From: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, keescook@chromium.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
ast@kernel.org, renauld@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 10:09:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZR5vSyyNGBb8TvNH@krava> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230928202410.3765062-5-kpsingh@kernel.org>
On Thu, Sep 28, 2023 at 10:24:09PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
SNIP
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
> index e97aeda3a86b..df9699bce372 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
> #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
> #include <linux/delay.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
>
> /* dummy _ops. The verifier will operate on target program's ops. */
> const struct bpf_verifier_ops bpf_extension_verifier_ops = {
> @@ -514,7 +515,7 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_tr
> {
> enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
> struct bpf_tramp_link *link_exiting;
> - int err = 0;
> + int err = 0, num_lsm_progs = 0;
> int cnt = 0, i;
>
> kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(link->link.prog);
> @@ -545,8 +546,14 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_tr
> continue;
> /* prog already linked */
> return -EBUSY;
> +
> + if (link_exiting->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
> + num_lsm_progs++;
this looks wrong, it's never reached.. seems like we should add separate
hlist_for_each_entry loop over trampoline's links for this check/init of
num_lsm_progs ?
jirka
> }
>
> + if (!num_lsm_progs && link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
> + bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(tr->func.addr, true);
> +
> hlist_add_head(&link->tramp_hlist, &tr->progs_hlist[kind]);
> tr->progs_cnt[kind]++;
> err = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
> @@ -569,8 +576,10 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_trampoline
>
> static int __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
> {
> + struct bpf_tramp_link *link_exiting;
> enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
> - int err;
> + bool lsm_link_found = false;
> + int err, num_lsm_progs = 0;
>
> kind = bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(link->link.prog);
> if (kind == BPF_TRAMP_REPLACE) {
> @@ -580,8 +589,24 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_
> tr->extension_prog = NULL;
> return err;
> }
> +
> + if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
> + hlist_for_each_entry(link_exiting, &tr->progs_hlist[kind],
> + tramp_hlist) {
> + if (link_exiting->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
> + num_lsm_progs++;
> +
> + if (link_exiting->link.prog == link->link.prog)
> + lsm_link_found = true;
> + }
> + }
> +
> hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
> tr->progs_cnt[kind]--;
> +
> + if (lsm_link_found && num_lsm_progs == 1)
> + bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(tr->func.addr, false);
> +
> return bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> index cfaf1d0e6a5f..1957244196d0 100644
> --- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
> @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
>
> static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
> #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> #undef LSM_HOOK
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
> @@ -32,3 +32,26 @@ DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
> .init = bpf_lsm_init,
> .blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes
> };
> +
> +void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value)
> +{
> + struct lsm_static_call *scalls;
> + struct security_hook_list *h;
> + int i, j;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks); i++) {
> + h = &bpf_lsm_hooks[i];
> + scalls = h->scalls;
> + if (h->hook.lsm_callback == addr)
> + continue;
> +
> + for (j = 0; j < MAX_LSM_COUNT; j++) {
> + if (scalls[j].hl != h)
> + continue;
> + if (value)
> + static_branch_enable(scalls[j].active);
> + else
> + static_branch_disable(scalls[j].active);
> + }
> + }
> +}
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index c2c2cf6b711f..d1ee72e563cc 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ static void __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl)
> __static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline,
> hl->hook.lsm_callback);
> scall->hl = hl;
> - static_branch_enable(scall->active);
> + if (hl->default_state)
> + static_branch_enable(scall->active);
> return;
> }
> scall++;
> --
> 2.42.0.582.g8ccd20d70d-goog
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-05 16:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-28 20:24 [PATCH v5 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-09-29 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-09-30 16:13 ` kernel test robot
2023-09-30 20:40 ` Kees Cook
2023-10-04 0:09 ` KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-10-05 8:09 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2023-10-05 13:26 ` KP Singh
2023-10-05 13:27 ` KP Singh
2023-10-05 13:52 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-05 16:07 ` KP Singh
2023-10-06 7:27 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-06 9:05 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-10-06 10:57 ` KP Singh
2023-10-06 18:32 ` KP Singh
2023-09-28 20:24 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-09-29 0:38 ` Kees Cook
2023-09-29 0:41 ` [PATCH v5 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls Kees Cook
2023-10-02 11:06 ` Paolo Abeni
2023-10-02 11:09 ` KP Singh
2023-10-02 13:27 ` Paolo Abeni
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