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From: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
To: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Cc: skhan@linuxfoundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com,
	dverkamp@chromium.org, hughd@google.com, jeffxu@google.com,
	jorgelo@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	jannh@google.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 3/5] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC
Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 19:29:46 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZJ1dGvWkJVAbBPn7@codewreck.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@mail.gmail.com>

Jeff Xu wrote on Wed, Jun 28, 2023 at 09:33:27PM -0700:
> > > BTW I find the current behaviour rather hard to use: setting this to 2
> > > should still set NOEXEC by default in my opinion, just refuse anything
> > > that explicitly requested EXEC.
> >
> > And I just noticed it's not possible to lower the value despite having
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN: what the heck?! I have never seen such a sysctl and it
> > just forced me to reboot because I willy-nilly tested in the init pid
> > namespace, and quite a few applications that don't require exec broke
> > exactly as I described below.
> >
> > If the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN there are more container escape methods
> > than I can count, this is basically free pass to root on main namespace
> > anyway, you're not protecting anything. Please let people set the sysctl
> > to what they want.
>
> Yama has a similar setting,  for example, 3 (YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH)
> will not allow downgrading at runtime.
> 
> Since this is a security feature, not allowing downgrading at run time
> is part of the security consideration. I hope you understand.

I didn't remember yama had this stuck bit; that still strikes me as
unusual, and if you require a custom LSM rule for memfd anyway I don't
see why it couldn't enforce that the sysctl is unchanged, but sure.

Please, though:
 - I have a hard time thinking of 1 as a security flag in general (even
if I do agree a sloppy LSM rule could require it); I would only lock 2
 - please make it clear, I don't see any entry in the sysctl
documentation[1] about memfd_noexec, there should be one and you can
copy the wording from yama's doc[2]: "Once set, this sysctl value cannot
be changed"
[1] Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst
[2] Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst


Either way as it stands I still don't think one can expect most
userspace applications to be converted until some libc wrapper takes
care of the retry logic and a couple of years, so I'll go look for
another way of filtering this (and eventually setting this to 1) as you
suggested.
I'll leave the follow-up up to you and won't bother you more.

Thanks,
-- 
Dominique Martinet | Asmadeus

  reply	other threads:[~2023-06-29 10:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-15  0:12 [PATCH v8 0/5] mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-15  0:12 ` [PATCH v8 1/5] mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-15  0:12 ` [PATCH v8 2/5] selftests/memfd: add tests for F_SEAL_EXEC jeffxu
2022-12-15  0:12 ` [PATCH v8 3/5] mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC jeffxu
2023-06-28 11:42   ` Dominique Martinet
2023-06-28 19:31     ` Dominique Martinet
2023-06-29  4:33       ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-29 10:29         ` Dominique Martinet [this message]
2023-06-29 21:04           ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-29  4:13     ` Jeff Xu
2022-12-15  0:12 ` [PATCH v8 4/5] mm/memfd: Add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfd jeffxu
2022-12-15  0:12 ` [PATCH v8 5/5] selftests/memfd: add tests for MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL MFD_EXEC jeffxu

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