From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D0ACC23C9; Sat, 1 Mar 2025 02:20:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1740795652; cv=none; b=FOvxZe9g/LGbo/1tU+YGpbH2R4wYqkv359xXUO9fNa6D9VcERXZxcbWjZ+zPitVrPByfW8/kPmg2pekvEcQgckeeOZKz1sBbwIIdEf7VJ9ZHXjBbbPkBmQnWU9MqIpleozvM2fgUsYfbVzf9lNEAoyK3LSOPysPp2WJqgI3q94w= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1740795652; c=relaxed/simple; bh=wrT0/PVw1RCAufMyi3hB7XHBapGeT8dsQ2+k7DkFsLQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=MBsQlTI9b4ajryalF1eMRy6nJChKj97D+UqI3m8V9WCKEjIgUWyvjPl2yJ4sgQYZDg2lAANYZKkR2ErmDYHQsmy4FQ6ZEsag5fTimFQtaCE5huOo0fisQnGjFFCUoYImH5Fa6s/au8yIRihBXEW2VNnPQtTXtALC70Sl0pWA+xo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=lCWp+p7j; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="lCWp+p7j" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B563EC4CED6; Sat, 1 Mar 2025 02:20:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1740795651; bh=wrT0/PVw1RCAufMyi3hB7XHBapGeT8dsQ2+k7DkFsLQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=lCWp+p7jm+5O/IKdY1grBUS9ZC9DB0ba/CqRyLpa76Ug4mjY/kS+tc9NsMhOr5ciX WTpLn4PYXCiEYG/u+m66GszCnWqXAjfCo8XhZqhEdqm2LrEwiu0wcmGLeK4gE7CxQ0 gk+49rIx59510uDm4MO2AH6jM0uZYMFU2wgKqi2S7ObvfvRWXklVF/Tk4jlCTm+KeQ yoX2iU0SabKwJ7hm1/R3OV6CJEt1zkPiW+2T9Vyv7Vprvuv+LdA/2j8X3w0gVqxaDa 3BpwMmngcTeJl06nAqhMPrXjT5YKN8i3tvKq35NAK4qQtBYvcWtSqccvB5oooxyfZl /l5EdpJ+SnvgA== Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2025 04:20:46 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Paul Moore Cc: Mimi Zohar , Eric Snowberg , David Howells , "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" , David Woodhouse , "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" , "davem@davemloft.net" , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Roberto Sassu , Dmitry Kasatkin , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , "casey@schaufler-ca.com" , Stefan Berger , "ebiggers@kernel.org" , Randy Dunlap , open list , "keyrings@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Message-ID: References: <20241017155516.2582369-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com> <72F52F71-C7F3-402D-8441-3D636A093FE8@oracle.com> <506e8e58e5236a4525b18d84bafa9aae80b24452.camel@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 05:22:22PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 3:41 PM Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Mon, 2025-01-06 at 17:15 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote: > > > > On Jan 5, 2025, at 8:40 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover > > > > > letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated > > > > > into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko > > > > > about this? > > > > > > > > I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially > > > > since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access > > > > control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM. > > > > > > > > I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason > > > > why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on > > > > keyrings/keys. What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so > > > > much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis > > > > policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it > > > > should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM. Yes, existing > > > > LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in > > > > an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security > > > > identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy. > > > > Hi Jarkko, David, > > > > Both Paul's and my main concerns with this patch set is storing policy in the > > keyring. We would appreciate your chiming in here about storing key policy in > > the keyring itself. > > I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the > addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting > ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys. > Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this > impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would > go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically > see with kernel keys. I get the theoretical concern but cannot see anything obvious in the patch set that would nail into practical concerns. > > -- > paul-moore.com BR, Jarkko