From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
linux-next@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: -next status as at v7.1-rc6
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2026 08:45:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aiLS4wOtpqrpw4pA@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wij4nkMRcshzEGsxvjwP2RBQyaiQ4-vQrYTOqvQusxu9g@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 04:18:46PM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, 4 Jun 2026 at 15:23, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> >
> > While you didn't reply to any of my comments explaining how Hornet
> > works, specifically how it ties into the kernel, I'm assuming you've
> > read the overview. Can you help those of us in the LSM space
> > understand why a BPF dev's NACK on code that lives strictly under
> > security/ is sufficient grounds to reject an LSM patch?
>
> Honestly, I'm not competent to make a judgment call between two
> different models for hash chain verification, so I basically *have* to
> go by maintainer opinions.
>
> And the discussions I have been cc'd on have not been what I'd call
> enlightening.
>
> But people have pointed out that the LSM code mucks around with bpf
> internals, and those NAK's have had reasons for them.
>
> And honestly, I don't understand *why* Hornet does what it does - and
> does it in ways that obviously annoy the bpf people. There is no
> *reason* to look at the bpf maps that I can see, and from my
> understanding of Alexei's arguments (which may be lacking), the fact
> that Hornet does that is the main reason for the NAK.
The two most useful threads I believe were from a year ago,
20250502184421.1424368-1-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com
and
20250528215037.2081066-1-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com
which includes the proposal by the BPF side:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CACYkzJ6VQUExfyt0=-FmXz46GHJh3d=FXh5j4KfexcEFbHV-vg@mail.gmail.com/
There were 2 or three objections from each side iiuc, but the main ones
that stuck in my mind were
1. whether it is ok to rely on a signed userspace bpf verifier program to
verify the signature.
2. objection by James Bottomley
(2f71d6c03698eb17d51f7247efde777627ee578a.camel@HansenPartnership.com)
about the verifiability of the hash chain link.
> But instead of working with the bpf people on coming up with some
> model that does *not* do that, it all seems to have become a "we'll do
> it anyway, despite maintainer complaints".
>
> And I *did* see the bpf people pointing to "this would be an
> acceptable alternative" with KP Singh outlining something that *had*
> been discussed.
>
> But I never actually saw anybody say "ok, we'll try that instead".
>
> Maybe I missed it.
>
> But from what I saw, it really looked like "I see NAK's from three
> different bpf maintainers, with suggested alternate approaches". None
> of which resulted in anything that looked like "ok, we'll try to
> follow your guidance", only more of the same.
>
> Why would *my* input then make any difference?
>
> The bpf people's arguments resonated more with me. For example, the
> whole "we need to know if it passed the bpf signature" seems to be
> complate pointless silliness, and the bpf peoples responses to that
> resonated with me. There's *no* point in any LSM check whether the
> signature passed or not, since if it didn't pass, it's not getting
> loaded.
>
> So that's basically where I stand - I've seen disagreement, and I've
> seen what looks to me like reasonable push-back, and I've not really
> seen the LSM response as taking it into account.
>
> Linus
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-05 13:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <83f77b2b-8c00-424d-b6f9-b044e7ea1ee7@sirena.org.uk>
[not found] ` <CAHk-=wj6CtZS9hbwFjQcoNkPwQLoyKmk8czaBF6=bBOCYuXEUQ@mail.gmail.com>
2026-06-04 0:04 ` -next status as at v7.1-rc6 Paul Moore
2026-06-04 0:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-06-04 22:23 ` Paul Moore
2026-06-04 23:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-06-05 2:53 ` Paul Moore
2026-06-05 13:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2026-06-05 17:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-06-05 18:29 ` James Bottomley
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