* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
[not found] <alpine.LFD.2.20.1711292113350.7808@localhost>
@ 2017-11-30 0:22 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 0:31 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-11-30 0:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/29/2017 2:26 AM, James Morris wrote:
> I'm seeing a kernel stack corruption bug (detected via gcc) when running
> the SELinux testsuite on a 4.15-rc1 kernel, in the 2nd inet_socket test:
>
> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/blob/master/tests/inet_socket/test
>
> # Verify that unauthorized client cannot communicate with the server.
> $result = system
> "runcon -t test_inet_bad_client_t -- $basedir/client stream 127.0.0.1 65535 2>&1";
>
> This correctlly causes an access control error in the Netlabel code, and
> the bug seems to be triggered during the ICMP send:
>
> ...<SNIP>...
>
> This is mostly reliable, and I'm only seeing it on bare metal (not in a
> virtualbox vm).
>
> The SELinux skb parse error at the start only sometimes appears, and
> looking at the code, I suspect some kind of memory corruption being the
> cause at that point (basic packet header checks).
>
> I bisected the bug down to the following change:
>
> commit bffa72cf7f9df842f0016ba03586039296b4caaf
> Author: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> Date: Tue Sep 19 05:14:24 2017 -0700
>
> net: sk_buff rbnode reorg
> ...
>
>
> Anyone else able to reproduce this, or have any ideas on what's happening?
I have also bisected a problem to this change. I do not have a trace
because the problem manifests as a hard system hang without a trace
being presented. The issue arises when Smack attempts to relabel a TCP
socket using netlbl_sock_setattr().
I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I don't see
the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my problem?
Thank you.
>
>
>
> - James
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 0:22 ` [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error Casey Schaufler
@ 2017-11-30 0:31 ` James Morris
2017-11-30 3:16 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2017-11-30 0:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I don't see
> the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my problem?
Forwarded off-list.
Interestingly, I didn't see the KASAN output email from Stephen here.
--
James Morris
<james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 0:31 ` James Morris
@ 2017-11-30 3:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-11-30 3:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
>> I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I don't see
>> the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my problem?
> Forwarded off-list.
The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
>
> Interestingly, I didn't see the KASAN output email from Stephen here.
>
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 3:16 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 12:47 ` Paul Moore
` (4 more replies)
0 siblings, 5 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2017-11-30 10:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Wed, 2017-11-29 at 19:16 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >
> > > I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I
> > > don't see
> > > the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my
> > > problem?
> >
> > Forwarded off-list.
>
> The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
Can you guys test the following more complete patch ?
It should cover IPv4 and IPv6, and also the corner cases.
( Note that I squashed ipv6 fix in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/8
42844/ that I spotted while cooking this patch )
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index c6bc0c4d19c624888b0d0b5a4246c7183edf63f5..77ea45da0fe9c746907a312989658af3ad3b198d 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1591,6 +1591,34 @@ int tcp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_filter);
+static void tcp_v4_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ memmove(IPCB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4,
+ sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
+}
+
+static void tcp_v4_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph,
+ const struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
+ * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
+ */
+ memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
+ sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
+ barrier();
+
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
+ skb->len - th->doff * 4);
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
+ skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
+}
+
/*
* From tcp_input.c
*/
@@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
- /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
- * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
- */
- memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
- sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
- barrier();
-
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
- skb->len - th->doff * 4);
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
- TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
- skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
-
lookup:
sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
@@ -1679,14 +1689,19 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_hold(sk);
refcounted = true;
nsk = NULL;
- if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
+ if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
+ th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
+ iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+ tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
+ }
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
reqsk_put(req);
+ tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
} else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
goto discard_and_relse;
@@ -1712,6 +1727,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto discard_and_relse;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
+ tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
skb->dev = NULL;
@@ -1742,6 +1758,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_it;
+ tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
+
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
csum_error:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
@@ -1768,6 +1786,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto discard_it;
}
+ tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
+
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto csum_error;
@@ -1784,6 +1804,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (sk2) {
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
sk = sk2;
+ tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
refcounted = false;
goto process;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 6bb98c93edfe2ed2f16fe5229605f8108cfc7f9a..1f04ec0e4a7aa2c11b8ee27cbdd4067b5bcf32e5 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1454,7 +1454,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
- tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) {
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
reqsk_put(req);
@@ -1467,8 +1466,12 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_hold(sk);
refcounted = true;
nsk = NULL;
- if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
+ if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
+ th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
+ hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
+ }
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_and_relse;
@@ -1492,8 +1495,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
- tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
-
if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
@@ -1501,6 +1502,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
goto discard_and_relse;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+ tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
skb->dev = NULL;
@@ -1590,7 +1592,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
break;
case TCP_TW_RST:
- tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2017-11-30 12:47 ` Paul Moore
2017-11-30 16:57 ` Paul Moore
2017-11-30 14:33 ` Casey Schaufler
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2017-11-30 12:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 5:50 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-29 at 19:16 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
>> > On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> >
>> > > I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I
>> > > don't see
>> > > the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my
>> > > problem?
