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From: Alejandro Colomar <alx+linux-hardening@kernel.org>
To: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev,
	syzbot+a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] landlock: Drop __counted_by from landlock_domain.layers
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2026 20:05:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <asp9mzpa4eJWvij0@debian> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261010164450.194439-1-ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>

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Hello Nguyen,

> Date: 2026-10-10 23:44:49+0700
> From: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
>
> With clang 22 and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, the second
> landlock_restrict_self() call hits a bogus fortify report in
> inherit_ruleset():
> 
>   memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 16 byte read of buffer size 0
>   Call Trace:
>    __fortify_panic
>    landlock_merge_ruleset+0xc46/0xc90
>    __se_sys_landlock_restrict_self+0x2bc/0xd40
> 
> layers[] lives in an anonymous struct inside the anonymous union
> that overlays work_free.  For such a flexible array, clang computes the
> address of the __counted_by counter as the start of the array instead of
> &num_layers.  The bound is then read from layers[0], i.e. from
> the first layer's configuration, which is not a count.  The same layout
> crashes clang itself in a standalone test.
> 
> The annotation was added as documentation, so drop it rather than
> restructure the union.  Keep the information in the member comment.
> 
> Reported-by: syzbot+a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d
> Fixes: bd3a19800dd1 ("landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain")
> Signed-off-by: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
> ---
> Reproduced with clang 22.1.8 and FORTIFY_SOURCE on mic/next (64b9e6eff524):
> the second landlock_restrict_self() hits the report, while 16 nested
> restricts run clean with this patch.  Mickaël, if you prefer to just drop
> bd3a19800dd1 from next, that works as well.

Is this reproducible with Clang 23 or later?

Should __counted_by() expand to nothing for bogus versions of Clang?
That would allow using it, and just ignore Clang when it's broken,
rather than not using safety features.


Have a lovely day!
Alex

>  security/landlock/domain.h | 6 +++++-
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/landlock/domain.h b/security/landlock/domain.h
> index 60e8eb2d6ac2..4bf1555a4349 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/domain.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/domain.h
> @@ -246,8 +246,12 @@ struct landlock_domain {
>  			 * properly handle merged rulesets without overlapping
>  			 * access rights.  These layers are set once and never
>  			 * changed for the lifetime of the domain.
> +			 *
> +			 * Not annotated with __counted_by(@num_layers): clang
> +			 * miscomputes the counter address for a FAM nested in an
> +			 * anonymous struct within a union, which trips FORTIFY.
>  			 */
> -			struct layer_config layers[] __counted_by(num_layers);
> +			struct layer_config layers[];
>  		};
>  	};
>  };
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 
> 

-- 
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es>

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  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-10 18:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-09 17:04 [syzbot] [lsm?] WARNING in landlock_merge_ruleset syzbot
2026-10-10 16:44 ` [PATCH] landlock: Drop __counted_by from landlock_domain.layers Nguyen Ngoc Thang
2026-10-10 18:05   ` Alejandro Colomar [this message]
2026-10-10 18:46     ` Nathan Chancellor
2026-10-11  2:57       ` Nguyen Ngoc Thang
2026-10-11 13:11   ` Günther Noack
2026-10-11 14:31     ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-10-11 15:59       ` Nguyen Ngoc Thang
2026-10-11 16:16       ` Mickaël Salaün

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