From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Adriano Cordova <adrianox@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] security: commoncap: clarify CAP_FS_SET comment in cap_task_fix_setuid()
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 12:02:59 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <arK0w65j4F2M3e+o@hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260921025209.1023530-1-adrianox@gmail.com>
On Sun, Sep 20, 2026 at 11:52:08PM -0300, Adriano Cordova wrote:
> CAP_FS_SET is exactly the set of capabilities that an fsuid of 0
> historically granted (see CAP_FS_MASK in include/linux/capability.h),
> so cap_task_fix_setuid() drops that set from the effective set when
> fsuid leaves 0. Replace the stale FIXME with this explanation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Adriano Cordova <adrianox@gmail.com>
lgtm, thanks.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
If I don't see objections soon, I can merge it into the caps-next
tree.
thanks,
-serge
> ---
> v2: reword the comment to something more concise.
>
> security/commoncap.c | 10 ++++++----
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 3399535808fe..1ba2ea2651fc 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1169,11 +1169,13 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
> break;
>
> case LSM_SETID_FS:
> - /* juggle the capabilities to follow FSUID changes, unless
> - * otherwise suppressed
> + /* Juggle the capabilities to follow FSUID changes, unless
> + * otherwise suppressed.
> *
> - * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
> - * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
> + * CAP_FS_SET is exactly the set of capabilities that an
> + * fsuid of 0 historically granted (see CAP_FS_MASK in
> + * <linux/capability.h>), so we drop that set when fsuid
> + * leaves 0.
> */
> if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
> kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
> --
> 2.51.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-22 17:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-21 2:52 [PATCH v2] security: commoncap: clarify CAP_FS_SET comment in cap_task_fix_setuid() Adriano Cordova
2026-09-21 2:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-22 17:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
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