>> >
>> > Forwarded off-list.
>>
>> The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
>
> Can you guys test the following more complete patch ?
>
> It should cover IPv4 and IPv6, and also the corner cases.
>
> ( Note that I squashed ipv6 fix in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/8
> 42844/ that I spotted while cooking this patch )
Building a test kernel now, although it make take me a few hours to
test it due to some commitments this morning.
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> index c6bc0c4d19c624888b0d0b5a4246c7183edf63f5..77ea45da0fe9c746907a312989658af3ad3b198d 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> @@ -1591,6 +1591,34 @@ int tcp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_filter);
>
> +static void tcp_v4_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> + memmove(IPCB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4,
> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> +}
> +
> +static void tcp_v4_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph,
> + const struct tcphdr *th)
> +{
> + /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> + * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> + */
> + memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> + barrier();
> +
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> + skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> + skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * From tcp_input.c
> */
> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> - * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> - */
> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> - barrier();
> -
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> - skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> -
> lookup:
> sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
> th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
> @@ -1679,14 +1689,19 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> sock_hold(sk);
> refcounted = true;
> nsk = NULL;
> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> + iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
> + }
> if (!nsk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> }
> if (nsk == sk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> } else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
> tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> @@ -1712,6 +1727,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_and_relse;
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>
> skb->dev = NULL;
>
> @@ -1742,6 +1758,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
> goto discard_it;
>
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> +
> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
> csum_error:
> __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
> @@ -1768,6 +1786,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_it;
> }
>
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> +
> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
> inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> goto csum_error;
> @@ -1784,6 +1804,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (sk2) {
> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> sk = sk2;
> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> refcounted = false;
> goto process;
> }
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> index 6bb98c93edfe2ed2f16fe5229605f8108cfc7f9a..1f04ec0e4a7aa2c11b8ee27cbdd4067b5bcf32e5 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> @@ -1454,7 +1454,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> struct sock *nsk;
>
> sk = req->rsk_listener;
> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) {
> sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
> reqsk_put(req);
> @@ -1467,8 +1466,12 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> sock_hold(sk);
> refcounted = true;
> nsk = NULL;
> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> + hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
> + }
> if (!nsk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> @@ -1492,8 +1495,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
> goto discard_and_relse;
>
> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> -
> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
> goto discard_and_relse;
>
> @@ -1501,6 +1502,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_and_relse;
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>
> skb->dev = NULL;
>
> @@ -1590,7 +1592,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
> break;
> case TCP_TW_RST:
> - tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
> tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> goto discard_it;
>
>
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 12:47 ` Paul Moore
@ 2017-11-30 14:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 15:11 ` Casey Schaufler
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-11-30 14:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/30/2017 2:50 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-29 at 19:16 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>
>>>> I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I
>>>> don't see
>>>> the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my
>>>> problem?
>>> Forwarded off-list.
>> The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
> Can you guys test the following more complete patch ?
Building now. I should have results soon.
>
> It should cover IPv4 and IPv6, and also the corner cases.
