From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 17AA617548; Wed, 5 Mar 2025 00:29:17 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1741134558; cv=none; b=MnB5Jm4fpOkZjB4nFMALUKC5Bq9QHRCmva37dFHMfxaM5Q0/lfWEsbFyWKW4rKzYlL3berhBmnntcVbyR2ABQnnVQSMVgDgeqCeG3hPqyia/EZdNTWGcQIZhmAeiL3zHkMxCRzKbHL2xeHDAF/TXOtRfPVSM+4hkWzr8BT0e7U0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1741134558; c=relaxed/simple; bh=v4LFSDcbSZvz0tDH0vbM1o3jV3dG7EspXAJxw8uUJk0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=WpaPTFU+SV6Jr9LAdZjxEW0JkA+DsOOlgE3V2sC27Cx7tTrwA0Z6wiNdE6hZIMgo345aKHYZDOvqN5otA/OI779SqTMX+NkMtZf3eSVgR5x9bwFGhroeOq5wQv2LH3XByJ8aYTFYbFqnBNFNbX8odTOlwVwdp9H9kvZT2U53hO0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=TPwVJp3g; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="TPwVJp3g" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 18355C4CEE5; Wed, 5 Mar 2025 00:29:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1741134557; bh=v4LFSDcbSZvz0tDH0vbM1o3jV3dG7EspXAJxw8uUJk0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=TPwVJp3gVOxr5vkeZvGhr+JufYiRWINOpBadU50KWF9Cb0DE1wDsXvRj3BV3ReSwq SD8gMy8hB/fvCjRq3rOA1+Dneetww9tJQDik2OxWFE9D5fWTPCU9vcWHz01MkAx4s0 89RmGTtmHEfLoEnuy//texnkqd3I6gg5zh8epMmC85dxxT8vd94GjPAv1hLrycAE1N IqS710KEJi3BJqkaWGBgWC0uKhv7W/cJgaCtxvf+zvSh3yPYZwgZ7fw8MspFExGVzO 07MoSlxTfPFwcqC3fvkKnXTCCbtqkwReZDOfEL6wDEQTocPWw0dqevsJ2TW/NTEyLV kXPnWtVFyNCZg== Date: Wed, 5 Mar 2025 02:29:13 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Paul Moore Cc: Eric Snowberg , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , "open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" , David Woodhouse , "herbert@gondor.apana.org.au" , "davem@davemloft.net" , Ard Biesheuvel , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Roberto Sassu , Dmitry Kasatkin , =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , "casey@schaufler-ca.com" , Stefan Berger , "ebiggers@kernel.org" , Randy Dunlap , open list , "keyrings@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM Message-ID: References: <506e8e58e5236a4525b18d84bafa9aae80b24452.camel@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: On Tue, Mar 04, 2025 at 07:25:13PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Mar 4, 2025 at 5:25 PM Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 05:40:54PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg wrote: > > > > > On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > >> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the > > > > >>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting > > > > >>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys. > > > > >>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this > > > > >>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would > > > > >>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically > > > > >>> see with kernel keys. > > > > > > > > The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key. The main > > > > point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys > > > > they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating > > > > source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could > > > > go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented > > > > toward usage. The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we > > > > have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based. > > > > > > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be > > > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be > > > introduced. We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over > > > the years. > > > > Could we implement such change in a way that these new imaginary > > (at this point) usage oriented keyrings would be used to create > > the "legacy" keyrings? > > I think it would be easier for them to coexist so that one could have > an easier migration. It's possible that even once everything was > migrated to the new usage oriented keyrings it would still make sense > to keep the existing keyrings in place and always link keys from there > to the newer usage keyrings. OK, so here I agree and disagree: 1. It probably does not port everything. 2. Still, we need to be sure that "can be done" condition is satisfied for the sake of robustness. > > -- > paul-moore.com > BR, Jarkko