From: james.l.morris@oracle.com (James Morris)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id
Date: Fri, 20 Oct 2017 16:15:00 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1710201614310.20085@t440> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171019130809.2farwdz3uav6vlp3@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
On Thu, 19 Oct 2017, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> On 2017-10-11 20:57, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid
> > application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was
> > supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities
> > in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event
> > really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly
> > records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on
> > set*id.
>
> <crickets>
>
> Serge? James? Can one of you two take this via your trees since Paul
> has backed down citing (reasonably) that it is mostly capabilities
> patches rather than audit?
Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-general
--
James Morris
<james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-20 5:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-12 0:57 [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-12 0:57 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-19 13:08 ` [PATCH GHAK16 V5 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-20 1:29 ` James Morris
2017-10-20 2:34 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2017-10-20 5:15 ` James Morris [this message]
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