Re: Landlock: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV bypass via io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD

["Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>]

On Wed, Jun 17, 2026 at 04:16:38PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> As I explained in previous (private) reports, there is currently no
> io_uring hooks implemented for Landlock because there is no use for
> them.
> 
> io_uring "bypass" was already mentioned to us two times in March but
> io_uring personality credential is not a Landlock bypass.  The Landlock
> threat model is about enforcing restrictions when accessing new kernel
> resources, on a sandboxed subject.  The credential identifies a set of
> access rights, so in the case of io_uring, the subject is inherited by
> the io_uring personality (i.e. the file descriptor).  If a sandboxed
> task creates an io_uring personality, it will be sandboxed with the same
> restrictions, which is BTW an interesting property (e.g.  pass a
> restricted io_uring FD to processes)

Remark on the side: We have previously received bug reports due to
io_uring using different credentials, but this report is not about that.

Instead, it is about the block device "discard" operation, which is
accessible through both (a) the ioctl() interface and (b) an io_uring
interface.  The report is, in my reading, about the fact that the access
through (a) can be blocked with Landlock, while the access through (b)
can not be blocked through Landlock.  (See the other answer I sent.)

But either way, as you are also saying here, we should probably document
better what the threat model for Landlock is, so that security
researchers (and AI models) can refer to that.  It'll result in less
work for everyone.

I opened https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/64 to track it and
collected some notes.

—Günther