c
> @@ -173,10 +173,14 @@ static void test_lsm_cgroup_functional(void)
> ASSERT_EQ(query_prog_cnt(cgroup_fd, NULL), 4, "total prog count");
> ASSERT_EQ(query_prog_cnt(cgroup_fd2, NULL), 1, "total prog count");
> - /* AF_UNIX is prohibited. */
> -
> fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
> - ASSERT_LT(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
> + if (skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> + || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
> + || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
[..]
> + ASSERT_GE(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
nit: maybe skip this completely instead of having ASSERT_GE+close?
if (!(skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR || _SELINUX || _SMACK)
/* AF_UNIX is prohibited. */
ASSERT_LT(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
> + else
> + /* AF_UNIX is prohibited. */
> + ASSERT_LT(fd, 0, "socket(AF_UNIX)");
> close(fd);
> /* AF_INET6 gets default policy (sk_priority). */
> @@ -233,11 +237,18 @@ static void test_lsm_cgroup_functional(void)
> /* AF_INET6+SOCK_STREAM
> * AF_PACKET+SOCK_RAW
> + * AF_UNIX+SOCK_RAW if already have non-bpf lsms installed
> * listen_fd
> * client_fd
> * accepted_fd
> */
> - ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->called_socket_post_create2, 5, "called_create2");
> + if (skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> + || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
> + || skel->kconfig->CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
> + /* AF_UNIX+SOCK_RAW if already have non-bpf lsms installed */
> + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->called_socket_post_create2, 6, "called_create2");
> + else
> + ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->called_socket_post_create2, 5, "called_create2");
> /* start_server
> * bind(ETH_P_ALL)
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
> b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
> index 4f2d60b..02c11d1 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_cgroup.c
> @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
> char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
> +extern bool CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX __kconfig __weak;
> +extern bool CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK __kconfig __weak;
> +extern bool CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR __kconfig __weak;
> +
> #ifndef AF_PACKET
> #define AF_PACKET 17
> #endif
> @@ -140,6 +144,10 @@ int BPF_PROG(socket_bind2, struct socket *sock,
> struct sockaddr *address,
> int BPF_PROG(socket_alloc, struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
> {
> called_socket_alloc++;
> + /* if already have non-bpf lsms installed, EPERM will cause memory leak
> of non-bpf lsms */
> + if (CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX || CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK ||
> CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
> + return 1;
> +
> if (family == AF_UNIX)
> return 0; /* EPERM */
> --
> 1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-14 17:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-14 4:59 [PATCH bpf] selftests/bpf: fix memory leak of lsm_cgroup Wang Yufen
2022-11-14 17:34 ` sdf [this message]
2022-11-15 3:07 ` wangyufen
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