From: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
paul@paul-moore.com, keescook@chromium.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, song@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
ast@kernel.org, renauld@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 09:58:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZUNko7AU7hDTk7LU@krava> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACYkzJ5PKECadW+B9ybJUidDb6SVb6L4A2xWqwh6ybkhfZ+eag@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Nov 02, 2023 at 01:46:14AM +0100, KP Singh wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 9, 2023 at 12:11 PM Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 06, 2023 at 10:47:00PM +0200, KP Singh wrote:
> > > BPF LSM hooks have side-effects (even when a default value is returned),
> > > as some hooks end up behaving differently due to the very presence of
> > > the hook.
> > >
> > > The static keys guarding the BPF LSM hooks are disabled by default and
> > > enabled only when a BPF program is attached implementing the hook
> > > logic. This avoids the issue of the side-effects and also the minor
> > > overhead associated with the empty callback.
> > >
> > > security_file_ioctl:
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e30 <+0>: endbr64
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e34 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e39 <+9>: push %rbp
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e3a <+10>: push %r14
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e3c <+12>: push %rbx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e3d <+13>: mov %rdx,%rbx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e40 <+16>: mov %esi,%ebp
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e42 <+18>: mov %rdi,%r14
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e45 <+21>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e57 <security_file_ioctl+39>
> > > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >
> > > Static key enabled for SELinux
> > >
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e47 <+23>: xchg %ax,%ax
> > > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > >
> > > Static key disabled for BPF. This gets patched when a BPF LSM program
> > > is attached
> > >
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e49 <+25>: xor %eax,%eax
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e4b <+27>: xchg %ax,%ax
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e4d <+29>: pop %rbx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e4e <+30>: pop %r14
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e50 <+32>: pop %rbp
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e51 <+33>: cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e57 <+39>: endbr64
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e5b <+43>: mov %r14,%rdi
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e5e <+46>: mov %ebp,%esi
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e60 <+48>: mov %rbx,%rdx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e63 <+51>: call 0xffffffff819033c0 <selinux_file_ioctl>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e68 <+56>: test %eax,%eax
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e6a <+58>: jne 0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e6c <+60>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e47 <security_file_ioctl+23>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e6e <+62>: endbr64
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e72 <+66>: mov %r14,%rdi
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e75 <+69>: mov %ebp,%esi
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e77 <+71>: mov %rbx,%rdx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e7a <+74>: call 0xffffffff8141e3b0 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e7f <+79>: test %eax,%eax
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e81 <+81>: jne 0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e83 <+83>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0e49 <security_file_ioctl+25>
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e85 <+85>: endbr64
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e89 <+89>: mov %r14,%rdi
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e8c <+92>: mov %ebp,%esi
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e8e <+94>: mov %rbx,%rdx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e91 <+97>: pop %rbx
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e92 <+98>: pop %r14
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e94 <+100>: pop %rbp
> > > 0xffffffff818f0e95 <+101>: ret
> > >
> > > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > > Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
> >
> > small nit, but looks good
> >
> > Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
> >
> > jirka
> >
> >
> > > ---
> > > include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 5 +++++
> > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 ++++++++++++-
> > > kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > security/bpf/hooks.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > > security/security.c | 3 ++-
> > > 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> > > index 1de7ece5d36d..5bbc31ac948c 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
> > > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
> > >
> > > bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id);
> > > bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
> > > +void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value);
> >
> > nit, this could be static, unless there are future plans ;-)
>
> Actually, this is called from trampoline.c and cannot be static.
ah you're right, I missed that
jirka
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-02 8:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-06 20:46 [PATCH v6 0/5] Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls KP Singh
2023-10-06 20:46 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling KP Singh
2023-10-06 20:46 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time KP Singh
2023-10-06 22:19 ` Kees Cook
2023-10-06 20:46 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls KP Singh
2023-10-11 9:27 ` kernel test robot
2023-10-06 20:47 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached KP Singh
2023-10-09 10:10 ` Jiri Olsa
2023-11-02 0:46 ` KP Singh
2023-11-02 8:58 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2023-10-06 20:47 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY KP Singh
2023-10-06 22:20 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ZUNko7AU7hDTk7LU@krava \
--to=olsajiri@gmail.com \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=renauld@google.com \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).