* [PATCH 0/3] namei: implement various scoping AT_* flags [not found] ` <39d64180-73d5-6f27-e455-956143a5b5d3@digikod.net> @ 2018-09-30 21:46 ` Jann Horn [not found] ` <0ca12a6e-a86b-5d50-40b9-e76c1a4bc6a0@digikod.net> 0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread From: Jann Horn @ 2018-09-30 21:46 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-security-module On Sun, Sep 30, 2018 at 10:39 PM Micka?l Sala?n <mic@digikod.net> wrote: > As a side note, I'm still working on Landlock which can achieve the same > goal but in a more flexible and dynamic way: https://landlock.io Isn't Landlock mostly intended for userspace that wants to impose a custom Mandatory Access Control policy on itself, restricting the whole process? As far as I can tell, a major usecase for AT_BENEATH are privileged processes that do not want to restrict all filesystem operations they perform, but want to sometimes impose limits on filesystem traversal for the duration of a single system call. For example, a process might want to first open a file from an untrusted filesystem area with AT_BENEATH, and afterwards open a configuration file without AT_BENEATH. How would you do this in Landlock? Use a BPF map to store per-thread filesystem restrictions, and then do bpf() calls before and after every restricted filesystem access to set and unset the policy for the current syscall? > On 9/29/18 12:34, Aleksa Sarai wrote: > > The need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid > > malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very > > long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a > > revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[1] patchset with a few additions. > > > > The most obvious change is that AT_NO_JUMPS has been split as dicussed > > in the original thread, along with a further split of AT_NO_PROCLINKS > > which means that each individual property of AT_NO_JUMPS is now a > > separate flag: > > > > * Path-based escapes from the starting-point using "/" or ".." are > > blocked by AT_BENEATH. > > * Mountpoint crossings are blocked by AT_XDEV. > > * /proc/$pid/fd/$fd resolution is blocked by AT_NO_PROCLINKS (more > > correctly it actually blocks any user of nd_jump_link() because it > > allows out-of-VFS path resolution manipulation). > > > > AT_NO_JUMPS is now effectively (AT_BENEATH|AT_XDEV|AT_NO_PROCLINKS). At > > Linus' suggestion in the original thread, I've also implemented > > AT_NO_SYMLINKS which just denies _all_ symlink resolution (including > > "proclink" resolution). > > > > An additional improvement was made to AT_XDEV. The original AT_NO_JUMPS > > path didn't consider "/tmp/.." as a mountpoint crossing -- this patch > > blocks this as well (feel free to ask me to remove it if you feel this > > is not sane). > > > > Currently I've only enabled these for openat(2) and the stat(2) family. > > I would hope we could enable it for basically every *at(2) syscall -- > > but many of them appear to not have a @flags argument and thus we'll > > need to add several new syscalls to do this. I'm more than happy to send > > those patches, but I'd prefer to know that this preliminary work is > > acceptable before doing a bunch of copy-paste to add new sets of *at(2) > > syscalls. > > > > One additional feature I've implemented is AT_THIS_ROOT (I imagine this > > is probably going to be more contentious than the refresh of > > AT_NO_JUMPS, so I've included it in a separate patch). The patch itself > > describes my reasoning, but the shortened version of the premise is that > > continer runtimes need to have a way to resolve paths within a > > potentially malicious rootfs. Container runtimes currently do this in > > userspace[2] which has implicit race conditions that are not resolvable > > in userspace (or use fork+exec+chroot and SCM_RIGHTS passing which is > > inefficient). AT_THIS_ROOT allows for per-call chroot-like semantics for > > path resolution, which would be invaluable for us -- and the > > implementation is basically identical to AT_BENEATH (except that we > > don't return errors when someone actually hits the root). > > > > I've added some selftests for this, but it's not clear to me whether > > they should live here or in xfstests (as far as I can tell there are no > > other VFS tests in selftests, while there are some tests that look like > > generic VFS tests in xfstests). If you'd prefer them to be included in > > xfstests, let me know. > > > > [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/784221/ > > [2]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin > > > > Aleksa Sarai (3): > > namei: implement O_BENEATH-style AT_* flags > > namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution > > selftests: vfs: add AT_* path resolution tests > > > > fs/fcntl.c | 2 +- > > fs/namei.c | 158 ++++++++++++------ > > fs/open.c | 10 ++ > > fs/stat.c | 15 +- > > include/linux/fcntl.h | 3 +- > > include/linux/namei.h | 8 + > > include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 20 +++ > > include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 10 ++ > > tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + > > tools/testing/selftests/vfs/.gitignore | 1 + > > tools/testing/selftests/vfs/Makefile | 13 ++ > > tools/testing/selftests/vfs/at_flags.h | 40 +++++ > > tools/testing/selftests/vfs/common.sh | 37 ++++ > > .../selftests/vfs/tests/0001_at_beneath.sh | 72 ++++++++ > > .../selftests/vfs/tests/0002_at_xdev.sh | 54 ++++++ > > .../vfs/tests/0003_at_no_proclinks.sh | 50 ++++++ > > .../vfs/tests/0004_at_no_symlinks.sh | 49 ++++++ > > .../selftests/vfs/tests/0005_at_this_root.sh | 66 ++++++++ > > tools/testing/selftests/vfs/vfs_helper.c | 154 +++++++++++++++++ > > 19 files changed, 707 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/.gitignore > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/Makefile > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/at_flags.h > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/common.sh > > create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0001_at_beneath.sh > > create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0002_at_xdev.sh > > create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0003_at_no_proclinks.sh > > create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0004_at_no_symlinks.sh > > create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0005_at_this_root.sh > > create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/vfs_helper.c > > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <0ca12a6e-a86b-5d50-40b9-e76c1a4bc6a0@digikod.net>]
* Re: [PATCH 0/3] namei: implement various scoping AT_* flags [not found] ` <0ca12a6e-a86b-5d50-40b9-e76c1a4bc6a0@digikod.net> @ 2018-10-01 20:14 ` James Morris 0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread From: James Morris @ 2018-10-01 20:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Mickaël Salaün Cc: Jann Horn, cyphar, jlayton, Bruce Fields, Al Viro, Arnd Bergmann, shuah, David Howells, Andy Lutomirski, christian, Eric W. Biederman, Tycho Andersen, kernel list, linux-fsdevel, linux-arch, linux-kselftest, dev, containers, linux-security-module, Kees Cook, Linux API [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6502 bytes --] On Mon, 1 Oct 2018, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Another way to apply a security policy could be to tied it to a file > descriptor, similarly to Capsicum, which could enable to create > programmable (real) capabilities. This way, it would be possible to > "wrap" a file descriptor with a Landlock program and use it with > FD-based syscalls or pass it to other processes. This would not require > changes to the FS subsystem, but only the Landlock LSM code. This isn't > done yet but I plan to add this new way to restrict operations on file > descriptors. Very interesting! This could possibly be an LSM which stacks/integrates with other LSMs to enforce MAC of object capabilities. > > Anyway, for the use case you mentioned, the AT_BENEATH flag(s) should be > simple to use and enough for now. We must be careful of the hardcoded > policy though. > > > > > >> On 9/29/18 12:34, Aleksa Sarai wrote: > >>> The need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid > >>> malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very > >>> long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a > >>> revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[1] patchset with a few additions. > >>> > >>> The most obvious change is that AT_NO_JUMPS has been split as dicussed > >>> in the original thread, along with a further split of AT_NO_PROCLINKS > >>> which means that each individual property of AT_NO_JUMPS is now a > >>> separate flag: > >>> > >>> * Path-based escapes from the starting-point using "/" or ".." are > >>> blocked by AT_BENEATH. > >>> * Mountpoint crossings are blocked by AT_XDEV. > >>> * /proc/$pid/fd/$fd resolution is blocked by AT_NO_PROCLINKS (more > >>> correctly it actually blocks any user of nd_jump_link() because it > >>> allows out-of-VFS path resolution manipulation). > >>> > >>> AT_NO_JUMPS is now