>
> ( Note that I squashed ipv6 fix in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/8
> 42844/ that I spotted while cooking this patch )
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> index c6bc0c4d19c624888b0d0b5a4246c7183edf63f5..77ea45da0fe9c746907a312989658af3ad3b198d 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> @@ -1591,6 +1591,34 @@ int tcp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_filter);
>
> +static void tcp_v4_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> + memmove(IPCB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4,
> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> +}
> +
> +static void tcp_v4_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph,
> + const struct tcphdr *th)
> +{
> + /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> + * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> + */
> + memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> + barrier();
> +
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> + skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> + skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * From tcp_input.c
> */
> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> - * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> - */
> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> - barrier();
> -
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> - skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> -
> lookup:
> sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
> th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
> @@ -1679,14 +1689,19 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> sock_hold(sk);
> refcounted = true;
> nsk = NULL;
> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> + iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
> + }
> if (!nsk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> }
> if (nsk == sk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> } else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
> tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> @@ -1712,6 +1727,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_and_relse;
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>
> skb->dev = NULL;
>
> @@ -1742,6 +1758,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
> goto discard_it;
>
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> +
> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
> csum_error:
> __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
> @@ -1768,6 +1786,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_it;
> }
>
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> +
> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
> inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> goto csum_error;
> @@ -1784,6 +1804,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (sk2) {
> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> sk = sk2;
> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> refcounted = false;
> goto process;
> }
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> index 6bb98c93edfe2ed2f16fe5229605f8108cfc7f9a..1f04ec0e4a7aa2c11b8ee27cbdd4067b5bcf32e5 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> @@ -1454,7 +1454,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> struct sock *nsk;
>
> sk = req->rsk_listener;
> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) {
> sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
> reqsk_put(req);
> @@ -1467,8 +1466,12 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> sock_hold(sk);
> refcounted = true;
> nsk = NULL;
> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> + hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
> + }
> if (!nsk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> @@ -1492,8 +1495,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
> goto discard_and_relse;
>
> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> -
> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
> goto discard_and_relse;
>
> @@ -1501,6 +1502,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_and_relse;
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>
> skb->dev = NULL;
>
> @@ -1590,7 +1592,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
> break;
> case TCP_TW_RST:
> - tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
> tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> goto discard_it;
>
>
>
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 12:47 ` Paul Moore
2017-11-30 14:33 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2017-11-30 15:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 15:44 ` David Ahern
2017-12-01 1:55 ` James Morris
4 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-11-30 15:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/30/2017 2:50 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-29 at 19:16 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
>>> On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>
>>>> I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I
>>>> don't see
>>>> the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my
>>>> problem?
>>> Forwarded off-list.
>> The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
> Can you guys test the following more complete patch ?
My tests are passing. Thank you.
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>
> It should cover IPv4 and IPv6, and also the corner cases.
>
> ( Note that I squashed ipv6 fix in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/8
> 42844/ that I spotted while cooking this patch )
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> index c6bc0c4d19c624888b0d0b5a4246c7183edf63f5..77ea45da0fe9c746907a312989658af3ad3b198d 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
> @@ -1591,6 +1591,34 @@ int tcp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_filter);
>
> +static void tcp_v4_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> + memmove(IPCB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4,
> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> +}
> +
> +static void tcp_v4_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph,
> + const struct tcphdr *th)
> +{
> + /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> + * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> + */
> + memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> + barrier();
> +
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> + skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> + skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * From tcp_input.c
> */
> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> - * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> - */
> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> - barrier();
> -
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> - skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> -
> lookup:
> sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
> th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
> @@ -1679,14 +1689,19 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> sock_hold(sk);
> refcounted = true;
> nsk = NULL;
> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> + iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
> + }
> if (!nsk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> }
> if (nsk == sk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> } else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
> tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> @@ -1712,6 +1727,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_and_relse;
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>
> skb->dev = NULL;
>
> @@ -1742,6 +1758,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
> goto discard_it;
>
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> +
> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
> csum_error:
> __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
> @@ -1768,6 +1786,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_it;
> }
>
> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
> +
> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
> inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> goto csum_error;
> @@ -1784,6 +1804,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (sk2) {
> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> sk = sk2;
> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
> refcounted = false;
> goto process;
> }
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> index 6bb98c93edfe2ed2f16fe5229605f8108cfc7f9a..1f04ec0e4a7aa2c11b8ee27cbdd4067b5bcf32e5 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
> @@ -1454,7 +1454,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> struct sock *nsk;
>
> sk = req->rsk_listener;
> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) {
> sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
> reqsk_put(req);
> @@ -1467,8 +1466,12 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> sock_hold(sk);
> refcounted = true;
> nsk = NULL;
> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> + hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
> + }
> if (!nsk) {
> reqsk_put(req);
> goto discard_and_relse;
> @@ -1492,8 +1495,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
> goto discard_and_relse;
>
> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
> -
> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
> goto discard_and_relse;
>
> @@ -1501,6 +1502,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> goto discard_and_relse;
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>
> skb->dev = NULL;
>
> @@ -1590,7 +1592,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
> break;
> case TCP_TW_RST:
> - tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
> tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
> goto discard_it;
>
>
>
>
--
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-30 15:11 ` Casey Schaufler
@ 2017-11-30 15:44 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 17:30 ` David Ahern
2017-12-01 1:55 ` James Morris
4 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Ahern @ 2017-11-30 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/30/17 3:50 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>
> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
> - * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
> - */
> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> - barrier();
> -
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
> - skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
> -
> lookup:
> sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
> th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
I believe moving the above is going to affect lookups with VRF. Let me
take a look before this gets committed.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 12:47 ` Paul Moore
@ 2017-11-30 16:57 ` Paul Moore
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2017-11-30 16:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 7:47 AM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 5:50 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, 2017-11-29 at 19:16 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
>>> > On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I
>>> > > don't see
>>> > > the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my
>>> > > problem?
>>> >
>>> > Forwarded off-list.
>>>
>>> The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
>>
>> Can you guys test the following more complete patch ?
>>
>> It should cover IPv4 and IPv6, and also the corner cases.
>>
>> ( Note that I squashed ipv6 fix in https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/8
>> 42844/ that I spotted while cooking this patch )
>
> Building a test kernel now, although it make take me a few hours to
> test it due to some commitments this morning.
I just realized I forgot to enable KASAN in the build, but I can
verify that the patch doesn't break anything in the selinux-testsuite.
Tested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
>> diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
>> index c6bc0c4d19c624888b0d0b5a4246c7183edf63f5..77ea45da0fe9c746907a312989658af3ad3b198d 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
>> @@ -1591,6 +1591,34 @@ int tcp_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_filter);
>>
>> +static void tcp_v4_restore_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> +{
>> + memmove(IPCB(skb), &TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4,
>> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void tcp_v4_fill_cb(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph,
>> + const struct tcphdr *th)
>> +{
>> + /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
>> + * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
>> + */
>> + memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
>> + sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
>> + barrier();
>> +
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
>> + skb->len - th->doff * 4);
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
>> + TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
>> + skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * From tcp_input.c
>> */
>> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>>
>> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
>> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
>> - * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
>> - */
>> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
>> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
>> - barrier();
>> -
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
>> - skb->len - th->doff * 4);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
>> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
>> -
>> lookup:
>> sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
>> th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
>> @@ -1679,14 +1689,19 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> sock_hold(sk);
>> refcounted = true;
>> nsk = NULL;
>> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
>> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
>> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>> + iph = ip_hdr(skb);
>> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
>> + }
>> if (!nsk) {
>> reqsk_put(req);
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>> }
>> if (nsk == sk) {
>> reqsk_put(req);
>> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
>> } else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
>> tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>> @@ -1712,6 +1727,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
>> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>>
