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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.orgg
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Don't use 'buf->handles'
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 09:19:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aTfNl2nhJkjcOG5J@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251209071144.56893-1-jarkko@kernel.org>

On Tue, Dec 09, 2025 at 09:11:43AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> tpm2_unseal_trusted() deduces number of handles in run-time even tho the
> expected value is known at compile time. Address the issue.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
>  security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 9074ae1a5896..e78061ee2d99 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>  		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>  			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
>  		} else  {
> -			offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
> +			offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 2 * sizeof(u32);

Oops.

Should be 'TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32)'. There's just a single handle.

>  			head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
>  			if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
>  				head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
> -- 
> 2.39.5
> 

BR, Jarkko

      reply	other threads:[~2025-12-09  7:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-12-09  7:11 [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Don't use 'buf->handles' Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-12-09  7:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]

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