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For context, in this patch set, we have three commits: * 1/3 and 2/3 copy documentation from the kernel side unmodified. * 3/3 revises a section about Landlock's "scoped" restriction features. I thought it would be easier to discuss with the "copy" and "rewrite" parts separate, but actually, as you also noticed, 3/3 does rewrite large chunks = of the 2/3 commit along the way, and it is probably not worth correcting much = of that wording any more. Would you prefer if I squashed commits 2/3 and 3/3 into one? On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 10:23:47PM +0100, Alejandro Colomar wrote: > On Wed, Feb 26, 2025 at 10:29:11PM +0100, G=C3=BCnther Noack wrote: > > With this ABI version, Landlock can restrict outgoing interactions with > > higher-privileged Landlock domains through Abstract Unix Domain sockets= and > > signals. > >=20 > > Signed-off-by: G=C3=BCnther Noack > > --- > > man/man7/landlock.7 | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > > 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > >=20 > > diff --git a/man/man7/landlock.7 b/man/man7/landlock.7 > > index 11f76b072..30dbac73d 100644 > > --- a/man/man7/landlock.7 > > +++ b/man/man7/landlock.7 > > @@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ This access right is available since the fifth vers= ion of the Landlock ABI. > > .SS Network flags > > These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process > > to a set of network actions. > > -This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4. > > +.P > > +This is supported since Landlock ABI version 4. > > .P > > The following access rights apply to TCP port numbers: > > .TP > > @@ -258,6 +259,24 @@ Bind a TCP socket to a local port. > > .B LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP > > Connect an active TCP socket to a remote port. > > .\" > > +.SS Scope flags > > +These flags enable to isolate a sandboxed process from a set of IPC ac= tions. >=20 > s/to isolate/isolating/ >=20 > AFAIU, to be able to use an infinitive with enable/allow you need a > direct object in the sentence. If there's no direct object, you need a > gerund. Thanks, this is useful. Changed it to infinitive for now. FWIW, the same phrases exist on the kernel side as well, unfortunately. > > +Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain > > +to forbid connections to resources outside the domain. > > +.P > > +This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6. >=20 > I'm wondering if we should have this as a parenthetical next to the > title, like we usually do with "(since Linux X.Y)". Don't do it for > now, but please consider it for when you have some time. I'm not saying > you should do it though, just that you consider it, and tell me if you > agree or not. I added it to my notes for further revisions, I think this would indeed be more appropriate in the man pages. Is it possible to set the paranthetical without bold as well, even in a .SS subsection header? > > +.P > > +The following scopes exist: > > +.TP > > +.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET > > +Restrict a sandboxed process from connecting to an abstract UNIX socke= t > > +created by a process outside the related Landlock domain > > +(e.g., a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process). > > +.TP > > +.B LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL > > +Restrict a sandboxed process from sending a signal > > +to another process outside the domain. > > +.\" > > .SS Layers of file path access rights > > Each time a thread enforces a ruleset on itself, > > it updates its Landlock domain with a new layer of policy. > > @@ -334,6 +353,51 @@ and related syscalls on a target process, > > a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules, > > which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer. > > .\" > > +.SS IPC scoping > > +Similar to the implicit > > +.BR "Ptrace restrictions" , > > +we may want to further restrict interactions between sandboxes. > > +Each Landlock domain can be explicitly scoped for a set of actions > > +by specifying it on a ruleset. > > +For example, if a sandboxed process should not be able to > > +.BR connect (2) > > +to a non-sandboxed process through abstract > > +.BR unix (7) > > +sockets, > > +we can specify such a restriction with > > +.BR LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET . > > +Moreover, if a sandboxed process should not be able > > +to send a signal to a non-sandboxed process, > > +we can specify this restriction with > > +.BR LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL . > > +.P > > +A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process > > +when its domain is not scoped. >=20 > Does "its" refer to the sandboxed one or to the non-snadboxed one? It refers to the sandboxed process. This correction would be overwritten in the following commit. I don't think it's worth fixing any more. > > +If a process's domain is scoped, > > +it can only connect to sockets created by processes in the same scope. > > +Moreover, > > +If a process is scoped to send signal >=20 > Is this a typo? s/signal/&s/ It is a typo, copied from kernel documentation. Oops. This correction is overwritten in the following commit. > > to a non-scoped process, >=20 > Should we use plural here? This correction is overwritten in the following commit. > > +it can only send signals to processes in the same scope. > > +.P > > +A connected datagram socket behaves like a stream socket > > +when its domain is scoped, > > +meaning if the domain is scoped after the socket is connected, > > +it can still > > +.BR send (2) > > +data just like a stream socket. > > +However, in the same scenario, > > +a non-connected datagram socket cannot send data (with > > +.BR sendto (2)) > > +outside its scope. > > +.P > > +A process with a scoped domain can inherit a socket > > +created by a non-scoped process. > > +The process cannot connect to this socket since it has a scoped domain= . > > +.P > > +IPC scoping does not support exceptions, so if a domain is scoped, >=20 > Please break after the first ',' too. Done. > > +no rules can be added to allow access to resources or processes >=20 > Please break after the second 'to'. Done. > > +outside of the scope. Thanks for the review, =E2=80=94G=C3=BCnther