>> skb->dev = NULL;
>>
>> @@ -1742,6 +1758,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
>> goto discard_it;
>>
>> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>> +
>> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
>> csum_error:
>> __TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
>> @@ -1768,6 +1786,8 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> goto discard_it;
>> }
>>
>> + tcp_v4_fill_cb(skb, iph, th);
>> +
>> if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
>> inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
>> goto csum_error;
>> @@ -1784,6 +1804,7 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> if (sk2) {
>> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
>> sk = sk2;
>> + tcp_v4_restore_cb(skb);
>> refcounted = false;
>> goto process;
>> }
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
>> index 6bb98c93edfe2ed2f16fe5229605f8108cfc7f9a..1f04ec0e4a7aa2c11b8ee27cbdd4067b5bcf32e5 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
>> @@ -1454,7 +1454,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> struct sock *nsk;
>>
>> sk = req->rsk_listener;
>> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb)) {
>> sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
>> reqsk_put(req);
>> @@ -1467,8 +1466,12 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> sock_hold(sk);
>> refcounted = true;
>> nsk = NULL;
>> - if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb))
>> + if (!tcp_filter(sk, skb)) {
>> + th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>> + hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
>> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>> nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
>> + }
>> if (!nsk) {
>> reqsk_put(req);
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>> @@ -1492,8 +1495,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> if (!xfrm6_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>>
>> - tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>> -
>> if (tcp_v6_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>>
>> @@ -1501,6 +1502,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> goto discard_and_relse;
>> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>> hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
>> + tcp_v6_fill_cb(skb, hdr, th);
>>
>> skb->dev = NULL;
>>
>> @@ -1590,7 +1592,6 @@ static int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> tcp_v6_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
>> break;
>> case TCP_TW_RST:
>> - tcp_v6_restore_cb(skb);
>> tcp_v6_send_reset(sk, skb);
>> inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
>> goto discard_it;
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
> --
> paul moore
> www.paul-moore.com
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 15:44 ` David Ahern
@ 2017-11-30 17:30 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 17:57 ` Eric Dumazet
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Ahern @ 2017-11-30 17:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/30/17 8:44 AM, David Ahern wrote:
> On 11/30/17 3:50 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>>
>> th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>> iph = ip_hdr(skb);
>> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
>> - * barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
>> - */
>> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
>> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
>> - barrier();
>> -
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
>> - skb->len - th->doff * 4);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
>> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)->hwtstamp;
>> -
>> lookup:
>> sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
>> th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
>
> I believe moving the above is going to affect lookups with VRF. Let me
> take a look before this gets committed.
>
Eric:
Can you add this to the patch? Fixes socket lookups with VRF which
stashes a flag in the cb.
Thanks,
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 4e09398009c1..6c020015d556 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline bool inet_exact_dif_match(struct net
*net, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV)
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept &&
- skb && ipv4_l3mdev_skb(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.flags))
+ skb && ipv4_l3mdev_skb(IPCB(skb)->flags))
return true;
#endif
return false;
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 17:30 ` David Ahern
@ 2017-11-30 17:57 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 18:03 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
0 siblings, 2 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2017-11-30 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Thu, 2017-11-30 at 10:30 -0700, David Ahern wrote:
> On 11/30/17 8:44 AM, David Ahern wrote:
> > On 11/30/17 3:50 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > > @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
> > > ?
> > > ? th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
> > > ? iph = ip_hdr(skb);
> > > - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location
> > > into TCP_SKB_CB()
> > > - ?* barrier() makes sure compiler wont play
> > > fool^Waliasing games.
> > > - ?*/
> > > - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
> > > - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
> > > - barrier();
> > > -
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th-
> > > >syn + th->fin +
> > > - ????skb->len - th->doff * 4);
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked ?= 0;
> > > - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
> > > - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)-
> > > >hwtstamp;
> > > -
> > > ?lookup:
> > > ? sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb,
> > > __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
> > > ? ???????th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
> >
> > I believe moving the above is going to affect lookups with VRF. Let
> > me
> > take a look before this gets committed.
> >
>
> Eric:
>
> Can you add this to the patch? Fixes socket lookups with VRF which
> stashes a flag in the cb.
>
> Thanks,
>
> diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
> index 4e09398009c1..6c020015d556 100644
> --- a/include/net/tcp.h
> +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
> @@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline bool inet_exact_dif_match(struct
> net
> *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
> ?{
> ?#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV)
> ????????if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept &&
> -???????????skb && ipv4_l3mdev_skb(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.flags))
> +???????????skb && ipv4_l3mdev_skb(IPCB(skb)->flags))
> ????????????????return true;
> ?#endif
> ????????return false;
I wonder if this should not be in a separate patch ?
Bug was added in 971f10eca186cab238c49daa91f703c5a001b0b1 ("tcp: better
TCP_SKB_CB layout to reduce cache line misses") in linux 3.18
While VRF was added later.
If you agree, I will prepare a patch series, with different Fixes tag
so that David can decide which path needs to be backported into each
stable version.