effectively (AT_BENEATH|AT_XDEV|AT_NO_PROCLINKS). At > >>> Linus' suggestion in the original thread, I've also implemented > >>> AT_NO_SYMLINKS which just denies _all_ symlink resolution (including > >>> "proclink" resolution). > >>> > >>> An additional improvement was made to AT_XDEV. The original AT_NO_JUMPS > >>> path didn't consider "/tmp/.." as a mountpoint crossing -- this patch > >>> blocks this as well (feel free to ask me to remove it if you feel this > >>> is not sane). > >>> > >>> Currently I've only enabled these for openat(2) and the stat(2) family. > >>> I would hope we could enable it for basically every *at(2) syscall -- > >>> but many of them appear to not have a @flags argument and thus we'll > >>> need to add several new syscalls to do this. I'm more than happy to send > >>> those patches, but I'd prefer to know that this preliminary work is > >>> acceptable before doing a bunch of copy-paste to add new sets of *at(2) > >>> syscalls. > >>> > >>> One additional feature I've implemented is AT_THIS_ROOT (I imagine this > >>> is probably going to be more contentious than the refresh of > >>> AT_NO_JUMPS, so I've included it in a separate patch). The patch itself > >>> describes my reasoning, but the shortened version of the premise is that > >>> continer runtimes need to have a way to resolve paths within a > >>> potentially malicious rootfs. Container runtimes currently do this in > >>> userspace[2] which has implicit race conditions that are not resolvable > >>> in userspace (or use fork+exec+chroot and SCM_RIGHTS passing which is > >>> inefficient). AT_THIS_ROOT allows for per-call chroot-like semantics for > >>> path resolution, which would be invaluable for us -- and the > >>> implementation is basically identical to AT_BENEATH (except that we > >>> don't return errors when someone actually hits the root). > >>> > >>> I've added some selftests for this, but it's not clear to me whether > >>> they should live here or in xfstests (as far as I can tell there are no > >>> other VFS tests in selftests, while there are some tests that look like > >>> generic VFS tests in xfstests). If you'd prefer them to be included in > >>> xfstests, let me know. > >>> > >>> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/784221/ > >>> [2]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin > >>> > >>> Aleksa Sarai (3): > >>> namei: implement O_BENEATH-style AT_* flags > >>> namei: implement AT_THIS_ROOT chroot-like path resolution > >>> selftests: vfs: add AT_* path resolution tests > >>> > >>> fs/fcntl.c | 2 +- > >>> fs/namei.c | 158 ++++++++++++------ > >>> fs/open.c | 10 ++ > >>> fs/stat.c | 15 +- > >>> include/linux/fcntl.h | 3 +- > >>> include/linux/namei.h | 8 + > >>> include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 20 +++ > >>> include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 10 ++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/.gitignore | 1 + > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/Makefile | 13 ++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/at_flags.h | 40 +++++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/common.sh | 37 ++++ > >>> .../selftests/vfs/tests/0001_at_beneath.sh | 72 ++++++++ > >>> .../selftests/vfs/tests/0002_at_xdev.sh | 54 ++++++ > >>> .../vfs/tests/0003_at_no_proclinks.sh | 50 ++++++ > >>> .../vfs/tests/0004_at_no_symlinks.sh | 49 ++++++ > >>> .../selftests/vfs/tests/0005_at_this_root.sh | 66 ++++++++ > >>> tools/testing/selftests/vfs/vfs_helper.c | 154 +++++++++++++++++ > >>> 19 files changed, 707 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/.gitignore > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/Makefile > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/at_flags.h > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/common.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0001_at_beneath.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0002_at_xdev.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0003_at_no_proclinks.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0004_at_no_symlinks.sh > >>> create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/tests/0005_at_this_root.sh > >>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/vfs/vfs_helper.c > >>> > >> > > > > > > -- James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2018-09-30 21:46 ` [PATCH 0/3] namei: implement various scoping AT_* flags Jann Horn
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2018-10-01 20:14 ` James Morris
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