Thanks.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 17:57 ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2017-11-30 18:03 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
1 sibling, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: David Ahern @ 2017-11-30 18:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/30/17 10:57 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> I wonder if this should not be in a separate patch ?
>
> Bug was added in 971f10eca186cab238c49daa91f703c5a001b0b1 ("tcp: better
> TCP_SKB_CB layout to reduce cache line misses") in linux 3.18
>
> While VRF was added later.
>
> If you agree, I will prepare a patch series, with different Fixes tag
> so that David can decide which path needs to be backported into each
> stable version.
>
That's sound fine to me.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 17:57 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 18:03 ` David Ahern
@ 2017-11-30 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
1 sibling, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2017-11-30 18:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On 11/30/2017 9:57 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-11-30 at 10:30 -0700, David Ahern wrote:
>> On 11/30/17 8:44 AM, David Ahern wrote:
>>> On 11/30/17 3:50 AM, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>>>> @@ -1631,24 +1659,6 @@ int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>>>> ?
>>>> ? th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
>>>> ? iph = ip_hdr(skb);
>>>> - /* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location
>>>> into TCP_SKB_CB()
>>>> - ?* barrier() makes sure compiler wont play
>>>> fool^Waliasing games.
>>>> - ?*/
>>>> - memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
>>>> - sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
>>>> - barrier();
>>>> -
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th-
>>>>> syn + th->fin +
>>>> - ????skb->len - th->doff * 4);
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked ?= 0;
>>>> - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_rxtstamp =
>>>> - skb->tstamp || skb_hwtstamps(skb)-
>>>>> hwtstamp;
>>>> -
>>>> ?lookup:
>>>> ? sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb,
>>>> __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
>>>> ? ???????th->dest, sdif, &refcounted);
>>> I believe moving the above is going to affect lookups with VRF. Let
>>> me
>>> take a look before this gets committed.
>>>
>> Eric:
>>
>> Can you add this to the patch? Fixes socket lookups with VRF which
>> stashes a flag in the cb.
I've done my testing and it works both ways for Smack.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
>> index 4e09398009c1..6c020015d556 100644
>> --- a/include/net/tcp.h
>> +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
>> @@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline bool inet_exact_dif_match(struct
>> net
>> *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> ?{
>> ?#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV)
>> ????????if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept &&
>> -???????????skb && ipv4_l3mdev_skb(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4.flags))
>> +???????????skb && ipv4_l3mdev_skb(IPCB(skb)->flags))
>> ????????????????return true;
>> ?#endif
>> ????????return false;
>
> I wonder if this should not be in a separate patch ?
>
> Bug was added in 971f10eca186cab238c49daa91f703c5a001b0b1 ("tcp: better
> TCP_SKB_CB layout to reduce cache line misses") in linux 3.18
>
> While VRF was added later.
>
> If you agree, I will prepare a patch series, with different Fixes tag
> so that David can decide which path needs to be backported into each
> stable version.
>
> Thanks.
>
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-30 15:44 ` David Ahern
@ 2017-12-01 1:55 ` James Morris
4 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2017-12-01 1:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
On Thu, 30 Nov 2017, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-11-29 at 19:16 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > On 11/29/2017 4:31 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > > On Wed, 29 Nov 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > >
> > > > I see that there is a proposed fix later in the thread, but I
> > > > don't see
> > > > the patch. Could you send it to me, so I can try it on my
> > > > problem?
> > >
> > > Forwarded off-list.
> >
> > The patch does fix the problem I was seeing in Smack.
>
> Can you guys test the following more complete patch ?
>
> It should cover IPv4 and IPv6, and also the corner cases.
Tested-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
--
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<james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-12-01 1:55 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2017-11-30 0:22 ` [BUG] kernel stack corruption during/after Netlabel error Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 0:31 ` James Morris
2017-11-30 3:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 10:50 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 12:47 ` Paul Moore
2017-11-30 16:57 ` Paul Moore
2017-11-30 14:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 15:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-30 15:44 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 17:30 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 17:57 ` Eric Dumazet
2017-11-30 18:03 ` David Ahern
2017-11-30 18:16 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-12-01 1:55 ` James Morris
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